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Abstract 
Norway’s economy has gone through unprecedented growth in the past decade.  The strong 
growth in GDP, employment, labor productivity, real wage, and labor immigration combines 
with increasing outflows from the labor force, such as early retirement scheme, sickness and 
disability, and old age retirement implies that Norway’s labor market is tight.  We 
hypothesize demographic changes and skilled and unskilled job composition affects tertiary 
education participation through wage premium and job opportunities.  Motivation to pursue 
tertiary education is determined by perceived wage premium, expected foregone earnings, 
expected relative lifetime earnings, and ease of finding jobs.  Among the four elements, 
expected foregone earnings have the most weight when individuals decide whether to pursue 
tertiary education or not. Thus, we propose policies to minimize individuals’ expected 
foregone earnings, such as voluntary-base internship to tertiary students and online tertiary 
education for the mature students in age group 30-35. On the other hand, we propose the 
government to establish agencies in countries that have high skilled labor reserve with lower 
living stand than Norway. These agencies will disseminate information labor market and 
regulatory issues of Norway and to market the attractiveness of Norway as a migration 
destination. Lastly, we propose the government to further entice foreign students to come to 
the country. These students can be a potential skilled labor supply after they graduate.   
   
Keywords:  skilled labor, labor supply, labor demand, skilled wage premium, tertiary 
education, labor immigrant 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
In the recent years, demand for skilled labor
1
 in Norway is expected to increase 
(Bjørnstad,et.al., 2002, Salvanes & Førre, 2003).  In their paper, Salvanes & Førre reveal that 
net job creation rate for the low-skilled labor was negative in the 1980s and 1990s whereas it 
was positive for the medium- and high-skilled workers.  The net job creation rate for the low-
educated labors was -4% annually; the net job creation rates for the medium- and high-skilled 
labors were 1% and 5% annually.  They expect the trend to be continued into the future. 
 
As there is no hard data on skilled labor demand, we infer the demand for skilled 
labor through several indicators such as skilled employment growth, skilled unemployment 
rate, and skilled wages.  Norway has seen a strong productivity and economic growth at 
unprecedented rates.  From 1948 to 2003, Norway’s mainland GDP grew by an average of 
3.3% annually.  Since the past two decades, Norwegian labor demand has shifted from 
unskilled to skilled labors (Lindquist & Skjerpen, 2000). Due to rapid output growth, 
unemployment rate had remained low, between the range of 1.5% and 2.0% from 1997 to 
2008. From Figure 1-1, it shows that the unemployment rate for skilled labors was almost 
half of the national unemployment rate.  On the other hand, real wages for the tertiary 
educated also projected an increasing trend from 1993 to 2003 (Figure 1-2).  The average 
annual real wages of a tertiary educated labor was slightly above NOK 300,000 in 1993.  In 
2007, the number approached NOK500, 000. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 The Comparison of National Unemployment Fraction to Tertiary 
Educated Unemployment Fraction, 1997 to 2007 
                                               
1 Since skill is unobservable, we use education attainment as an indication of skills.  In our paper, we refer 
skilled labor market as a labor market that is made up labors with education attainment of at least ISCED 5. 
Refer to Appendix E.  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
year
Unemployment Fraction-tertiary educated
National Unemployment Fraction
6 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Figure 1-2 Average Annual Real Wages for Tertiary Educated Labor, 1993 
to 2007 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Norway also has a high labor force participation rate
2
, 73%, which is one of the 
highest among the OECD
3
 countries.  As a consequence of strong output growth, high 
participation rate, and low unemployment rate, Norway encounters a tight skilled labor 
market.     
 
Lately, much attention was devoted to skilled labor supply in the media and politics.  
It was said that the skilled labor market was tight and some were concerned about the 
development of skilled labor shortage in the future.  In a tight skilled labor market, Norway 
tries to ease the pressure by boosting tertiary education participation and attracting foreign 
skilled labors.  Skilled labor immigration is a fast-track solution to ease the tight skilled labor 
market situation. This can be seen from the number of specialist permits being issued in the 
recent years.  The number of skilled worker permits
4
 issued had been increasing since 1997. 
In 1997, there were 1528 permits issued to foreign skilled labors; in 2009, 5605 permits were 
issued.  This implies that the need for foreign skilled labor has increased over the years.  
 
In order to encourage skilled labor immigration, as of 2010, foreign skilled labors who 
meet the requirements as skilled labors are granted the rights to start working as soon as the 
applications for permit are submitted. This modification is to let foreign skilled start work as 
                                               
2 Labor force participation rate in Norway is defined by the population in the age group of 15-74 in OECD 
StatsExtracts (http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html)  
3 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries include:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
4 Skilled worker permits are granted to applicants with specialist training corresponding to upper-secondary 
education level, craft certificates or university or university college education. (http://www.udi.no) 
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soon as possible rather than making them wait until they are granted the permit.  Another 
newly launched immigration policy is the skilled job seeker scheme.  Under this scheme, 
foreign skilled job seekers who are either fresh graduates from Norwegian higher education 
institutions or potential skilled labors from oversea are granted this permit.  With this permit, 
foreign skilled job seekers are able to remain in the country for up to two years to take 
Norwegian language course, to search for jobs, or to take courses relevant to their desired 
employment. 
 
The other source of skilled labor comes from local tertiary education institutions.  
These institutions educate the locals in order to become skilled labors.  In our paper, we 
define these skilled labors as ―domestic skilled labors‖. From 1997 to 2007, Norway’s 
tertiary education attainment among population 25 to 64 had been 5% higher than the OECD 
country average.  The education attainment rate increased linearly from 25% to 34% (Figure 
1-3). 
 
 
Figure 1-3 Tertiary Education Attainment of Population 25-64, 1997 to 2007 
Source: OECD Education At a Glance (2009) 
 
The Norwegian government has initiated several reforms in the past few years to 
boost skilled labor supply.  These reforms include: The Competence Reform 2000 and 
Quality Reform of Higher Education 2003 (OECD, 2004).  The Competence Reform 2000 is 
an action plan targeted on those employed and unemployed adults who have little or low 
education.  The reform plans to make it easier for adults who have not completed primary and 
secondary education by providing flexible schedule and location that work around their work 
schedule and live situation. The Quality Reform of Higher Education 2003 is a 
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comprehensive reform aiming to improve the quality and efficiency of the tertiary education 
in Norway.   By implementing this reform, the Norwegian government expects an educated 
population with better quality and international exposure. By shortening the duration of 
tertiary education, it is anticipated that larger proportion of the students will be willing to take 
up graduate studies.    
 
Since the skilled labor market is considered to be tight, skilled labor supply merely 
meets the demand.  If the development of skilled labor supply and demand continue as it is, 
skilled labor shortage will possible emerge in the near future. Trendle (2008) and Brigden 
and Thomas (2003) define labor market tightness as ―the disequilibrium state between supply 
and desired demand of labor at an agreeable price determine by the market.‖  In another 
word, the increase in skilled job demand or the lag in skilled labor supply, or the sluggish 
skilled wage growth are trends that will possibly lead to a tight skilled labor market. Skilled 
labor shortage will eventually appear if skilled labor demand keeps rising while skilled labor 
supply fails to increase marginally to match the demand. Also, according to them, wages of 
skilled labor affects the development of skilled job demand and skilled labor supply.   
 
Our study intends to explore the causal relationship of job opportunities, labor supply, 
and wages in a closed feedback loop.  Feedback loop is described as interactions between 
components in a closed chain of cause and effect.  Since both skilled and unskilled labors 
come from a limited source—the working age population, individuals participate in the labor 
force are either skilled or unskilled.  The development of skilled labor force will affect the 
unskilled labor force and vice versa. Thus, we will use a model to simulate and trace the 
causal effect of wages and job opportunities for skilled and unskilled labor on tertiary 
education participation rate in the country.  Lastly, we will formulate feasible policies based 
on the findings from our analysis through simulations. We would like to find policies to 
prevent future skilled labor shortage from worsening. 
 
We will discuss labor supply and demand theory in general in the literature review 
section.  Then we will identify the knowledge gap we aim to fill. Next, in the hypothesis 
section, we will build a useful model to study the endogenous relationship of job 
opportunities, wages, and skilled labor supply. After which, we will analyze the system to 
identify policy leverage points.  Through our study, we wish to propose policies that will 
increase skilled labor supply in order to keep up with skilled labor demand.  
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1.1 Literature Review 
In traditional economics textbooks, labor shortage is characterized as imbalanced state 
due to the development of labor demand, labor supply, and wages.  In fact, these market 
forces will push institutions to the direction to re-establish a new equilibrium in the long run 
(Brigden & Thomas, 2003).   According to them, labor market can only be considered as tight 
or loose if the economic shocks move the labor market away from the equilibrium of supply 
and demand.   In the standard labor market model, labor supply and demand will achieve its 
equilibrium state at an agreeable wages. Therefore, it is essential to gain an understanding 
how these three factors relate to each other and how they affect skilled labor supply.  
Trendles (2008) expressed labor shortages arise from three different shocks.  In the following, 
we will present these three types of shortages briefly. 
 
In a demand-driven shortage situation, demand for skilled labors increases faster than 
the supply.  Therefore, shortage occurs.   The demand for labor comes from the increase in 
demand for goods and services and technical advancement.   
 
The relationship can be illustrated through the following figure (Figure 1-4).  When 
wages and labor supply are held constant, the increase of labor demand will lead to labor 
shortage.   
 
Figure 1-4 Demand-driven Labor Shortage 
Source: Trendle, 2008 
 
On the other hand, supply driven shortage denotes the labor shortage caused by a 
decrease or sluggish growth of labor supply at a given wage level.  The slow growth or 
decrease in labor supply can be attributed to low incentives to participate in the labor market 
or the reduction in working age population growth.  Incentives include monetary and non-
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monetary returns.  In our paper, we focus on economic returns, namely wages.  This 
relationship is presented in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 1-5 Supply-driven Labor Shortage 
Source: Trendle, 2008 
 
In the supply-driven labor shortage situation, while wages and demand are held 
constant, the reduction in labor supply will cause labor shortage.   
 
The third factor that constitute to labor shortage is wages.  When wages increases, it 
will reduce the labor demand, but it raises the incentives for labors to enter the market. Labor 
surplus takes place in this situation. On the contrary, when wages decreases, firms will be 
willing to take in additional labor input to increase production marginally.  But labors will be 
unwilling to provide service at lower wages, so this will lead to labor shortage as illustrated 
in Figure 1-6.  In this case, the unmatched wage level between firms and labors constitute to 
the mismatch of labor demand and supply.  Therefore, shortage occurs. 
 
 
Figure 1-6 Wage-driven Labor Shortage 
Source: Trendle, 2008 
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Up until this point, the causal relationship between the developments of labor demand, 
labor supply, and wages are assumed to be one-way.  These relationship described by Trendle 
fails to take feedback into consideration.  By that we mean Trendle omits the feedback of 
labor shortage to labor demand and labor supply and the effect of labor shortage on wages 
(Figure 1-7).  
 
 
Figure 1-7 Links omitted in standard economic textbook 
explanation of the causes of labor shortage  
 
 
The previously explained relationship between labor demand, labor supply, and wages 
can be further extended to explain the interaction between skilled
5
 and unskilled labor
6
 
shortages.  
 
In most OECD countries, the skill structure of labor demand has shifted in favor of 
skilled workers in the recent years.  The shift is hypothesized to be caused by skilled-biased 
technological change and increased international competition (Linquist & Skjerpen, 2003).  
This emergence has significant impact on demand for skilled and unskilled labors.  This is 
because skilled labors and technology are complements while unskilled labor and technology 
are substitutes.  In another word, the demand for skilled labor will increase over time but the 
demand for unskilled labor will decrease over time (Lindquist & Skjerpen, 2003, Acemoglu, 
1999).   
 
                                               
5 Since skill is unobservable, we use education attainment as an indication of skills.  In our paper, we refer 
skilled labor market as a labor market that is made up labors with education attainment of at least ISCED 5. 
Refer to Appendix E 
6 Unskilled labors mean those who have not attained education at ISCED 5 level. 
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In his paper, Acemoglu (1999) claims that skilled labor demand comes from skilled 
labor supply—―supply creates its own demand‖.  It is hypothesized that the increasing supply 
of skilled labor urges firms to take advantage of skill premium.  Hence, firms’ investment in 
more advance technology and replace unskilled labors with skilled labors to take advantage 
of technological advancement for profit- maximization purpose.  Therefore, amidst the 
increasing skilled job demand, skilled labor supply falls short.  
 
Next, we shall look at how wages play a role in skilled labor shortage formation.  By 
and large, investment in education is considered as an investment in human capital from the 
economic perspective.  Expected returns to tertiary education are the expected relative 
benefits of getting tertiary education.  Individuals are assumed to weigh the relative benefits 
of investing in tertiary education when they are to decide whether to go to tertiary education 
to be skilled labors or remain unskilled.  In our paper, we focus on economic returns to 
tertiary education.  In skilled labor production, relative wages does not only affect labor force 
participation, it also determines the motivation for individual to invest in education.  This is 
because motivation to tertiary education is a function of costs and future earnings. 
 
  Cost includes direct and indirect costs.  Direct costs represent tuition fees and 
expected foregone earnings; foregone earning is considered as opportunity costs. Opportunity 
costs denote the earnings one gives up when he or she pursues tertiary education. On the 
other hand, indirect costs include living expenses, textbooks, and other educational-related 
expenses. When considering the cost for tertiary education, direct costs such as tuition are 
more important than expected foregone earnings to individuals’ (Tannen, 1978). However, 
when weighing costs and future earnings, Tannen concluded that individuals give costs more 
weight than future financial returns in their consideration.   
 
Opposite to Tannen’s study, OECD reports that returns to education in OECD 
countries are mostly driven by earnings premium
7
 (OECD, 2009).  Earnings premium is the 
ratio between earnings of skilled labors and the unskilled. Individuals’ assessment of the 
earnings premium can be analyzed in two ways:  short-term and long-term.  From short-term 
view, individuals concern the starting wages and the wages in the next few years; from the 
long-term perspective, individuals formulate expectation of their lifetime earnings.   
                                               
7 Earnings premium, wage premium, and wage differential are used interchangeably throughout the paper.   
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In the previously presented literature review, labor shortage caused by labor demand, 
labor supply, and wages are discussed in one-way links, not feedback loops.  Most literature 
fails to assess the demand, supply, and wages with feedbacks to see how these three factors 
develop dynamically over time.  The relationship between these three factors is not static; it 
is dynamic and it will change relatively to the changes within each factor.  More specifically, 
we intend to study the changes in supply and demand of skilled and unskilled labor force to 
understand how relative wages and job opportunity affect tertiary education participation, 
which will eventually feedback to skilled labor supply. The following figure illustrates the 
knowledge gap we are intending to fill.   
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1-8 The Feedback Relationship Our Study Includes to the traditional labor shortage model 
Note: red lines represent the feedback loops our study intends to investigate 
 
 
 
We apply system dynamics methodology to study the endogenous relationship 
between wages, job opportunity, and skilled labor supply and how the endogenous 
relationship constitutes to skilled labor shortage.  The central concept of this method is to 
study the persistent dynamic nature of a complex system from its causal structure internally 
rather than external disturbances or random events (Meadows, 1980).  We will discuss the 
dynamic problem in the following section.  
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2.0 The Dynamic Problem 
From indicators such as skilled employment growth, skilled unemployment rate, and 
skilled wages, the skilled labor market in Norway for the past 17 years is characterized to be 
tight.  As the nation’s economy is transforming to be knowledge and technology intensive, 
the demand for skilled labor will continue to rise.  If skilled labor demand continues to rise 
faster than skilled labor supply, shortage will possibly occur.  Depending on the growth rate 
of skilled labor force, the intensity of skilled labor shortage varies (Figure 2-1). 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Reference Mode: Historical and Future Projection of Skilled Labor Supply, 
Skilled Labor Demand and Desired Demand 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Figure 2-1 demonstrates the historical development and future projection of the 
estimated skilled labor force and skilled labor demand.  As there is no existing hard data on 
the supply of skilled labor force and skilled labor demand, skilled labor force is derived from 
the estimation of historical and future projection of labor force with the tertiary education 
attainment rate in the country over time; both statistics are obtained from Statistics Norway.  
Estimated skilled labor demand is calculated by estimating the gross domestic production 
(GDP), obtained from Statistics Norway, with tertiary education attainment rate to obtain an 
estimated fraction of GDP that requires skilled labor input.  From there, GDP with skilled 
input divides by labor productivity to obtain skilled labor demand.  The trend is extrapolated 
to the future. 
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It is uncertain how the development of skilled labor force will be in the future.  If the 
education attainment rate (34%) and skilled labor force participation rate (88%) remain at the 
current rate, the gap between skilled labor force supply and demand will be widening from 
2013 onwards; if the skilled labor force is projected to be growing at 3% annually (Est. SLF 
High), skilled labor supply will exceed skilled labor demand from 2020 onwards.  In this 
scenario, skilled labor supply outgrows skilled labor demand and skilled labor surplus will 
occur. 
 
As mentioned previously, the two sources of skilled laborer are foreign skilled 
immigrant and local tertiary educated laborers.  Foreign skilled immigration is on the rise.  
However, looking into the tertiary education entry patterns in the country shows different 
entry rates of various age cohorts.  The new entrants to tertiary education of age group 19-24 
were about 17,500 from 1998 to 2001 (Figure 2-2).  From 2001 to 2003, the number of new 
entrants dropped to 10,000.   Then it climbed back up and peaked at 22,500 in 2005. 
However, it started to head downward after 2005.  In 2006 and 2007, the number of new 
entrants in age group 19 – 24 remained at 10,000 students and it seems that the trend took a 
gradual upturn again in 2007.     
 
 
Figure 2-2 Number of New Entrants to Tertiary Education in Age Group 19-24, 1998 
to 2007 
Source: OECD StatExtract 
 
The similar trend was also portrayed in Figure 2-3 for age group 25-29.  It shows that 
the number of students who entered tertiary education in age group 25 – 29 was relatively 
stable, around 3,500 from 1998 to 2002. After that it peaked at 3,700 in 2005.  After which, 
the number of students entered tertiary education reduces to 2500 in 2006.  The number was 
increasing again in 2007.  However, the number of new entrants in age group 30-34 and 35 – 
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39 was increasing linearly from 1998 to 2003.  After that both trends turned downward and 
stabilized at 2,000 students in 2007.   
 
 
Figure 2-3 Number of New Entrants to Tertiary Education in Age Group 25-29, 30-34, 
and 35-39, 1998 to 2007 
Source: OECD StatExtract 
 
As tertiary education participation is vital to assure sufficient supply of domestic 
skilled laborer, this leads to the question of what motivates individuals to become skilled 
laborers? As the demand for skilled laborer is increasing, if the supply of skilled laborer falls 
short, shortage will follows.  This becomes a concern for the policy makers. 
 
Regardless, undersupply or oversupply of skilled laborers is not a desirable outcome 
from the government’s perspective.  Undersupply of skilled laborer will slow down Norway’s 
transformation to a knowledge- and technology intensive economy; whereas oversupply of 
skilled laborer will bring forth skill mismatch or layoffs within industries.  This may lead to 
unemployment and increases welfare expenditure.  Therefore, the ideal condition is to be able 
to have a predictable and steady development of skilled labor supply and demand as pre-
requisite and to close the gap as the secondary goal.  Our study intends to gain an 
understanding in how wages and job opportunity affect skilled labor supply and how the 
system can be improved to achieve a desirable development of skilled labor supply and 
demand. 
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2.1 Research Questions 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wages and job opportunity on 
skilled labor market in an endogenous relationship and the causes of the possible future 
shortage.  Thereafter, we formulate feasible policy to avoid the mismatch of skilled labor 
supply and demand that will lead to future shortage.  
In short, our research questions are as of the following: 
(1) What is the endogenous relationship between wages, job opportunities, and skilled 
labor supply in Norway? 
(2) How does this endogenous relationship affect skilled labor shortage? 
(3) What are the feasible policies to avoid skilled labor shortage? 
 
We hypothesize that perceived wage premium and job opportunity have great impact 
on individuals’ decision to pursue tertiary education.  We simulate the decision-making of 
potential tertiary education students in relation to the development of skilled and unskilled 
labor forces and demand for skilled laborer.  Finally, we identify the resilient dominating 
factors and design policies to alleviate the possible shortage in a long-run. 
  
We will describe our hypothesis in the next section.  Subsequently, we analyze the 
system through modeling and simulation, and then followed by model validation tests and 
result analysis.  Lastly, we formulate feasible policies to avoid future skilled shortage in the 
country. 
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3.0 Dynamic Hypothesis 
In the past twenty years, the demand for skilled labor in Norway has been increasing. 
However, due to slower population growth, it is projected by media and politicians that 
skilled labor supply will lag behind demand. We hypothesize that the sluggish skilled labor 
force growth is mainly caused by lower growth rate in tertiary entry rate in conjunction with 
slower population growth. We believe the motivation for individual to pursue tertiary 
education is responsible for the decreasing growth in domestic skilled labor force. The 
motivation for individual to pursue tertiary education encompasses four factors; these are 
perceived wage premium, expected foregone earnings, ease of finding job, and expected 
lifetime earnings. In this section, we will present our hypothesis in two ways: through causal-
loop diagrams (CLD) and through stock and flow diagrams (SFD). CLD is used to 
demonstrate cause-and-effect relationships while SFD is useful in showing accumulation and 
delay in the system. 
 
 The following section exhibits our model boundary (Figure 3-1). 
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3.1 Model Boundary 
        Exogenous                 Endogenous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Model Boundary 
 Our cross-sector model consists of two major sections: labor supply and labor demand. 
These two sections consist of internal and cross sector feedback loops.  The labor force 
section includes skilled and unskilled labor force, motivation to university, and tertiary 
education; whereas the labor demand section includes job demand, wages, and capital 
investments.  
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3.2 Causal Loop Diagram Explanation 
 
Through CLDs, we present our hypothesis by studying the interdependencies and feedback 
processes that affect the development of skilled labor force in the country. 
 
3.2.1 Skilled Job Density Loop (C2) and Foreign Skilled Labor Loop (C7) 
 
Norway is facing the demographic ageing challenge just like other European countries 
due to declining fertility rate.  According to Statistics Norway, the fertility rate, average 
number of children per woman, has fallen from 2.13 in 1974s to 1.96 in 2008. On the other 
hand, life expectancy has improved over the years.  The life expectancy of men and women 
in 1951 was 71.11 and 74.7 respectively.  However, in 2005, the number of years increases to 
76.94 and 81.91 for men and women respectively.     
 
 Life expectancy and fertility rate are not sufficient to explain a growing population 
stock. A nation’s population growth is determined by three factors, namely: births, deaths, 
and net migration.  Figure 3-2 outlines the trend of net births and net migration. In the recent 
years, net migration is the third force that contributes to the population growth in Norway. 
The number of total deaths is decreasing gradually since 1990.  However the decrease in 
births and the increase in net migration are substantial.  Total births started to decrease 
linearly since 1965 until 1985 and started to pick up again and remain stable.  Net migration 
was insignificant during 1970s and early 1980s, but gradually increased considerably in late 
1980s.  The increment was more and more drastic since 1986 and continued to grow until 
2008. It seems to decrease slightly in 2009. Amidst fewer deaths and staggering births, net 
migration is the dominating factor for the population growth in the last 10 years.  
 
21 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Population Net Flow broken down by Net Births and Net Migration, 1974 – 2009 
 Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Albeit the population is expected to grow, it is estimated that by 2050, almost 25% of 
the total population will be aged 65 and over as opposed to 14% only in 2000 (OECD, 2004a).   
 
 
Figure 3-3 Historical Developments and Future Projection of the 
Population of Three Different Age Groups, 1986 – 2009 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
 Figure 3-3 provides an overview of the historical development and future projections 
of three age groups, namely: the Young (0-14 years old), the Working Age (15-67 years old), 
and the Elderly (over 68 years old).  Up until 2010, the number of Young and the Elderly has 
been quite stable.  Only the Working Age grew somewhat linearly.  However, after 2010, the 
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number of Elderly will grow at a higher rate than the Working Age; meanwhile there will be 
not much increment in the Young. 
  
The changes in demography indicate that the working age population will grow at a 
decreasing rate while the elderly population will grow linearly.  Without immigration, the 
population net growth will become negative eventually.  Therefore, the development of the 
population will have direct impact on the inflows and outflows of the labor force stocks.   
 
 
 
  
Figure 3-4 Skilled Job Density Loop
8
 (C2) and Foreign Skilled Labor Loop (C7) 
 
In our model, Total Skilled Labor Force consists of locally educated skilled laborers 
and foreign skilled immigrants (Figure 3-4).  Tertiary graduates participate in domestic 
skilled labor force once they obtain employment or intend to seek employment. As the rate of 
locally educated and foreign skilled laborers enter the skilled labor force exceeds the rate of 
leaving, the skilled labor force has been increasing from 1994 to 2008.   However, the 
population is growing at a decreasing rate due to lower fertility rate.  Nevertheless, the 
fraction of young working age population who participate in tertiary education is increasing, 
skilled labor supply is still sufficient to meet the demand (C2).   But the gap between skilled 
                                               
8 We label CLD presented in this section with names for communication purpose. Later in the paper, we will 
frequently refer to corresponding loop by name. 
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labor supply and demand is projected to be enlarging as the growth of skilled labor force is 
presumed to be slower than the growth of skilled labor demand. If the supply of local tertiary 
graduate persistently falls shorts the demand, more foreign skilled laborers will have to be 
brought into the country to fill the void (C7).  
  
The increase in skilled labor force will reduce the gap (SL gap) between skilled labor 
demand (indicated skilled labor needed) and supply (Total Skilled LF).  As the gap reduces, 
two consequences will be brought forth: reduction in the need for foreign skilled labor and 
skilled job opportunities.  Fewer skilled jobs represent lower skilled job density (C2).  
Individuals formulate their perception on skilled job density through job postings, media, or 
word-of-mouth. In our model, we use the ratio between skilled labor demand and skilled 
labor supply to represent this perception of individuals at large. If the ratio equals to one, it 
means the skilled labor supply is enough to meet the demand and the skilled labor market is 
in equilibrium; if the ratio is less than one, that means skilled labor supply falls short the 
demand.    This relationship is characterized as a counteracting loop.  Counteracting loop is 
described as a self-correcting process that opposes change and will seek balance and 
eventually lead to balance in the system (Sterman, 2000). Lower skilled job density will 
reduce the incentives for individuals to participate in tertiary education as it symbolizes the 
difficulty of landing jobs after graduation. Individuals are assumed to take the historical 
development of skilled job density into consideration and adjust their perception gradually, 
and then they project the probable development for the next few years when they assess the 
benefits to pursue tertiary education. Hence, lower skilled job density will lead to fewer 
skilled laborers produced locally.   
 
The red circle in Figure 3-4 summarizes the inflows to tertiary education submodel.  
We will discuss the tertiary education submodel in the later section.  Here, we shall explain 
the entry point to our model.  The following flow chart (Figure 3-5) indicates that when age 
group 18 turns 19, the individuals in this age group will either enter tertiary education or 
remain to be non-tertiary students (Potential Students). Once they are in the tertiary education 
system, they will either finish tertiary education or to be dropouts (Incompletes) and enter 
unskilled labor force. In Education at a Glance (OECD, 2009), data shows that in 2007, the 
percentage of age group 15-29 who are neither in education nor labor force was only 0.8%.  
Since the fraction is relatively small, we consider that all the Incompletes who leave tertiary 
education will join the labor force. The potential students will either obtain jobs and be 
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unskilled laborers or remain idle. These potential students will enter tertiary education system 
if the opt to do so in the future. A more detailed view of the SFD will be presented in the 
SFD Explanation section. 
 
Potential 
Students
Age 
Group 18
Tert Edu
Unskilled WAP
Unskilled Labor 
Force
Incompletes
Tertiary 
Graduates
 
Figure 3-5 Flow Chart – Transitional paths of Age Cohort 18 and 
Future Possible transitions 
 
3.2.2 Capital Investment and Skilled Wages Loop (R2) and Capital Investment and Skilled 
Labor Gap Loop (C9) 
 
 As skilled labor shortage increases, skilled job vacancies outnumber skilled job 
seekers; wages for skilled labor increases due to low unemployment rate.  The growing wage 
rate encourages firms to raise capital investment to boost labor productivity. As wages grows 
proportionally to labor productivity, higher labor productivity will result in higher wages for 
skilled laborer (R2, Figure 3-6). So, this causal relationship will lead to higher capital 
investments from firms.  This loop is characterized as a reinforcing loop.  Reinforcing loop is 
a process that amplifies the growth of the system itself to produce exponential growth 
(Meadows, 1980). 
 
In neoclassical economic growth theory, economic growth originates from 
technological progress and labor supply. Solow-Swan neo-classical growth model shows that 
the economic growth rate increased by capital investment is only temporary.  Even though 
there is more capital available for each laborer to use, the marginal product of additional units 
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of capital is assumed to decline and the economy will converge to a steady growth path.  As 
output, capital, and labor are growing at the same rate, output per labor and capital per labor 
are constant.  Hence, it is hypothesized by neoclassical economists that long-term economic 
growth requires increase in labor supply and improvement in labor and capital productivity 
through technology. 
 
 
Figure 3-6 Skilled Labor Productivity and Wages Loop (R2) and 
Skilled Labor Productivity and Skilled Labor Gap Loop (C9) 
 
Nevertheless, higher skilled labor productivity will also lead to the reduction of 
skilled labor demand (C9), a development termed capital-augment technological process.  As 
skilled labor market relaxes, wage growth is dampened. Thus, firms find fewer incentives to 
invest in capital as human input is relatively less expensive at this stage. This counteracting 
loop becomes dominant; it will eventually curb the exponential growth of R2.  Thus, 
sufficient skilled labor supply and persistent capital investment in technology to raise 
productivity are vital to economic growth. 
 
3.2.3 Motivation to University Loops (C1, C3, C13, C14, and C15) 
 
As discussed in section 1.1, Motivation to University is individual’s expected relative 
benefits and opportunity costs to tertiary education.  In our paper, we focus on private 
financial returns to education and leave out the psychological and social returns.  Opportunity 
costs include direct and indirect costs. Tuition and education related spending are direct costs; 
expected foregone earnings are indirect costs. Benefits represent the expected lifetime 
earnings: the accumulated earning stream of an individual.   
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However, tertiary education in Norway is free.  So, if direct cost is not in the picture, 
why the tertiary education participation rate did not increase drastically?  It is indicated that 
expected foregone earnings is the second most important factors (Tannen, 1978).  In the 
recent years, the relative earnings of skilled and unskilled labor have been decreasing.  This 
implies that the accumulated foregone earnings for individuals who pursue tertiary education 
rise higher. 
 
We hypothesize that two more factors need to be included into the motivation to 
university: starting wage and relative ease of finding jobs.  Human’s cognitive map is very 
simplified and always fails to relate to the causal structure of system.  People always tend to 
misperceive the effect of time and unable to refer to the dynamics of causal relationship 
because of ―the many limitations of attention, memory, recall, information processing 
capability, and time constraint‖ (Sterman, 2000). Thus, individuals are more likely to focus 
on the wage premium that they might enjoy in the first few years after tertiary graduation, 
with the limited historical information.  Wage premium development in a longer term may be 
difficult for individual to foresee, so they tend to discount the future rate of return sharply.  
The future discount rate of individual is fairly constant if they calculate the discount with 
subjective perception of time duration.  Zauberman et al. (2008) concluded in their study that 
conceptualizing the future is very abstract and human is insensitive to time horizon if the time 
is perceived as a delay, for example in 10 years,  rather than a point in time,  i.e. year 2020.  
Corresponding to heavy discount of future lifetime earnings, it is likely that individuals 
consider future earnings as delayed benefit. 
 
We believe that job availability affect individuals perception because individuals will 
be discouraged to invest in education if they believe it is difficult to find jobs after graduation. 
The skilled and unskilled labor market tightness, economic growth, and changing job 
composition in the country determines the relatively ease of finding jobs. 
 
Wages for the skilled labor is compared to the unskilled labor when individuals weigh 
the economic benefits to tertiary education.  Wage premium is the ratio of the skilled wages 
to the unskilled wages. Perceived wage premium symbolizes the attractiveness of skilled jobs.  
If wage premium is higher than one, it represents that skilled laborers are paid more than then 
unskilled as the returns to the additional education.  The higher the perceived wage premium, 
the more attractive the skilled jobs are.  Thus, working age population is more motivated to 
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take up tertiary education in order to become skilled laborers (C1, Figure 3-7).  In the recent 
years, the increasing outflows from the unskilled labor force due to disability, early 
retirement, and official retirement have exerted upward pressure on wages for unskilled 
laborers (C3).  Therefore, wage premium demonstrates a downward trend from 1994 to 2008.   
 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Perceived Wage Premium Loop (C1 & C3) 
 
As more people become skilled laborers, the unskilled labor force is depressed. In 
conjunction with increasing outflow from unskilled labor force, this will lead to increasing 
unskilled labor shortage.  Unskilled wages increases due to higher labor productivity and 
labor shortage, therefore expected foregone earnings of tertiary students increase (C15, 
Figure 3-8).    
 
Figure 3-8 Expected Foregone Earnings Loop (C15) 
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Expected lifetime earnings are the accumulated stream of earnings of individuals 
expected. It consists of the expected stream of earnings during the working years minus 
foregone earnings should individuals pursue tertiary education and give up earnings during 
the study period. Figure 3-9 exhibits the two causal loops that affect expected lifetime 
earnings (C13 and C14).  If perceived wage premium heightens, the expected lifetime 
earnings skilled laborers swell; on the contrary, if wages for unskilled laborers rises, the 
inflated foregone earnings will reduce the cumulated stream of earnings of skilled laborers. 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Expected Lifetime Earnings Loop (C13 & C14) 
 
We hypothesize that motivation to university enrollment is a function of skilled job 
density loop (C2, Figure 3-4), Perceived Wage Premium Loop (C1 & C3), Expected 
Foregone Earnings Loop (C15), and Expected Lifetime Earnings Loop (C13 & C14).  
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, individuals put different weighs on the factors that 
constitute motivation to pursue tertiary education. Thus, in our model the weight distribution 
of these elements is: Starting Wage (0.3), Expected Foregone Earnings (0.4), Expected 
Lifetime Earnings (0.1), and Ease of Finding Job (0.2).  The total is 1. 
 
3.2.4 Aggregate Demand with Skilled Input Loop (R1) 
  
Finally, the growth of skilled labor force accounts for the growth in aggregate demand 
that requires skill input.  If skilled labor supply is abundant, firms are encouraged to take 
advantage of the availability of skills.  Therefore, firms have the human resource to venture 
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into sectors that required skilled labor input. The demand for skilled labor increases 
moderately within the past 15 years. This has prompted moderate growth of indicated skilled 
labor needed (R1, Figure 3-10).  As a consequence, skilled labor gap widens and skilled job 
density increases and thus skilled labor market is tighten. The tighten labor market will lead 
to higher wages for skilled labor as firms compete for talents.  This development will 
enhance the attractiveness of skilled jobs.  Hence, more individuals take up tertiary education.     
 
 
Figure 3-10 Aggregate Demand with Skilled Input Loop (R1) 
 
As the result of increased cross-border trading, international competition, and labor 
scarcity, Norwegian economy has been shifting to more skilled based industries in the past 
two decades. In the early 90s, the fraction of aggregate demand that requires skilled input 
increased slowly, so skilled labor supply was able to catch up the demand.  The growing 
skilled labor force also fueled the growth of aggregate demand that required skilled input.  
Even though the perceived wage premium has been decreasing from 1994 to 2008, the 
increasing skilled job density compensates for the lower wage premium and continues to 
attract individuals to tertiary education.  As a result, skilled labor supply has been increasing 
from 1994 to 2008, so has the skilled labor demand. 
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In a nutshell, Figure 3-11 demonstrates the overview of our dynamic hypothesis.  The 
combination of the counteracting loops and reinforcing loop produces the behavior in the 
reference mode (Figure 1-8). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-11 CLD-The Overview of Dynamic Hypothesis (C13 & C14 are omitted from the 
diagram for clarity purpose)  
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3.3 Stock and Flow Diagram Explanation 
 
In this section, we present our hypothesis in a more detailed level by using stock and flow 
diagrams (SFD) to show accumulation and delays in the system. 
 
3.3.1 WAP Entry Point 
 
  
 
Figure 3-12 SFD – Partial View of Entry Points for Age Group 18 
 
As the starting point to our model, individuals will enter the aging chain and move 
along either horizontally or vertically (Figure 3-12).  Individuals in age group 18 who are 
turning 19 will either be the inflow to tertiary education or potential students if they are not in 
tertiary education. Once the fraction of individual is in tertiary education, they will move on 
to the next level of their studies year by year until they graduate. Certain fraction of these 
tertiary students will drop out and enter the potential students stocks, depending on their age. 
The individuals in potential student stocks will also age year by year. This SFD is a detailed 
illustration of the red circle in Figure 3-4. 
 
The statistics of age cohort 18 from 1994 to 2008 is taken from the historical data 
from Statistics Norway.  From 2008 to 2050, the age cohort is taken from the projection done 
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by Statistics Norway.  The projection takes net migration, life expectancy, and fertility into 
consideration. Net migration is projected to be 8,000 people per year until 2050; life 
expectancy is projected to increase between 3 and 4 years until 2050; fertility rate is projected 
to be 1.89 until 2050. 
 
The following table exhibits the transition to tertiary education rate of the age cohort 
of 19 and 20. 
 Age 19 Age 20 
2002 12 25 
2003 14 28 
2004 13 29 
2005 14 29 
2006 15 30 
2007 15 29 
Table 3-13 Percentage of Age Cohort entered Tertiary Education 
Source: OECD Education at a Glance (2009) 
 
Our model includes the tertiary education entry rate from 19 to 29. This is because the 
entry rate of these cohorts is more pronounced than individuals older than 30
9
. The fraction 
of age cohorts enter tertiary education varies.  In general, most people continue to tertiary 
education after having completed videregående skole (high school), which is after 18 years 
old.  Some individuals may also choose to participate in the unskilled labor force in their 
early twenties and go back to tertiary education few years later.  However, the likelihood of 
individuals’ tertiary education participation decreases drastically after 30 years old.  Hence, 
the tertiary education sector in our model only consists of age cohorts from 19 to 29. 
 
The detailed view of unskilled labor force submodel shows the corresponding flows 
of age group 18.  The unskilled labor force stock is an array
10
.  It consists of 49 individual 
age groups from 19 to 67. Circle A in Figure 3-14 indicates the fraction of potential students 
entering domestic unskilled labor force. This co-flow consists of individuals who decide not 
to pursue tertiary education at age 19 as well as the dropouts from tertiary education (AG_18 
and Incompletes entering_USLF). In Education at a Glance (OECD, 2009), data shows that 
in 2007, the percentage of age group 15-29 who are neither in education nor labor force was 
                                               
9 According to OECD Education at a Glance 2003-2007, the tertiary enrollment rate of age cohorts 30-39 and 
over 40 were between 6-7% and 2% respectively from 2001-2007. Refer to Appendix D. 
10 In Powersim, array can be structured in such a way as aging chain.  The transition flow (TT_D_USLF) 
contains a pulse function that moves each age cohort to the next age group by the end of every year. 
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only 0.8%.  Since the fraction is relatively small, we consider that all the Incompletes leave 
tertiary education to join the labor force. The remaining fraction of age group 18 which is 
neither in tertiary education nor unskilled labor force enters the domestic idle unskilled 
working age population (Circle C). Data shows that in the transition from 18 to 19 years old, 
the fraction of this age group which remains idle was between 7 – 8% on average from 1994 
to 2009. 
 
 
  
 Figure 3-14 SFD – Detailed view of the Domestic Unskilled LF and Domestic Idled USWAP 
Submodel 
 
In the course of their work life from 20 to 29, the fraction who decides to pursue 
tertiary education leaves the domestic unskilled labor force stock (Circle B). Even though 
individuals leave the unskilled labor force to participate in tertiary education, Jobs for Youth-
Norway (OECD, 2008b) highlights that in 2006 50% to 60% of the students did work part 
time while they were studying. Therefore, the students who leave the unskilled labor force 
not only enter universities, but also enter the Students as PT USL stocks (Figure 3-15) as a 
co-flow if they hold part-time jobs.  The fraction of tertiary students who leaves tertiary 
education before graduation enters the unskilled labor force. If students stay in the tertiary 
education for three years and graduate, they will leave Students as PT USL stock and enter 
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skilled labor force or idle working age population as co-flows to domestic skilled labor force 
and idle skilled working age population.  The following SFD is the detailed view of the 
stocks and flows for students with part-time jobs. 
 
 
 Figure 3-15 SFD – Detailed view of the Students as PT USL Submodel 
 
 The total unskilled labor force is made up of total domestic unskilled labor force, 
foreign unskilled labor force, and total students as part-time unskilled labor stocks. Figure 3-
16 shows that unskilled labor immigration has been increasing annually from 1999 to 2009. 
The inflow of unskilled labor immigrants is almost four times greater in 2009 than in 1999. 
The labor force participation rate of Norway, which is 76%, is one of the highest among the 
OECD countries. The already high labor force participation rate and low unemployment 
rate
11
, leaves very few not-employed unskilled labor reserve.  In addition, the increasing 
outflow due to disability and sickness, early retirement (AFP)
12
, and old age retirement
13
 
intensify labor shortage. Therefore, more foreign unskilled laborers are needed to fill job 
vacancies. 
 
                                               
11 From 2000 to 2007, the annual national unemployment rate was about 3.06 on average. Refer to Figure 1-1. 
12 Early retirement – Due to high wage increase, an early retirement scheme (AFP), an agreement-based early 
retirement pension due to the wage settlement in 1988, was introduced in 1989.  The age limit from 1988 to 
1997 was 66, but it was reduced to 62 in 1998.   
13 Refer to the official retirement at the age of 67. 
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Figure 3-16 SFD – Number of permits granted to unskilled and skilled labor 
immigrants, 1999 -2009 
  
According to Statistics Norway, GDP in Norway has grown 3% annually on average 
from 1948 to 2003. However, the unskilled labor leaving rate (leaving_unskilled rate, Figure 
3-14) and early retirement rate (AFP_unskilled, Figure 3-14) deserve more detailed 
elaboration here. This is because ―in Norway, the inflow into disability benefits is particularly 
high and with no sign of a turnaround in the trend, and sickness absence is twice the OECD 
average‖ (OECD, 2006a).  In 2004, public spending on sickness and disability was 4.1% of 
GDP. But most of the spending is on benefits rather than encouraging the benefit-recipients 
to re-enter the work force.  Therefore, the outflow from the disability-recipient stock is 
almost zero.  The unemployed working age population in Norway is mainly due to health 
reasons (OECD, 2006a).  This is serious because labor inactivity depresses the labor force 
stock.   
 
In 2001, close to 19% of the working age population between 62 and 66 accepted the 
AFP scheme (early retirement scheme) as the exit path from the labor force.  Figure 3-17 
shows the percentage of the population aged 62 to 66 who accepted the AFP-scheme from 
1990 to 2002.  It clearly shows that the number of people who selected to leave the labor 
force before they reach the official retirement age were increasing ever since AFP-scheme 
was introduced. 
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Figure 3-17 Percentage of the population aged 62-66 who received the 
Contractual Early Retirement scheme, 1990 – 2002 
Source: Extracted from Ageing and Employment Policies: Norway (OECD, 
2004a) 
 
 
 
Figure 3-18 Disability Benefit Percipient as a Fraction of the Working Age Population 
 , 1989 – 2004 
Source: Recreated from “Sickness, Disability, and Work: Breaking the 
Barrier” (OECD, 2006a) 
 
More than 11% of the working age population in Norway receives disability benefits 
since 2002 (OECD, 2006a, Figure 3-18).  The annual inflow to the disability stock is 1% of 
the working age population.  Disabled persons have lower employment rate and only about 3% 
to 4% are employed and mostly on part-time basis.  Therefore, the overall outflow of 
unskilled disabled from the domestic idle unskilled working age population stock (Domestic 
Idle_USWAP) is merely 0.5%.   
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The generous welfare options provided to exit the labor force has negative impact on 
the labor force stock.  The study conducted by Brinch, Hernoes and Strøm concluded that if 
AFP-scheme was abolished at the end of 1999, the labor force participation would have lifted 
1.8% in 2005 among the population aged 16 to 74 (OECD, 2004a). 
 
 
3.3.2 Skilled Labor Force 
 
It is predicted by Statistics Norway that in the coming years, aggregate demand in 
Norway will grow by 3.3% to 3.9% from 2011 to 2013.  This is due to the expected strong 
growth in household consumption (over 3%), moderate growth in export (average 1.1% 
annually until 2013), and resumed investment in capital after the economy downturn in 2008 
(average 4.6% until 2013). So, between 2011 and 2050, aggregate demand is expected to 
grow at a constant growth fraction of 3.7%.  Therefore, the demand for skilled laborers is also 
expected to increase from 2011 onwards. 
 
Total skilled labor force is made up of domestic skilled labor force (Domestic 
LF_Skilled) and foreign skilled labor force (Foreign Labors_Skilled), as shown in Figure 3-
19
14
.  The first inflow to domestic skilled labor force is the fraction of tertiary graduates who 
enter the market to seek for job every year. The second inflow is the people who re-enter the 
labor force from Domestic Idle SWAP.  Domestic Idle SWAP is the stock of skilled working 
age population who are inactive; they are neither employed nor looking for employment.  The 
fraction of tertiary graduates who are not in the skilled labor force will enter Domestic Idle 
SWAP. The three outflows from domestic skilled labor force are deaths, leaving rate, and old 
age retirement.  Leaving rate includes those who are leaving due to sickness, disability and 
early retirement scheme (AFP).  The outflows from idle skilled working age population are 
deaths and old age retirement. Those who reach 67 years old leave the domestic skilled labor 
force and domestic idle skilled working age population stocks.   
 
                                               
14 This is a simplified SFD to show the stocks and flows of skilled labor force. For a detailed view, refer to  
Appendix C. 
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Figure 3-19 SFD – Simplified view of Domestic Skilled Labor Force, Domestic Idle 
SWAP, Foreign Skilled Labor Force and Total Skilled LF 
 
Note that domestic skilled labor force and idle SWAP are stocks with arrays, meaning 
that these two stocks contain individual age group from 19 to 67.  With transition flows, 
individual age group will age year by year throughout the entire simulation.    Since our study 
focus on how the local population dynamics affect the total skilled labor force, so total 
Skilled LF is the sum of all individual age groups in domestic skilled labor force and foreign 
skilled labor force. 
 
Foreign skilled labor force has one inflow, which is F_Labors_hiring rate_SL.  This is 
the number of foreign skilled laborers being hired into the country.  Figure 3-16 shows that 
the number of permits granted to foreign skilled labor has been increasing every year from 
1999 to 2009.  The number of permits approved in 2009 slightly more than 5,000 as 
compared to less than 1,500 in 1999.  We assume that the foreign skilled laborers have 
obtained employment offers prior to their arrival because employment offer is the pre-
condition for obtaining work permit in the country.  The outflows from this stock are firing 
rate and leaving rate.  When skilled labor force gap (SL gap) becomes negative when skilled 
labor supply is greater than demand, foreign laborers will possibly be retrenched.  A fraction 
of the foreign skilled labor is assumed to be leaving the stock every year due to various 
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reasons. Most Nordic or European foreign labors usually stay in Norway on a temporary 
basis (OECD, 2004), only 60% of them stay more than 10 years. 
 
 The following submodel demonstrates the hiring and firing process of skilled labor 
force. In this sector, domestic skilled labor force is broken down into two stocks: employed 
domestic skilled labor force and unemployed domestic skilled labor force. This sector also 
shows the how skilled job demand affects the hiring of foreign skilled labor. 
 
 
Figure 3-20 SFD – Simplified view of Employed Domestic Skilled Labor Force, Unemployed 
Domestic Skilled Labor Force, Foreign Skilled Labor Force for hiring and firing process 
illustration 
 
 Tert grad seeking job is a co-flow of tert grad entering SLF rate (Figure 3-19). When 
tertiary students graduate, the fraction of graduates who intends to obtain employment will 
enter the unemployed skilled labor force stock.  Idle skilled laborers who decide to participate 
in labor force will also enter into unemployed skilled labor force stock.  It is assumed that it 
will take 6 months for them to land a job.  The hiring rate is determined by either SL gap or 
the unemployed skilled labor stock.  If SL gap is larger than the unemployed skilled labor 
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stock, the maximum number of skilled labor to be hired only equals to the number of 
unemployed skilled labor waiting for jobs. On the flip side, if SL gap is smaller than the 
number skilled labor waiting to be hired, the maximum number of unemployed skilled labor 
to be hired only equals to the gap. 
 
 In the event of skilled labor supply exceeds demand, surplus of skilled labor occurs.  
Then, employed skilled labor will be laid off and become unemployed.  This firing process 
will also take place in foreign skilled labor force stock. 
 
 If the stock of unemployed skilled labor is insufficient to meet skilled labor gap, firms 
will seek skilled laborers outside of the country (need for F_Labor_SL). It takes much longer 
time for firms to get foreign laborers because of delay in recognizing the need for foreign 
skilled labor, to advertise, to establish communication with potential employees, to negotiate, 
to deal with legal process, and so on. We assume it takes 2.5 years for the entire process. But 
starting from 2006, the immigration department simplified applications for skilled permits. 
Therefore, we reduce the foreign labor adjustment time to 2.0 years from 2006 onwards. 
 
The tightness of the skilled labor market, density of skilled job, has an impact on the 
foreign labor hiring adjustment time.  If the skilled labor market relaxes, the hiring time will 
be longer.  This is because employers will be less aggressive in searching for foreign skilled 
labor if they believe there are locals who are available for the job vacancies. The nonlinear 
graphical function below (Figure 3-21) demonstrates the effect of SLF coverage on foreign 
skilled labor hiring adjustment time.   In the recent years, as skilled labor shortage is 
intensifying, the immigration department simplified application procedures and grants rights 
to skilled laborers to start working as soon as they have submitted their applications. 
According to UDI
15
, it takes at least 3 months to process skilled worker permits. In the event 
that density of skilled job falls below 1.0, we assume the hiring adjustment time will return to 
normal processing procedures. Thus the adjustment time will return to 2.5 years.  
 
 
                                               
15 Denotes Directorate of  Immigration. The period taken to process a case is calculated from the day the job 
applicant submit your application to the police or at a Norwegian embassy or consulate until the day the UDI 
takes a decision on the case. 
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Figure 3-21 Nonlinear Graphical Function of the Effect of Skilled Labor Force Coverage 
on Foreign Skilled Labor Hiring Adjustment Time 
 
In comparison to educating skilled laborers locally, which will take at least three years, 
hiring skilled laborers from abroad will reduce shortage faster.  In our paper, we leave out the 
perceived attractiveness of working in Norway in the eyes of potential foreign skilled 
laborers and assume that Norway is as competitive as other countries in attracting foreign 
skilled laborers. 
 
The hiring process in the unskilled labor force submodel is similar to the skilled labor 
force.  The major differences are the hiring adjustment time. The domestic hiring adjustment 
time is 6 months and 1 year for foreign unskilled labor hiring.  
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3.3.3 University Enrollments 
 
 
Figure 3-22 SFD-University Enrollments for Age Group 19 to 21 
 
In the university enrollments submodel, the University stock symbolizes the tertiary 
education (Figure 3-22).  The outflows consist of graduation rate and incompletion rate. The 
classification of the Norwegian tertiary education system was complicated.  Some available 
data defines tertiary education in Norway by duration of education, for example tertiary 
education from 2 to less than 4 years is considered as lower university education while more 
than 4 years is considered as higher education. Thus, in our model we consider the duration 
of tertiary education as 3 years uniformly. However, after the implementation of Quality 
Reform of Higher Education 2003, Norwegian tertiary education has been restructured 
according to the Bologna’s standard; most undergraduate program durations were 
standardized to 3 years. 
 
   
3.3.4 Wages 
 
From the neo-classical economic perspective, wages is expected to reflect labor 
productivity growth
16
.  The increase in labor productivity leads to higher output.  In Cobb-
                                               
16 See Sharpe, Arsenault, & Harrison (2008) for the relationship of labor productivity, real wage growth, and 
labor share. 
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Douglas production function equation (Equation 1), output is a function of technology, 
capital, and labor input. 
 
                       (1) 
y = real output 
A - technology 
K – capital 
L – labor 
1-α – share of output going to labor (labor share) 
α  - share of output going to capital 
 
 A, technological change is assumed to be exogenous.  It can be influenced by the 
decreasing barrier to international competition and rapid technological revolution.  Increasing 
capital (K) and labor (L) in equal proportion will increase an equivalent proportion in 
production.  So, output will increase. 
 
In Equation (1), all the factors are characterized to have complimentary relationship. 
In order to achieve higher output, one of the factors on the right side of the equation has to 
increase if others are constant. But, if one of these factors declines, the other factors have to 
be increased marginally to keep the real output constant.  
 
In this section, the relationship between capital and labor input is particularly 
important to illustrate wage development in Norway.  Labor share (1-α) represents the total 
national wages as a proportion of real GDP.  Equation (2) presents this relationship.  The 
relationship between wages and labor share can be further illustrated through Equation (3). 
The increase of labor share comes from the higher increase in real wage than increase in labor 
productivity; the decrease of labor share comes from the higher increase in labor productivity 
than real wage.   
 
Labor share = total real national wages / real GDP         (2) 
 
Labor share = real wage / labor productivity                   (3) 
 
 Guscina’s (2006) study of the movement in labor share and confirmed that after 1985, 
the beginning of globalization and rapid-technological progress era in OECD countries, the 
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capital-rich or industrialized countries tend to specialize in production of capital-intensive 
goods where less human input was needed.  This development led to the decreasing of labor 
share in national income.  The regression result in her study presented that after 1985, the 
technological progress is capital-augmenting.  This means that the technological progress 
tends to boost capital’s return and share rather than returns to labor compensation.  In a word, 
the increase of labor productivity will increase real wage for labor, but it will reduce the 
demand for labor.  Therefore, fewer laborers are needed.  This will lead to a decrease in Total 
Real National Wages (Equation 2).  This is a significant contrast to the era prior to 1985 
where labor productivity tended to compliment labor input and boost labor share through 
higher real wage growth.  In the post-globalization era, one percentage point increase in labor 
productivity of the total economy, leads to a decline in labor share by 0.13 – 0.19 percentage 
point (Guscina, 2006). 
 
Figure 3-23 below shows the development of labor share
17
 in Norway over time.   
 
 
Figure 3-23 Labor Share Trend in Norway, 1994 – 2009 
Source: Statistics Norway  
 
 
                                               
17 In Norway, labor compensation in the national account is defined by salary and wages plus employer’s social 
contribution.  Social contributions incurred by employers, paid to central government and to autonomous 
social security and pension funds as well as non-autonomous pension funds. They include the following sub-
items: employers' contributions to National Insurance, employers' other actual social contributions 
(contributions to the Public Service Pension Fund, Municipal Pension Funds, other social security schemes, 
and other social contributions), and in addition, employers' imputed social contributions. The latter item 
coincides with social benefits actually paid through unfunded arrangements - from employers to present or 
former employees, for instance AFP-pensions.  See Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no) 
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Figure 3-24 Development of Capital Investment Growth and Labor Productivity 
Growth Fraction, 1994 – 2009 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Labor share in Norway has been decreasing gradually since 1994 while the share of 
capital returns to total national income has been increasing.  It is shown that the growth 
fraction of capital investment was relatively high in 1990s and mid-2000.  Labor productivity 
growth replicated the growth of capital investment with delays (Figure 3-24).   
 
Capital investment is the primary factor that determines labor productivity in 
developed country like Norway where labor is scarce.  As labor productivity is boost up, 
GDP expands and wages increases.  Norway real wage grew at around 3% per year from 
1988 to 2007; labor productivity growth was 2.5% annually from 1988 to 2007 (Norges Bank, 
2009).   
  
 Figure 3-25 presents the development of real annual wages for the tertiary educated 
and non-tertiary educated from 1993 to 2008.  In 1993, the tertiary educated annual wages 
was slightly above NOK300,000 whereas the annual wage for non-tertiary educated was 
about NOK120,000.  After 15 years, the real annual wages for tertiary educated and non-
tertiary educated reached NOK500,000 and NOK350,000 respectively.  From the graph, it 
seems that these two trends are emerging.   
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Figure 3-25 Development of Individual Real Wage for Tertiary Educated and 
Non-tertiary Educated Laborers, 1993 – 2008 
Source:  Statistics Norway  
 
  Figure 3-26 describes the factors that influence wages for the skilled and unskilled.  
The ratio of wages for skilled and unskilled laborers is termed as wage premium, which is the 
relative earnings of the skilled laborers to the unskilled.  Perceived Wage Premium is the 
ratio of wages of skilled and unskilled laborers.   The Perceived Wage of Skilled and the 
Unskilled are a delayed perception of the wages.  It takes time for individuals to gather 
information and update their perception.  Then, they form a mental perception of how the 
wages for skilled relates to the unskilled.  If the ratio is more than one, it means the Perceived 
Wage of Skilled is higher than the unskilled, or vice versa.  By and large, wage growth is the 
consequence of the growth in labor productivity and labor share.  In our model, labor share is 
treated as an exogenous input. However, efficiency wage model explains that higher wages 
are offered by firms as the economy is approaching to full employment (Brigden & Thomas, 
2003).  The efficiency wage model is based on the assumption that higher wages attracts 
more qualified laborers and increase workforce quality and eventually leads to higher 
productivity.  Therefore, in our model, unemployment rate has impact on individuals’ wages. 
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Figure 3-26 SFD- Factors Influencing Wages and Perceived Wage Premium 
 
Referring to the trends of skilled and unskilled wages in Figure 3-25, the growth of 
real wage for tertiary and non-tertiary educated labor is mainly the effect of rising labor 
productivity and tight labor market from 1994 to 2008. 
 
When take a closer look, the relative earnings by education attainment have been 
decreasing since 1997.  Figure 3-27 compares the relative earnings of tertiary educated to the 
upper secondary educated in Norway, the United States, and German from 1997 to 2007.  
The relative earnings of tertiary educated in the United States had been much higher than 
Norway and Germany until 2006.  The relative earnings in the United States did not grow 
much from 1997 to 2007.  But the trend in Germany was increasing rapidly. It increased 
about 30% in 10 years.  However, the relative earnings by education attainment in Norway 
present a decreasing trend, implies an almost 20% drop in 10 years. 
   
 
Figure 3-27 Trends in Relative Earnings by Education Attainment in 
Norway, US, and Germany 
Source: OECD Education at a Glance (2009) 
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4.0 Analysis 
 
Model testing is part of our validation to uncover flaws in the model.  As Barlas (1994) 
expressed it as a ―confidence-building process‖. He further explained that ―validity‖ in 
system dynamics represents the validity of the internal structure of the model, not only the 
output behavior.  Through structural assessment, once the model is confirmed to have ―the 
right behavior for the right reasons‖, then both the modeler and stakeholders will build up 
confidence toward the model.  In this sense, ―Models are not true or false, but lie on a 
continuum of usefulness‖ (Barlas & Carpenter, 1990). System dynamic models are causal 
model (Qudrat-Ullah & Seong, 2009). The purpose of system dynamic modeling is to 
identify the structure and decision rules that generate the behavior of a system. Therefore, the 
structural validity testing is the first crucial step in validation process before proceeding to 
behavior validity testing.   
 
We follow Yaman Barlas validation process in this section.  The validation testing is 
carried out in two levels: structural validation and behavior validation.  The following table 
summarizes our validation tests. 
 
Test 
No 
Test Name Purpose 
Result 
Location 
(A) Structural Validation Testing 
A1 
Parameter 
Verification Test 
Evaluate constant parameters against knowledge 
of the real system conceptually and numerically. 
Appendix A 
A2 
Structure 
Verification Test 
Compare the structure of model against the 
structure of the real system. 
Appendix A 
A3 
Local Extreme 
Condition Test 
Evaluate model equations under extreme 
condition and assess the plausibility of the local 
results against the real system. 
Appendix A 
A4 
Dimensional 
Consistency Test 
Analyze model equations to eliminate 
parameters that have no meaning in real life. 
Appendix C 
A5 
Extreme 
Condition Test 
This is different that the local extreme condition 
test.  This test is to assign extreme values to 
selected parameters and compare the global 
simulated behavior to the real system. To 
determine if the simulated behavior replicated 
the real system if extreme condition also takes 
Appendix A 
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place in real system. 
A6 
Parameter 
Sensitivity Test 
Determine the sensitivity of selected parameter 
to the model, especially the parameters with 
uncertain values. 
Section 4.5 
Appendix A 
(B) Behavior Pattern Testing 
B1 
Integration Error 
Test 
Evaluate if the integration method or timestep is 
correctly chosen for the model. 
Appendix A 
B2 
Behavior 
Reproduction 
Test 
Uncover flaws in the structure or parameters of 
the model and assess whether the flaws conflict 
with the purpose of the model. 
Section 4.7 
 
B3 
Behavior 
Sensitivity Test 
Determine the sensitivity of the change of 
assumption to the model behavior. 
Section 4.8 
 
Figure 4-1 Overview of Validation Tests 
 
The model is initialized in the equilibrium state before any testing is performed.  
Results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
4.1 Parameter Verification Test (A1) & Structure Verification Test (A2) 
 
 The exogenous parameters in our model are divided into two categories: statistical 
data and estimated value.  The parameters with estimated value are highly uncertain.  Thus 
we will test the sensitivity of these parameters in section 4.5 for parameter sensitivity.  For 
the statistical parameters, we compare the simulated behavior with relevant historical 
behavior. Results are presented in Appendix A. 
  
We conclude that the behavior of the model is not sensitive to parameter value 
changes and the tested behaviors replicated real system behaviors. 
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4.2 Local Extreme Condition Test (A3) 
  
In this test, we assess the behavior of the following stocks in the model under extreme 
condition.  This is a local test because we examine the direct corresponding loops to the 
stocks.  Results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
The following loops are tested to examine the behaviors for the corresponding stocks: 
 
Loop Number & Name Corresponding Stock Behavior 
Reinforcing Loop 
R1 (Aggregate Demand and Skilled Input Loop) Reference Skilled Labor Fraction 
Counteracting Loop 
C1,C2,C3,C13 – C15 (Motivation to University 
Loops) 
Domestic Skilled Labor Force 
Total Skilled Labor Force 
C7 (Foreign Skilled Labor Loop) Foreign Skilled Labor Force 
C8 (Foreign Unskilled Labor Loop) Foreign Unskilled Labor Force 
Figure 4-2 Overview of Local Extreme Condition Tests 
 
We conclude that the tested local behavior presented the expected trend under 
different extreme condition tests. 
 
 
4.3 Dimensional Consistency Test (A4) 
 Formulas and units are assessed and presented in Appendix C. 
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4.4 Extreme Condition Test (A5) 
  
In this test, we intend to examine the effect of extreme condition on skilled labor 
supply at the global level. So, we set extreme values to some parameters to determine if our 
model is robust enough to take on extreme values.  The following parameters are tested.  
Simulated results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
(1) Reduce the inflow to tertiary education and unskilled labor force by reducing age 
group 18 to zero from year 2020 
(2)  Average aggregate demand growth fraction becomes -3.3% from 2020 to 2030 
(3)  Domestic Skilled Labor hiring rate becomes 100 years 
(4)  Foreign Skilled Labor hiring rate becomes 100 years 
(5)  Domestic Unskilled Labor hiring rate becomes 10 years 
(6)  Foreign Unskilled Labor hiring rate becomes 100 years 
 
We conclude that the tested global behavior presented the expected trend under 
different extreme condition tests. 
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4.5 Parameter Sensitivity Test (A6) 
 
The table below presents exogenous parameters with uncertain value.  We test the 
sensitivity of these values to the model by assigning values two times greater or smaller to 
these parameters.  After that, we use correlation coefficient
18
 and mean absolute percent error 
19
(MAPE) to determine the correlation of the relevant behavior in the base run to the tested 
behavior.  Tested results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 Parameter Estimated Value 
Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24 
GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.36,0.37,0.32,
0.28}) 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2
_19 to 24 
GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.28,0.26,0.22,
0.16}) 
Incompletion_fract_Univ1
_25 to 29 
GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.35,0.35,0.3,0.
28}) 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2
_25 to 29 
GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.28,0.26,0.21,
0.16 }) 
hiring_SL _AT 0.6 year 
hiring_USL _AT 0.5 year 
frct of _F_SL leaving 0.01 per year 
frct of _F_USL leaving 0.05 per year 
distr_starting wage 3 
distr_foregone earnings 4 
distr_foregone earnings 1 
distr_ease of finding job 2 
Figure 4-3 List of Tested Parameters 
  
  
                                               
18 Correlation(r) = NΣXY - (ΣX)(ΣY) / Sqrt([NΣX2 - (ΣX)2][NΣY2 - (ΣY)2]) 
19 MAPE= 1/𝑛 |(X− Y)
𝑛
𝑘=1
|/Y ∗ 100 
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From the parameter sensitivity tests, we discovered that only the MAPE with the 
following parameters are higher than 10%. The rest of the tests do not alter the behavior 
modes of Domestic Skilled LF and Total Skilled LF. 
 
Parameter 
Domestic 
Skilled LF 
Total 
Skilled LF 
 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24 = 0.14 
8.16% 1.97% 
Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24 = 0.72 
20.52% 4.77% 
Table 4-4(a) Parameter Sensitivity Test on Incompletion frct_Univ1_19 to 24 
 
 In the base run, the values for the parameters are between 0.28 and 0.36. As shown in 
Table 4-3(a), when the incompletion fraction of tertiary students from 19 to 24 years old is 
lowered to 0.14, meaning only 14% of the students leave tertiary education before they 
completion, the domestic skilled labor force presents a 8.16% deviation from the absolute 
mean of the base run.  On the contrary, when the fraction is raised two times higher than in 
the base run, which is to 0.72, the domestic skilled labor force is sensitive to this change. But 
the Total Skilled Labor Force is not as sensitive. The deviations from the absolute mean in 
the base run are 20.52% and 4.77%.  This test reveals that if Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 to 
24 falls in the range of 0.14 to 0.72, the fitness of the data to the base run for Domestic 
Skilled LF will be in the range of 8.16% to 20.52% and Total Skilled LF will be in the range 
of 1.97% to 4.77%.    The alteration of Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 to 24 in the test does 
not change the behavior mode of Domestic Skilled LF and Total Skilled LF. 
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Parameter 
Domestic 
Skilled LF 
Total 
Skilled LF 
 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 
to 24 = 0.08 
6.47% 1.41% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 
to 24 = 0.56 
16.77% 3.59% 
Table 4-4(b) Parameter Sensitivity Test on Incompletion frct_Univ2_19 to 24 
  
We test the sensitivity of Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 2 with the value of 0.08 
and 0.56.  As shown in Table 4-3(b), with 0.08, the MAPE for Domestic Skilled LF and Total 
Skilled LF are below 10%, whereas when the fraction is increased to 0.56, meaning 56% of 
the students leave without completion, the absolute mean deviation of the tested behaviors 
from the base run lead to 16.77% and 3.59%.  This represents that with the values between 
0.08 and 0.56, the absolute mean error will be 6.47% to 16.77% and 1.41% to 3.59% for 
Domestic Skilled LF and Total Skilled LF respectively.  In the base run, the values are 
between 0.16 and 0.28.The alteration of Incompletion fract_Univ2_19 to 24 in the test does 
not change the behavior mode of Domestic Skilled LF and Total Skilled LF. 
 
Parameter 
Domestic 
Skilled LF 
Total 
Skilled LF 
 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 
to 29 = 0.14 
3.4% 10.9% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 
to 29 = 0.7 
8.5% 10.9% 
Table 4-4(c) Parameter Sensitivity Test on Incompletion frct_Univ1_25 to 29 
  
 In this test, we use fraction 0.14 and 0.7.  The results show that the MAPE of the 
tested behavior to Total Skilled LF is slightly higher than 10%.  So, if the fractions of tertiary 
students in age group 25 to 29 leave the education before completion falls in the range of 
0.14 to 0.7, the confidence level is about 90%.  In the base run, the values are between 0.28 
and 0.34. The parameter is insensitive to the model and the parametric alteration does not 
change the behavior mode of Domestic Skilled LF and Total Skilled LF. 
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Parameter 
Domestic 
Skilled LF 
Total 
Skilled LF 
 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 
to 29 = 0.08 
2.7% 11.1% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 
to 29 = 0.56 
6.3% 12.1% 
Table 4-4(d) Parameter Sensitivity Test on Incompletion frct_Univ2_25 to 29 
  
Lastly, the Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29 is tested with the values of 0.08 and 
0.56.  The MAPE to Domestic Skilled LF is considered as insignificant, only 2.7% and 6.3%; 
the MAPE to Total Skilled LF are 11.1% and 12.1%.  This means that if the value for this 
parameter falls in the range of 0.08 to 0.56, the confidence level is about 90%.  In the base 
run, the values are between 0.16 and 0.28.  The parameter is insensitive to the model 
behavior, especially Domestic Skilled LF, but more sensitive to Total Skilled LF.  The 
parametric alteration does not change the behavior modes of Domestic Skilled LF and Total 
Skilled LF. 
 
 In conclusion, the model passes the parameter sensitivity test.  Most of the tested 
parameters are insensitive to the model behavior; the changes of these parameters do not 
change the behavior mode of the model. 
 
 
4.6 Integration Error Test (B1) 
  
The timestep for the base run is set to 0.03125 with Euler first order fixed step 
integration method.  We reduced the timestep to 0.00390625 to examine integration error.  
The results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
We conclude that the model is stable and generates the same behavior given different 
timesteps. 
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4.7 Behavior Reproduction Test (B2) 
 
The model starts at year 1994 until 2009 to determine the fitness of the simulated 
behavior to the reference mode.  There are two reference modes: skilled labor supply and 
skilled labor demand.  The model is able to reproduce a behavior similar to the reference 
mode—linear increment (Figure 4-4).  Through statistical significance testing, mean absolute 
percent error (MAPE) is used to determine the fitness of the simulated behavior to the 
reference mode, we obtain the MAPE for Total Skilled LF is 4.21% and 3.53% for Indicated 
Total Skilled Labors Needed (Figure 4-5).  As the percentage error is less than 5%, the 
confidence level of the simulated behavior to the reference mode is more than 95%.  The 
model has passed the behavior reproduction test.  
 
Reference Mode (1): Skilled Labor Supply 
 
Figure 4-5 Behavior Reproduction Test-Simulated Behavior of Total Skilled LF and Estimate of Skilled 
Labor Force (Reference Mode) 
 
As shown in Figure 4-5, the simulated behavior of Total Skilled LF matches the 
increasing trend of the estimated historical trend, Ref Mode-SLF_1994 to 2009.  However, 
the simulated behavior of Total Skilled LF is somewhat lower than the reference behavior.  
To formulate the reference mode, we take the historical data of the working age population 
with tertiary education attainment.  After that, we determined the labor force participation 
rate from for the skilled workers from 1994 to 2009 from OECD reports.  With these three 
inputs, we produced the reference mode from 1994 to 2009.  The reference mode does not 
differentiate the tertiary education attainment and labor force participation rate in different 
age groups; whereas in our model, dynamic changes are captured in different age groups by 
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breaking down inflows and outflows for different age groups.  Therefore, the error margin 
can be reduced.   
 
Reference Mode (2): Skilled Labor Demand 
 
Figure 4-6 Behavior Reproduction Test-Simulated Behavior of Indicated Total Skilled 
Laborers Needed and Estimate of Desired Skilled Labor Demand (Reference Mode) 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 4-6, the simulated behavior of skilled labor demand (Indicated 
Total Skilled Laborers Needed) replicates the linear increasing trend presented in the 
reference mode (ref mode-Skilled Labor Demand).  However, the simulated skilled labor 
demand is higher than the reference skilled labor demand throughout the simulation.  In the 
reference mode, the reference behavior does not incorporate any feedback from 
macroeconomic development such as the effect of skilled labor force growth on the 
development of AD that requires skilled labor input; whereas in the simulated behavior, the 
model contains this causal relationship.  The more rapid the growth in the skilled labor force 
leads to more rapid growth in the fraction of AD that requires skilled labor input.  In a highly 
aggregate level, skilled labor supply and skilled labor demand form a reinforcing relationship; 
supply boosts demand and the higher demand will lead to higher supply eventually. 
Nevertheless, this reinforcing relationship is not captured by the extrapolated trends of skilled 
labor supply and demand in the reference mode. 
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As we have been able to reproduce the historical behavior, we will present our base 
run (Figure 4-3).   
 
 
4.7.1 Base Run 
 
Figure 4-7 Base Run – Total Skilled Labor Force (Supply) and Indicated Skilled Labor 
Needed (demand) 
 
In the base run, Total Skilled LF and Indicated Total Skilled Laborers Needed 
increase linearly from 1994 to 2050 (Figure 4-7).  Total Skilled LF is made up by Domestic 
Skilled LF and Foreign Skilled LF.  Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed serves as the 
demand for skilled laborers.  The relationship between Domestic Skilled LF, Total Skilled LF, 
and Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed is illustrated in skilled job density loop (C2, Figure 
3-4) and foreign skilled labor loop (C7, Figure 3-4).  Indicated Skilled Laborers Needed and 
Total Skilled LF determine SL Gap.  This gap is filled by employing more skilled laborers 
from the Unemployed Domestic Skilled Labor stock. If the total labor force in the country is 
insufficient to fill the gap, then the need for foreign skilled laborers is created. In our model, 
we exclude the attractiveness of the country to the potential foreign laborers; we assume that 
Norway is as competitive as other countries when it comes to attracting skilled and unskilled 
laborers to work in the country.   
 
However, not only that Total Skilled LF fails to fulfill the gap, the gap will be 
widening in the future. This is due to the increasing outflows from Domestic Skilled LF such 
as aging, early withdrawal from the labor force, and old age retirement, while the inflow of 
tertiary graduates and foreign skilled laborers to the labor force is insufficient to cover the 
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outflows and the growth of skilled job demand.  In 1994, wage premium was 2.4 and 
gradually decreased until 1.5 in 2012. Skilled job density was decreasing from 1.04 to 1.01 
between 1994 and 1996. After that, it increases until 1.03 in 2008.  This means more skilled 
jobs were available. So, the perceived wage premium loop (C1 & C3, Figure 3-7) and the 
skilled job density loop (C2, Figure 3-4) were the dominating loops from 1994 to 2010.  But 
the dominance is shifting to the expected lifetime earnings loop (C13 & C14, Figure 3-9) and 
foregone earnings loop after 2010. From 1994 to 2005, expected forgone earnings increased 
15%. In the same period, expected lifetime earnings dropped 15% (C13 & C14) as perceived 
wage premium dropped. As a result, from 1994 to 2010, Motivation to University dropped 
sharply until from 1.3 to 1.05 in 2010.     
 
To summarize, from 1994 to 2010, the dominance of C1 & C3, and C2 propelled the 
attractiveness of skilled job.  Enrollment in tertiary education increased from 140,000 
students in 1994 until 155,000 in 2005.  It dropped slightly in mid 2000, but increased 
drastically to 160,000 in 2010. From 2010 to 2020, it is projected that enrollment in tertiary 
education among age group 19 to 29 will grow strong and linearly until 225,000 students by 
2050.  After these students graduated, they flood into skilled labor force and took up 
employment.  As the supply of skilled labor increase, it increases the fraction of AD that 
requires skilled input too.  Therefore, Indicated Skilled Laborers Needed continues to rise. 
  
After 2010, Motivation to University starts to pick up and continues to rise until 1.13 
in 2020 and almost remains stable until 2050. This is due to the weakening of the perceived 
wage premium loop.  Even though skilled job density and expected lifetime earnings 
continue to rise and expected foregone earnings remains low, it is insufficient to compensate 
the weakening of the perceived wage premium loop.  As a result, skilled labor shortage is 
reduced significantly from 2015 to 2020.  After that, the gap between skilled labor supply and 
demand starts to widen until 2050. 
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4.8 Behavior Sensitivity Test (B3) 
 
 In the behavior sensitivity test, we will cut out some feedback loops to determine the 
influence of particular feedback loops on the model behavior.  From this test, we determine 
which loops are responsible for the behavior in base run.  
 
(1) Cutting Motivation to University Loops 
 
As we mentioned in Section 1.1, individuals rank the importance of starting wage, 
expected foregone earnings, expected lifetime earnings, and the ease of finding job when they 
make a decision to pursue tertiary education.  These factors make up the Motivation to 
University.  The weight distribution of these elements in the base case is: Perceived Wage 
Premium (0.3), Expected Foregone Earnings (0.4), Expected Lifetime Earnings (0.1), and 
Ease of Finding Job (0.2).  The total is 1.  Below is the comparison of the results on 
Motivation to University after eliminating the feedback loop one by one. 
 
 
(a) No Perceived Wage Premium effect 
 
 
(b) No Expected Foregone Earnings effect 
 
 
(c) No Expected Lifetime Earnings effect 
 
 
(d) No Ease of Finding Job effect 
 
Figure 4-8 (a-d) Sensitivity of Motivation to University by cutting 
feedback loops one at a time 
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  (a) No Perceived Wage Premium Effect 
  
In this test, we cut C1 and C3 (Figure 4-8a).  After cutting this loop, wage premium 
does not affect individuals’ decision to pursue tertiary education. They only consider 
expected foregone earnings, expected lifetime earnings, and ease of finding job.  Motivation 
to University reduced from 1.3 to 1.0 in 1994 and remains below 1.0 throughout the 
simulation. As fewer students entered tertiary education, Total Skilled LF decreases.  
Therefore skilled job density is escalated (C2); more jobs are awaiting skilled laborers to fill.  
More foreign skilled labors are being hired into the country to fill the job as shortage 
increased (Figure 4-9-1 and 4-9-2).  This reduces skilled job density.  Hence, Motivation to 
University remains stable until 2050.  
 
 
Figure 4-9-1 Domestic Skilled Labor force: No Perceived Wage 
Premium Effect on Motivation to University 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9-2 Foreign Skilled Labor force: No Perceived Wage 
Premium Effect on Motivation to University 
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 It is shown from Figure 4-9-3 below shows that the elimination of this loop does not 
stop the gap between Indicated total skilled laborers needed and total skilled labor force from 
widening. 
 
 
Figure 4-9-3 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: No 
Perceived Wage Premium Effect on Motivation to University 
 
 
(b) No Expected Foregone Earnings Effect 
 
In this test, we cut C15.  This loop is considered the most important factor among the 
four factors that contribute to Motivation to University.  After this loop is cut, only perceived 
wage premium, expected lifetime earnings, and ease of finding jobs will affect individuals’ 
decision to tertiary education.  The result shows that Motivation to University is almost 10% 
to 15% higher than the base run (Figure 4-8(b)).  Student enrollments rose from 140,000 to 
165,000, followed by a reduction from 2000 to 2004.  After that, it increases to about 225,000 
in 2050.Thus, Figure 4-10-1 shows that the number of domestic skilled labor is higher than in 
the base run.  Since the number is not considerably large, the impact on the total skilled labor 
force is not significant too (Figure 4-10-2). 
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Figure 4-5-1 Domestic Skilled Labor force: No Foregone 
Earnings Effect on Motivation to University 
 
 
Figure 4-5-2 Total Skilled Labor force: No Foregone Earnings 
Effect on Motivation to University 
 
 
It is shown from Figure 4-5-3 that the elimination of this loop does not stop the gap 
between Indicated total skilled laborers needed and total skilled labor force from widening. 
Though, the gap is drawn closer between 2015 and 2025. 
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Figure 4-10-3 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: No 
Expected Foregone Earnings Effect on Motivation to University 
 
 
(c) No Expected Lifetime Earnings Effect  
  
The C13 and C14 loop are cut.  In this test, individuals only consider wage premium, 
expected foregone earnings, and ease of finding jobs.  When perceived wage premium is high, 
the expected earnings over a lifetime are high (C14).  However, the falling wage premium 
reduces individuals’ expected lifetime earnings.  Therefore, once this loop is cut, Motivation 
to University increases slightly from 2000 to 2012 compared to base run (Figure 4-8(c)).  
There are no significant effects on the Domestic Skilled LF and Total Skilled LF stocks 
(Figure 4-11-1 and 4-11-2).   
 
 
Figure 4-11-1 Domestic Skilled Labor force: No Expected 
Lifetime Earnings Effect on Motivation to University 
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Figure 4-11-2 Total Skilled Labor force: No Expected Lifetime 
Earnings Effect on Motivation to University 
 
It is shown from Figure 4-11-3 that the elimination of this loop does not stop the gap 
between Indicated total skilled laborers needed and total skilled labor force from widening. 
 
 
Figure 4-11-3 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: No 
Expected Lifetime Earnings Effect on Motivation to University 
 
(d) No effect of Ease of Finding Job 
 
In this test, we eliminated C2.  By cutting this loop, the job availability does not 
matter to the potential students’ decisions to tertiary education; potential students only 
consider economic returns.  From 1994 to 2002, Motivation to University was mainly 
determined by perceived wage premium. As perceived wage premium starts to fall from 2.40 
to 1.5 from 1994 to 2010, so did Motivation to University (Figure 4-8(d)).  After 2020, the 
ease of finding job takes over the dominance. The weakening of feedback loops of perceived 
wage premium and expected lifetime earnings in conjunction with the strengthening of 
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expected foregone earnings gradually provides less incentive for individuals to go to tertiary 
education from 1994 to 2010.  As the domestic skilled labor force decreases, skilled job 
opportunity increases due to fewer tertiary graduates. In the base run, the Effect of Ease of 
Finding Job takes over the dominance and boost up Motivation to University from 2025.  But 
in this test, without the effect from ease of finding job, Motivation to University remains 
stable from 2025 to 2050. There are no significant effects on the Domestic Skilled LF and 
Total Skilled LF stocks (Figure 4-12-1 & 4-12-2).   
 
 
Figure 4-12-1 Domestic Skilled Labor force: No Ease of Finding 
Job Effect on Motivation to University 
 
 
Figure 4-12-2 Total Skilled Labor force: No Ease of Finding Job 
Effect on Motivation to University 
 
It is shown from Figure 4-12-3 below that the elimination of this loop does not stop 
the gap between Indicated total skilled laborers needed and total skilled labor force from 
widening. 
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Figure 4-12-3 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: No 
Ease of Finding Job Effect on Motivation to University 
 
From the tests above, it reveals that economic returns to tertiary education influence 
the motivation for individual to participate in tertiary education from 1994 to 2010 is strong.  
Later on, the effect of job availability gains strength and is able to offset the negative impact 
of lower perceived wage premium imposes on the motivation.  Nevertheless, the 
development of Total Skilled LF seems very resistant from the loop cutting sensitivity tests 
above.  By changing the weight of factors that affects individuals’ decision making is not 
enough to increase the supply of skilled labor force.  As the system is dynamic and behavior 
changes over time, it is necessary to trace further to see how foreign laborers affect wages, 
job opportunity, and job composition.  These three factors affect skilled labor supply in 
Norway. 
 
 
(2)  Cut inflow to foreign skilled labor force (C7)  
 
In this test, we cut the inflows of foreign skilled laborers. This test is to determine the 
effect of foreign laborers on the development of skilled laborers demand and supply.  After 
the loop is eliminated, Motivation to University increases by 0.05 in 2050 (Figure 4-13-1). 
The increment is insignificant. Therefore, the number of tertiary students in age group 19 to 
29 does not increase significantly, so does the Domestic Skilled LF stock (Figure 4-13-2 & 
4-13-3). 
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Figure 4-13-1 Motivation to University: No Foreign Skilled Labor Inflow 
 
 
Figure 4-13-2 Total University Students_19 to 29: No Foreign Skilled Labor 
Inflow 
 
 
Figure 4-13-3 Domestic Skilled Labor force: No Foreign Skilled Labor 
Inflow 
 
 
Due to the lack of foreign skilled labor inflow, Total Skilled LF is about 300,000 
lower than in the base run (Figure 4-13-4). This constitutes to the visible enlarging gap from 
as early as 2005.  
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Figure 4-13-4 Total Skilled Labor force: No Foreign Skilled Labor 
Inflow 
 
 
Figure 4-13-5 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: No 
Foreign Skilled Labor Inflow 
 
Skilled labor force does not rely on foreign laborers as heavily as unskilled labor force 
before 2010.  Therefore the halt of foreign skilled labor inflow can be more or less 
compensated by domestic skilled labor force.  Job opportunity will be increasing due to lower 
skilled labor supply. Job availability leads to rising Motivation to University after 2020. 
Fewer tertiary graduates combined with larger outflows from skilled labor force constitute to 
the slowdown of the total skilled labor force accumulation.  Hence, the gap of skilled labor 
supply and demand is much wider than in the base run (Figure 4-7). 
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(3)  Cut inflow to foreign unskilled labor force (C8) 
 
When the inflow of foreign unskilled labor is zero, unskilled labor shortage worsens. 
Therefore, firms invest in capital to substitute human input. This will lead to the reduction of 
unskilled labor demand. Amidst high unemployment rate, wages for the unskilled dips further. 
Therefore, wage premium increases and so does Motivation to University (Figure 4-14-1).  
 
 
Figure 4-14-1 Motivation to University: No Foreign Unskilled Labor 
Inflow 
 
Nevertheless, the slight increment in Motivation to University fails to boost local 
skilled labor production significantly (Figure 4-14-2 & 4-14-3). 
 
 
Figure 4-14-2 Total University Students_19 to 29: No Foreign Unskilled Labor 
Inflow 
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Figure 4-14-3 Domestic Skilled Labor Force: No Foreign Unskilled Labor Inflow 
 
Due to the labor shortage in general, GDP grows sluggishly.  Therefore aggregate 
demand growth slows down too.  This leads to lower demand for labor. So, the skilled labor 
gap is narrowed between 2020 and 2030 (Figure 4-14-4) and the need for foreign skilled 
labor is also reduced (Figure 4-14-5). 
 
 
Figure 4-14-4 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: No 
Foreign Unskilled Labor Inflow 
 
 
Figure 4-14-5 Total Skilled Labor Force: No Foreign Unskilled Labor Inflow 
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(4)  Constant Reference Skilled Labor Fraction (cut R1) 
 
By eliminating the feedback loop that increase the fraction of skilled aggregate 
demand (R1), AD_skilled only grows parallel to the total aggregate demand.  The proportion 
of skilled and unskilled AD remains the same throughout the entire simulation, that is 26% of 
skilled AD to 74% unskilled AD.  In this scenario, capital investment in production and the 
demand for skilled labor form a substitution effect.  Higher labor productivity replaces skilled 
labor input. As skilled labor shortage is reduced, skilled wages grows very slowly.  As the 
need for unskilled labor is high, higher capital investment to boost unskilled labor 
productivity leads to higher wage growth for the unskilled labor.  Therefore, wage premium 
suffers.  In addition to the decreasing skilled job density (about 0.55, almost two skilled labor 
for one skilled job), Motivation to University is almost 15% lower than in the base run from 
2010 onwards (Figure 4-15-1).  Hence, Domestic Skilled Labor Force is lower than in the 
base run (Figure 4-15-2). 
 
 
Figure 4-15-1 Motivation to University: Constant Reference Skilled Labor 
Fraction 
 
 
Figure 4-15-2 Domestic Skilled Labor Force: Constant Reference Skilled Labor 
Fraction 
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Figure 4-15-3 Total Skilled Labor Force: Constant Reference Skilled 
Labor Fraction 
 
Due to low skilled labor demand, no foreign skilled labor is introduced to the country. 
Combined with slower domestic skilled labor production, total skilled labor force in the 
country is about 500,000 lower than in the base run (Figure 4-15-3). 
 
This test shows that if the fraction of AD that requires skilled input does not increase, 
the demand for skilled labor will grow slower and this constitutes to slower growth in skilled 
labor force stock.  However, with the tertiary education attainment rate, the stock of skilled 
labor supply will supersede the demand throughout the simulation (Figure 4-15-4). It grows 
at a decreasing rate and presents a goal seeking behavior.  This is because that the surplus of 
skilled labor will reduce skilled job density and skilled wages.  Therefore, Motivation to 
University deteriorates over time. 
 
 
Figure 4-15-4 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: 
Constant Reference Skilled Labor Fraction 
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In a summary, from the previous behavior sensitivity tests, it shows that without 
inflow of foreign skilled labor, skilled labor shortage will reach 500,000 people by 2050; 
however, without the inflow of foreign unskilled labor, skilled labor shortage will almost 
diminish between 2020 and 2030. By 2050, skilled labor shortage will be about 100,000 
people.   
 
Higher wage premium and lower foregone earnings are particularly important from 
1994 to 2010 in attracting individuals to pursue tertiary education.  After 2030, as wage 
premium remains at 1.6 until 2050, ease of finding job become the predominant loop that 
serve as the main attraction to tertiary education. 
 
If the fraction of skilled labor in the country remains constant throughout the 
simulation, skilled labor supply will surpass the demand. Under such condition, the skilled 
labor will face an oversupply situation and unemployment rate for the skilled will hike. 
 
After performing loop cutting tests to determine the sensitivity of each single loop to 
the model behavior, we will formulate feasible policy to boost skilled labor supply in the 
following section.  
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5.0 Policy 
  
In the past decade, industrial restructuring, globalization, and technological 
advancement have gradually changed the skill requirements and job composition in Norway.    
It is predicted by Statistics Norway that in the coming years, aggregate demand in Norway
20
 
will grow by 3.3% - 3.9% from 2011 to 2013.  Investment in capital and technology and the 
transformation to a knowledge- and technology-intensive economy will indeed call for a 
stronger demand for skilled labor in the near future. 
 
Another strong demand for skilled labor arises from the new national initiative in 
research and development (R&D).  The national science and innovation strategy aims to 
increase the R&D spending in the country from 1.6% of the GDP in 2005 to 3.0% in 2014.  
In terms of R&D spending, Norway still lags behind other OECD countries (Figure 5-1).  In 
2007, 42,000 of researchers, technicians, and other employees with at least five years of 
higher education were involved in R&D activities in Norway. This number accounts for 6% 
of the total skilled labor force.  If the country is to achieve the R&D spending target, it is 
probable that another 42,000 skilled laborers are needed by 2014.   
 
 
Figure 5-1 Trends in R&D Spending as the Percentage of GDP in 
OECD Countries, 1991 - 2004 
2- data are adjusted up to 1995 
Source:  OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook (2006) 
                                               
20 Consumption in households and non-profit organizations + general government consumption + gross fixed 
capital formation in mainland Norway. 
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Nevertheless, the gap between the demand and supply for skilled laborers seems to 
enlarge regardless of the effort from the government to boost skilled labor supply.  We 
hypothesized that economics returns to tertiary education and job density influence 
individuals’ decision to become skilled laborers. Thus, it affects the development of the 
skilled and unskilled labor force stocks over time. These two stocks are competing for the 
working age population, which is growing at a decreasing rate.  So, we study the prevailing 
factors behind the competition that persuade individuals in their decision-making process.  
 
With the labor force and motivation to tertiary education endogenously built in our 
model, we study how the feedback loops work.  From the analysis in previous section, we 
understand that labor shortage development is dynamic because supply and demand itself 
keeps evolving over time. The choice of policy depends on the aggressiveness of policy 
makers to solve the situation—to mitigate the shortage immediately or to promote the 
production of domestic skilled labor in long run. If the government has an aggressive goal to 
close the gap between skilled labor supply and demand in the shortest time frame, more 
foreign skilled labor and foreign students can be brought into the country to reduce shortage; 
this will further deteriorate the incentive to pursue tertiary education.  On the contrary, the 
moderate inflows of foreign skilled labor and students will exert upward pressure on wages 
and slow down the transformation of economy, but it will protect the domestic skilled labor 
production by boosting motivation to tertiary education.  In favor of the latter, we propose the 
following policies: 
 
(1) Incorporate internship program into current tertiary education curriculum; 
(2) Increase tertiary education participation among population age 30 to 35 
through online education; 
(3) Increase foreign skilled labor and foreign student stocks 
 
 
  
77 
 
Policy 1 – Incorporate internship program into current tertiary education 
curriculum 
 
Through the analysis in section 4.8, it shows that the in absence of expected foregone 
earnings, Motivation to University will increase 15% by 2050 (Figure 4-3b).  Thus, this is a 
leverage point for policy formulation.  In order to boost motivation for tertiary education 
participation domestically, fostering facilities that promote internship as part of students’ 
curriculum will provide financial returns to students during their study period.  From a 
broader perspective, internship does not only benefit students financially, it also helps 
students gain real working experience and increase the possibility of landing a job faster and 
easier after graduation.  The purpose of this policy is threefold:  (1) to reduce students’ 
expected foregone earnings; (2) to reduce skilled working hiring adjustment time; and (3) as 
an marketing effort to lure foreign students to study in Norway.  In the following, we will 
discuss the benefits of internship, followed by a detailed explanation of how this policy can 
raise domestic skilled labor supply, and then the cost effectiveness analysis (CEA).  
 
Internship is an opportunity for students to integrate real working experience as part 
of the tertiary education.  The program is carried out with planned and supervised work 
related to students’ studies.  The compensation from internship participation is one of the 
benefits to students, but the most important advantages obtained from internship participation 
stem from clearer career directions and expectations, job preparedness, marketability, 
interpersonal and leadership skills, and social or professional networking opportunities.  A 
survey shows that 94% of respondents in the United States indicated the experiential 
advantage from internship compliment their first permanent job search and attainment (Coco 
2000).  90% of colleges in the United States offer students some type of for-credit internship 
or work-related learning experience (Divine, et al., 2007).  In contrast to the United States, 
internship arrangement in Norwegian tertiary education system is almost obtained through 
individual efforts from job fair or individual internship search from private organization 
websites, school announcements, or governmental-related organizations.  Besides, there are 
other private or not-for-profit organizations that serve as a portal for paid-internship 
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programs
21
.  Only a few programs indicated possibilities of integrating internship into the 
study plan.   
 
From the employers’ perspectives, internship is a cost-effective way to get to know 
the pool of talents for future hiring effort.  It is an opportunity for employers to market and 
advertise themselves to the future potential employees.  Through internship, employers and 
interns can assess each others’ needs and wants to avoid future expectation mismatch.  
Interns are usually eager to learn and perform well, so they will likely introduce fresh 
perspectives that challenge entrenched processes and attitudes. 
 
For educational institutions, internship program will achieve program differentiation 
and departmental branding purposes.  Programs that integrate real work experience 
distinguish themselves as more inclusive and practical; therefore the departments can brand 
themselves as institutions that reinforce theoretical learning through real life experience.  
More particularly, educational institutions can foster close ties with business community to 
explore skilled labor demand to avoid mismatch of supply and demand.  
 
The inclusion of internship program in tertiary education curriculum will compensate 
part of the expected foregone earnings of students and increase expected lifetime earnings 
(Figure 5-2).  Besides, internship will enhance students’ marketability and thus leads to 
shorter job search time and adjustment time in the work force.  With these benefits, the 
Motivation to University will be increased.  This policy targets on tertiary students between 
age 19 and 29 because this group of student is more likely lack of professional work 
experience.  We do not encourage the compulsory inclusion of internship into tertiary 
education because this will cost substantial amount of time and governmental spending to 
ensure every students get placement; rather, it is going to be voluntary-based. We propose to 
broaden the responsibilities of current career planning units within educational institutions by 
hiring more staff.  The tasks of the new staff include student counseling, placement, 
workforce preparation seminars, marketing internship programs to potential employers, 
setting up internship placement, and follow-ups.   
 
                                               
21 These organizations required participation fees from students in order to place them.  Some of the internship 
program is paid, and some is non-paid. Examples of this type of organization are: AIESEC , Internship.NO, 
IAESTE, etc. 
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Figure 5-2 SFD-Policy 1: Internship Reduces Expected Foregone Earnings of Tertiary Students 
 
Figure 5-2 shows the new structure added to the model (the red elements). Total 
internship spending per person is determined by the average length of study, the perceived 
real unskilled wages, and the fraction of internship coverage. The average length of study is 3 
years. Fraction of internship coverage is a policy goal which determines the fraction of the 
foregone earnings of students that the government intends to cover. This is the amount that 
the government will be spending on each student. Internship period as average study period 
denotes the length of internship during tertiary education.  It is assumed that students 
participate in internship program in summer every year for three months. Thus, in total, 
students will accumulate 9 months of internship experience. 
 
Internship spending per student per year is initialized at NOK 85,158 per person per 
year. The fraction of internship coverage is the percentage of tertiary students’ expected 
foregone earnings that government intended to cover, both directly or indirectly; it will be 0.3 
in 2014.  Direct foregone earnings covered denotes the wages students receive during the 
internship period; indirect foregone earnings covered represents the spending on 
administrative costs in maintain the career placement units as well as incentives to private 
firms to employ interns.  From 2015 to 2050 the fraction will increase 1% annually.  Thus, it 
will reach 65% by 2050 and this is the proposed maximum fractional coverage.  The purpose 
of the annual increment is to increase the attractiveness of internship participation.  Without 
ave study period
expected foregone
earnings
ave working years
in life_SL
expected LT
Earnings_SL
ave working years
in life_unskilled
expected LT
Earnings_nonTE
relative expected LT
earnings
perceived skilled
wages
perceived unskilled
wages
total internship
spending per
person
frct_internship_cove
rage
internship period as
ave study period
effectiveness of
Internship Policy
80 
 
the annual increment, Motivation to University will only increase insignificantly after the 
implementation of Policy 1.  After 10 years since the implementation, the effect of internship 
will wear off due to the increment of perceived wage premium.  As perceived wage premium 
starts to pick up from 2015, unskilled wages increases slower.  This represents that the 
financial returns from internship participation loses its appeals.  Therefore, with an annual 
increment of internship coverage fraction ensures the attractiveness of this policy to students.  
The total internship spending per person encompasses costs for facility maintenance, staff 
compensation, marketing effort, and incentives to business to recruit interns. 
 
We also add Policy 1 to our model by developing two stocks, namely Internship 
Budget and Internship Capacity (Figure 5-3).   
 
 
Figure 5-3 SFD-Policy 1: Internship Budget and Internship Capacity Stocks Added to the Model 
 
Resources are pre-requisite to the implementation of a new policy. First and foremost 
is the funding.  Funding is needed to recruit staff, to communicate, to deploy, to monitor, and 
to follow up. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) assert that money is critical in any program 
initiations and the success in reaching policy objectives relies on the threshold level of 
funding. The probability of achieving the policy objectives is proportional to the level of 
funding above the threshold.   
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So, we propose the establishment of Internship Budget from 2012 with the 
consideration of a delay for the budget to be approved.  We assumed that by 2013, budget is 
approved and be allocated for this policy.  The inflow of initial internship budget allocation is 
a one-off investment at the initial stage.  It is calculated based on the estimated desired 
number of tertiary students who will be participating in the internship program in 2015.  It is 
the same for Internship Capacity. The internship capacity building adjustment time is set to 
be 2 years.  The initial internship capacity built will be ready by 2015.  Internship capacity is 
an abstract representation of human resources needed, framework formulation, and placement 
arrangement through setting up connection with firms.  Firstly, planning needs to be initiated 
at the Ministry of Education and Research.  After that, approval of budget needs to be 
obtained from the parliament.  Thirdly, funding will be allocated to educational institutions 
for expanding the services offered by current internal career planning units.  Lastly, in order 
to encourage firms to participate in the internship programs, incentives can be provided to 
participating firms through tax incentive and partial wage subsidy by the Ministry of 
Education and Research. 
 
The enrollment of students into the internship programs can be initiated in 2015 as we 
assumed it takes three years for the budget and capacity building.   The other inflows to the 
stocks are annual additional allocation for expected extra capacity and students’ internship 
financial compensation. As the number of participating student grows, internship expenditure 
increasing rate will grow.  
 
The following structure explains how internship capacity is determined. 
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Figure 5-4 SFD-Policy 1: The Determination of Internship Capacity 
 
The desired total number of interns is determined by the number of tertiary students 
between 19-29 years old and total number of foreign students (Figure 5-4). Internship 
capacity gap denotes the difference between the current capacity and the desired capacity, 
measured by number of people. If there is an excess of capacity, this variable will become a 
negative value.   
 
The extra internship capacity is determined by the internship capacity gap and 
expected intern growth fraction.  The growth fraction is expected to be 0.2 from 2015 to 2019; 
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after that, it gradually decreases 0.05 marginally every five years.  This is because the age 
group of 19 to 29 is growing decreasingly, thus capacity becomes excess.   
 
When the capacity exceeds the desired number of interns, the ratio of internship 
capacity and desired total interns is greater than one.  Thus the expected internship capacity 
growth fraction will zero out and the extra internship capacity will become negative due to 
the negative value in internship capacity gap (negative internship expenditure increasing rate).  
This means that the capacity will reduce accordingly by reducing budget allocation.  
 
In their book, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) contend that a policy decision that 
deviates from status quo will likely be implemented successfully if (1) the policy objectives 
are clear and consistent; (2) sound theory that identify the principal factors and causal 
linkages affecting policy objectives is provided to implementation agents; (3) implementation 
plans and process are carefully designed and carried out by agents; (4) implementation 
agencies possess sufficient managerial and political skills and experiences and is committed 
to carry out the implementation plans. 
 
With Policy 1, objectives have been clearly spelled out previously and causal linkages 
have also been presented to form relevant theories.  However, we are uncertain the 
effectiveness of the implementation agencies.  Therefore, we presume that the effectiveness 
of Policy 1 will gradually increase from 30% from 2014 to 70% in 2050.  At the beginning 
stage, staff dealing with internship counseling and placement may be lack of experience to 
handle students; the connection with businesses may be weak; students might not be getting 
full information and training yet; on top of that, some students might be interested in 
internship programs or might be interested in studying abroad instead.  Therefore, the full 
effect of this policy will likely kick in some time after its introduction and we assume the 
effectiveness will be lower than 100%. 
 
Then, we run the model with Policy 1 integrated. These are the comparison of the 
simulated and base run behavior from Policy 1. 
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Figure 5-5 Motivation to University:  the impact of Internship Policy  
 
With the internship policy alone, Motivation to University will rise about 9% from 
1.05 to about 1.15 in 2020 (Figure 5-5).  By 2050, Motivation to University will reach 1.20.  
Hence, more students will enroll in tertiary education. From 2014 to 2050, an increment of 2% 
in tertiary student enrollment in age group 19 to 29. This leads to 5,756 more students 
enrolled in tertiary education (Figure 5-6) compared to the base run. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Total University Students in age group 19 to 29: the impact of 
Internship Policy  
 
 
Figure 5-7 Domestic Skilled Labor Force: the impact of Internship Policy 
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Figure 5-8 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: the 
impact of Internship Policy 
 
The domestic skilled labor force will result in 29,778 additional skilled laborers if 
Policy 1 is implemented (Figure 5-7). A total of 24,769 skilled labor job vacancies are filled 
from 2014 to 2050 (Figure 5-8). 
 
The following table demonstrates the changes take place with the implementation of 
Policy 1.  
 
 
Domestic 
Skilled LF  
Reduction in 
Skilled Labor 
Shortage 
Internship 
Budget 
(NOK/year) 
Changes from 
Policy 1 
 
34,402 
(people) 
24,769 
(people) 
35 billion 
CEA 
(NOK/people) 
1,022,414 1,420,033 - 
Performance 
Analysis 
(MAPE)
22
 
0.64% 6.28% - 
 
Figure 5-9 The Impact of Internship Policy on Domestic Skilled Labor Force, Skilled 
Labor Shortage, and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, and Performance Analysis 
 
 
                                               
22 Mean absolute percentage error. 
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With Policy 1 in place, Domestic Skilled LF increases 34,402 people. This leads to a 
reduction of 24,769 skilled labor shortages. The total internship budget approaches 35 billion 
kroner per year.  From the CEA, about 1.0 million kroner will be spent per domestic skilled 
laborer produced by 2050; about 1.4 million kroner per year per skilled labor shortage 
reduced. The policy performance analysis shows that the deviation from the base run for 
domestic skilled labor force and skilled labor shortage are only 0.64% and 6.28%.  
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Policy 2 - Increase tertiary education participation (undergraduate level) among 
population age 30 to 35 through online or long distance tertiary education 
 
The Competence Reform 2000 action plan aims at providing continuing education and 
training to individuals through public and private institutions.  The reform enables mature 
students over 25 years who have not finished formal upper secondary education to have their 
formal and non-formal qualification recognized (realkompetanse).  As a result, mature 
students flooded to tertiary education in the first few years after the reform was launched.  
However, the number of mature students who entered tertiary education through this reform 
started to decline after the implementation (OECD, 2004b).  This could be due to individuals’ 
reluctance in giving up their jobs and expected foregone earnings for a few years.  Through 
our simulation, it reveals that without the inhibition of lost earnings, tertiary education 
participation rate is indeed higher than the base run—where expected foregone earnings is the 
major concern of potential tertiary students.  This could imply that students will defer 
participation in tertiary education. 
 
Statistics shows that students who entered tertiary education immediately after upper 
secondary education did not increase much from 1992 to 2002.  However, the age of students 
who enter tertiary education had been increasing (Figure 5-10). This implies that individuals 
tend to participate in unskilled labor force after secondary education for a number of years 
before they continue to tertiary education.   
 
 
Figure 5-10 Students at ISCED 5 & 6 Level as percentage of the Respective Age Groups  
Source:  Equity in Education, Country Analytical Report: Norway 
 
As foregone earnings are one of the most important factors that influence individuals’ 
decision to tertiary education, we propose a policy to encourage the tertiary education 
participation in age group of 30 to 35 through long distance or online tertiary education.   
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This policy will enable individuals who are employed to obtain undergraduate level tertiary 
education.  In 1999, a bill for employees’ right to education was passed. However, the bill 
does not cover paid leaves matter. It depends on the negotiation between the employees and 
employers (Brandt, 2000).  With this policy, potential students can remain in employment 
while pursuing tertiary education without losing their income. 
 
The government believes that the dividing line between work life and educational 
system must be reduced.  So, the Norwegian University Network for Lifelong Training 
(Norgesuniversitet) was established in 2000.  It provides a database or search engine on 
several thousand trainings and courses, ranging from short seminars to Master’s degree 
programs, module-based add-on courses and Internet-based instructions.  Study shows that 
not only those who live far away from educational institution would take up online or 
distance education, often people who are employed or have family with children would opt 
for this non-traditional learning method (OECD, 2000).  As online or distance learning puts 
more responsibility for learning on the students and on the interaction of students and 
information-technological based learning material in the absence of direct supervision, this 
type of learning is more suitable for mature students.  
 
Since the infrastructure for the online and long distance education has been built, the 
government can take the opportunity to utilize the facility to a fuller extent in order to 
accommodate individuals’ needs while trying to boost the production of skilled labor.  From 
Figure 5-10 it indicates that the participation rate at age 28 was merely 12.7% in 2002.  So 
we inferred the participation rate in 30 to 35 to be lower than 12.7% initially.  This policy 
will compliment the Competence Reform 2000 by further boosting the inflow to tertiary 
education.  Since the online and long distance tertiary education is provided to those who are 
working and studying for a tertiary degree, the duration for the study is proposed to be 
extended to four years instead of three years in on-campus undergraduate studies.   
 
We build this new structure into our existing model and implement this policy from 
2012.  According to OECD Thematic Higher Education Review (2005), the current policies 
on higher education have not formulated any numerical target.  We set a goal in our 
simulation of this policy— to achieve 15% participation rate among the age group of 30-35 in 
2050.   
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Figure 5-11 SFD- Policy 2: Online Tertiary Education Policy 
 
As in the previous section, we established two stocks:  Online Tertiary Education 
Budget and Online Tertiary Education Capacity (Figure 5-11).  Online tertiary education 
budget covers the spending in building the infrastructure, staff compensation, operating and 
maintenance costs for this program.  Online tertiary education capacity represents the human 
and technological capacity available for students’ enrollments.   
 
A one-off investment is allocated to Online Tertiary Education Budget to enhance 
current Norwegian University Network for Lifelong Training capacity from 2013.  By 2015, 
the capacity for online tertiary education will be ready and to enroll 1,000 students under this 
program. 
 
After 2015, online tertiary education gap will be assessed based on the current 
capacity and current number of students who enrolled in online tertiary education program.  
If the capacity is insufficient, extra online capacity will be needed.  Extra online tertiary 
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education capacity will also take future capacity growth into consideration.  Thus, as long as 
capacity is not oversupply, expected online capacity growth fraction will be at least 2% 
annually.  This is to accommodate the expected increasing number of student enrollments. 
The ratio of online students over capacity is the ratio of online student enrollments and 
Online Tertiary Education Capacity. If the ratio is over 1, that means there is a shortage of 
capacity and the expected online capacity growth fraction will be increased.  On the contrary, 
expected online capacity growth fraction will be zero out if the ratio is lower than 0.98 where 
there is excess capacity.   When there is excess capacity, online education capacity gap will 
become negative and so does online budget increasing rate. Online budget increasing rate is 
determined by the extra online tertiary education capacity needed. This will reduce Online 
Tertiary Education Budget.  So, less spending is needed for operating and maintenance costs 
or human input.     
 
Expenditure per online student is initialized at 70,000 kroner per year per student.  
According to OECD Education at a Glance (2009), annual expenditure on educational 
institutions per student is reported to be 70,000 kroner per year on average.  With this number, 
we expected a 5% increment for price and wage growth.  By 2050, the expenditure per online 
student approaches 189,000 kroner per student per year.  
 
 Due to uncertainty of the effectiveness of the implementation, as in the previous 
policy, we presume that the effectiveness of Policy 2 will gradually increase from 30% from 
2014 to 77% in 2050. The effectiveness of the policy will be affected by the administration of 
relevant higher education, infrastructure, and information dissemination to persuade 
individuals to participate in this program. 
 
 Figure 5-12 demonstrates the stock of Online Tertiary Graduates after the 
implementation of Policy 2. By 2050, the number of tertiary students who graduate through 
this program will reach over 6,000 per year from 2040 onwards.  Motivation to University 
drops slightly after the implementation of this policy (Figure 5-13).  This is because of lower 
skilled job density, as there are more skilled laborers to fill up skilled job vacancies.  As a 
consequence, tertiary student enrollment of age group 19 to 29 is 1,215 lower than in the base 
run (Figure 5-14).  However, this policy results in an increment of about 129,065 domestic 
skilled laborers (Figure 5-15) by 2050. With this policy implemented alone, 153,460 skilled 
job vacancies will be filled by 2050 (Figure 5-16). 
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Figure 5-12 Online Graduates_33 to 38: Online Tertiary Education Policy  
 
 
Figure 5-13 Motivation to University: Online Tertiary Education Policy  
 
 
 
Figure 5-14 Total University Students_19 to 29: Online Tertiary Education 
Policy 
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Figure 5-15 Domestic Skilled Labor Force:  Online Tertiary Education Policy  
 
 
Figure 5-16 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: Online 
Tertiary Education Policy 
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The table below demonstrates the changes of domestic skilled labor force, skilled 
labor shortage, CEA, and performance analysis for Online Tertiary Education Policy. 
 
 
Domestic 
Skilled LF  
Reduction in 
Skilled Labor 
Shortage  
Online Tertiary 
Education Budget 
(NOK/year) 
Changes from 
Policy 2 
 
129,065 
(people) 
153,460 
(people) 
8.1 billion 
CEA 
(NOK/people) 
62,650 52,691 - 
Performance 
Analysis 
(MAPE) 
1.90% 25.90% - 
 
Figure 5-17 The Impact of Online Tertiary Education Policy on 
Domestic Skilled LF, Skilled Labor Shortage, Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis, and Performance Analysis 
 
 After the implementation of Policy 2 from 2012, domestic skilled labor force will 
increase about 138,469 people whereas the shortage of skilled labor will be decrease by about 
221,392 people.  This policy will cost 8.7 billion kroner per year in 2050.  It costs about 
63,069 kroner for the addition of one domestic skilled laborer and 52,691 kroner per shortage 
reduced. The performance analysis indicates that with Policy 2 alone, Domestic Skilled LF 
will only increase 1.90% but 25.90% reduction of skilled labor shortage compared to the base 
run.   
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Policy 3 - Increase international skilled laborer inflow and foreign student mobility 
 
As an extension to Policy 1 and 2, we recommend that the country further liberalizes 
the immigration policy to attract foreign skilled laborers. There are three objectives for 
increasing the inflow of skilled laborers: (1) to reduce skilled labor shortage; (2) to speed up 
the accumulation of human capital ; (3)   to encourage knowledge circulation and transfer in 
order to promote innovation. Norway has low skilled international labor mobility.  The 
foreign labor stock from 1998 to 2007 increased from 3.0% to 8.6%.  The increment seems 
drastic but most of the labor immigrants are unskilled. In 2008, 25% of the work permit was 
granted to unskilled laborers in building and construction industry.  The skilled work permits 
or specialist permits which is specially granted to skilled workers only took up 2% - 3% of 
the total permits approved. Under the specialist rule which was introduced in 2002, 5000 
specialist permits quota was set for the country.  However, from 1999 to 2008, specialist 
permits only increased from 428 to 3,384.  Conversely, skilled migration to the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom is quite significant.  Figure 5-17 shows that the 
share of foreign skilled labor in skilled employment in Australia, Canada, and United States 
is relatively high, about 25%, 18%, and 10% respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5-18 Share of Foreign-born in Highly Skilled 
Employment in Australia, Canada, and United States 
Source: International Mobility of the Highly Skilled 
  
This leads to the question of how to attract foreign skilled laborers to the country.  
First, we take a look at the drives for skilled labor migration.  Skilled laborers mostly respond 
to better economic opportunities abroad relative to their home countries.  Other than this, 
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factors such as intellectual pursuits, growth of multinational corporations, or hardship in their 
home countries due to war or political suppression are also reasons for migration. 
  
Some national barriers to skilled labor migration will undermine the attractiveness of 
Norway as a migration destiny.  These barriers includes access to labor market or regulatory 
information and general living conditions of the descendents of skilled labor migrants 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, 2007-2008, UDI, 2003).  In order to tackle this 
barrier, social inclusion and language training program should be provided at the home 
countries of potential source of skilled labor.  Although there are programs as such provided 
at no cost to the immigrants and their families, they will have to arrive in the country first 
before they can start to get aquatinted with the culture.  Nonetheless, if they were to migrate 
to the English-speaking countries, this factor will be less likely to affect their decision.   In its 
effort to attract foreign skilled laborers, the government has introduced a more liberal 
immigration policy for skilled migration.  In the beginning of 2010, skilled laborers will be 
granted a residence permit to remain in Norway to attend Norwegian language course or up 
to two years to take additional education or gain experience in order for their education to be 
recognized by the Norwegian system.  Despite the new scheme to attract foreign skilled 
laborers to migrate to the country on their own fund, to get adapted to the society, and to 
break the entry barrier to the job market, and to learn Norwegian and cultural differences, the 
―social inclusion process‖ of the potential foreign skilled laborers will likely to take up a 
couple of years.  In reality, those who are highly capable and desired talents will tend to be 
lured away by countries that are seen as foreign labor magnet, such as the United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia.   So, pull and push approach need to work together 
in order to make Norway an attractive choice for potential foreign laborers. It is essential for 
the government to establish agencies in potential source country to proactively market the 
opportunities available in Norway and to foster communication between potential foreign 
laborers and employers.  Countries with high skilled labor reserve with lower living standard 
will become a push factors for the skilled laborers to seek for emigration.  The lower-than-
expectation outcome in its effort to promote Ukrainian laborers to migrate to Norway stems 
from the lack of information on Norway’s labor market and regulatory framework (UDI, 
2003). As a pull approach, these agencies’ task is to market Norway’s competitive advantage 
in order to attract foreign skilled laborers.  The competitive advantage of Norway lies in its 
high living standards, balanced work and leisure lifestyle, well-planned social welfare, and 
friendly environment for families.  With appropriate branding with these qualities and 
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effective marketing campaign, Norway will be able to enhance its attractiveness to potential 
foreign skilled laborers. Since this policy will involve establishing physical presence abroad, 
it is too broad of a scope to add the policy structure to our current model. 
 
Another source of skilled migration would be from the European countries where 
skilled laborers are more or less familiar with Norway due to proximity.  According to 
Nordic Labor Journal Online
23
, it is indicated that Norway tends to attract more European 
Union citizens. But most Nordic or European laborers usually stay on a temporary basis 
(OECD, 2004), only 60% of them stay for more than 10 years.  Compared with Sweden and 
Finland, labor immigrants who stay for more than 10 years make up 67% and 76% of the 
total labor immigrants.  So, policies are needed to encourage foreign skilled laborers to stay 
longer.  
  
The third source of foreign skilled labor comes from foreign students.  Foreign 
students are potential labor force reserves.  As Norway provides free tuition in tertiary 
education, it becomes a strong attraction to potential tertiary students abroad.  In the recent 
years, many European countries have started or are planning to charge tuition fees, including 
Germany, Denmark, and Sweden (in 2011).  Norway will be able to take the opportunity to 
attract talented tertiary students to study in the country.  Nevertheless, Norway still attracts 
far too few foreign students to study and to stay in Norway (OECD, 2005).  In 2008, there 
were only 5,900 international students in Norway (OECD, 2010).   
  
OECD countries are increasingly seeking ways to attract foreign students (OECD, 
2002). Among these countries, the United States attracts the most foreign students, about 
one-third of all foreign students studying in OECD countries.  Statistics shows that many of 
these students remain in the host country upon graduation.  For example, 47% of the foreign-
born PhD graduates remain in the United States.  There are many benefits to retaining foreign 
                                               
23 http://www.nordiclabourjournal.org/i-fokus/theme-joint-nordic-drive-for-more-foreign-labour/joint-nordic-
drive-for-more-foreign-labour.  
 
The information is said to be adapted from the report ―Recruitment of highly skilled labour from third-countries 
to the Nordic countries: Regulations, policies and realities‖ on commission from the Nordic Council of 
Ministers and a range of Nordic engineering and employee organizations.  ―The report shows Sweden is best at 
attracting third-country labour, while Norway attracts the most EU citizens…. researchers from FAOS, Fafo and 
Uppsala University guess Norway's high wages makes the country particularly attractive to EU citizens, while 
Sweden's many large companies make that country a good starting point for labour recruitment from countries 
outside of the EU and the Nordic region.‖ 
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students as potential skilled labor force.  These students have adapted to the culture and 
society during their stay.  The hesitation of migrating and adapting to a new environment and 
to master a new language will be less of a concern to foreign students.  In 2008, 8100 study 
permits were issued.  The largest increase of student group was from EEA countries, 
particularly from Germany, France, and Spain.  Most of these students participate in 
undergraduate courses or the Erasmus program.  They only stay on a temporary basis.  The 
largest groups of foreign tertiary students outside of EEA were from China and Russia.  
These students usually take the entire degree program and stay for several years (UDI, 2008). 
In 2010, UDI launched a specialist or skilled labor job-seeking scheme to attract the recently 
tertiary graduates from Norwegian education institutions to remain in the country for up to 
six months to search for jobs. 
  
In order to facilitate the job-seeking process for foreign students, the career planning 
units within tertiary education institutions need to function at a broader level.   At the 
moment, most career planning units provide seminars and trainings on how to write CV and 
application, how to search jobs from job databases, but mostly in Norwegian (OECD, 2005).  
Some of the careers planning units serve as a meeting place between graduates and potential 
employers.   In a way, the units become a platform solely for Norwegian-speaking students 
and employers.   In a broader extent, career planning units can foster communication between 
foreign students and potential employers by organizing events not only for Norwegian-
speaking students, but also for non-Norwegian students.   There are few career services 
outside tertiary education institutions.  The proposed internship policy in the previous section 
will also serve as a strong attraction to the foreign students.   By making the internship 
program as a competitive advantage of the tertiary education system in Norway, foreign 
students will not only be able to receive wages during internship to offset the high living 
costs, but will also gain invaluable working experience. The relevant working experience will 
provide support and enhance foreign students’ learning process as well as groom them to be 
experienced job seekers after graduation.  
 
Also, more tertiary programs offered in English are needed to achieve the desired 
outcome of this policy. As English is an international language, requiring foreign students’ 
Norwegian proficiency will turn away potential foreign students who are outside of Nordic 
countries. 
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So, we build the foreign student policy into our model (Figure 5-19).  In this new 
structure, we establish an inflow of foreign students who will study for three years in the 
country.  The goal for the number of students the country intends to recruit is a fraction of the 
anticipated skilled job vacancies.  The expected skilled job vacancies is the product of 
expected skilled labor loss rate due to old age retirement, early retirement, sickness and 
disability exit rate, foreign skilled labor, foreign students leaving rates, and the current skilled 
labor shortage. The expected skilled job demand is smoothed with a 5 year delay.   
 
Figure 5-19 SFD- Policy 3: Foreign Student Policy 
 
The estimated foreign student recruitment adjustment time is set for 10 years.  This 
represents a less aggressive approach to reduce skilled labor shortage.  In another word, it 
means that the targeted number of foreign students to be recruited to the country is 10% of 
the current skilled job vacancies. We presume internship policy will play a role in attracting 
foreign students’ interest.  As in the previous two policies, an effectiveness parameter is 
included. In the beginning stage, we expect that the marketing effort only achieve 30% 
effectiveness.    As this policy involves the inflow from foreign sources, the uncertainty is 
relatively higher.  Therefore, we estimate the effectiveness of this policy reach only 50% by 
2050 conservatively. 
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After graduation, we expect 40% of these students remain in the country to seek 
employment and 60% leave the country.  40% of the employed foreign students are expected 
to stay in the country for an average of 10 years
24
.  This characterizes 4% of the employed 
foreign students will probably be leaving the country for various reasons. 
 
As in the previous two policies, Extra Tertiary Education Capacity for Foreign 
Students and Foreign Student Education Budget stocks are to be set up in order to initialize 
this program.  Extra Tertiary Education Capacity represents the added capacity to current 
education institutions for human input and facility extension. 
 
Figure 5-20 SFD- Policy 3: Foreign Student Policy 
 
The program is initialized in 2012.  One-off initial budget allocation is expected to be 
approved in 2013 (Figure 5-20).  We assumed the extra capacity for foreign tertiary students 
will be ready for enrollment by 2015.  It is estimated that it will take two years get budget 
                                               
24 From OECD International Migration Outlook 2009, 40% of the foreign-born labors stayed in the country for 
less than 10 years.  
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approved and three years for capacity building adjustment time, the delay involve is five 
years to build up additional capacity.  Therefore, we propose to set 5% annual expected 
foreign student capacity growth fraction to build more capacity to avoid overcrowding in 
tertiary education. 
 
The expected foreign student capacity growth fraction is influenced by the foreign 
student capacity ratio.  When the ratio is higher than one, that means more capacity is needed; 
when the ratio is lower than 1, it represents excess capacity and the budget growth fraction 
will be zero out.  The extra foreign student capacity is determined by the foreign student 
capacity gap and the expected capacity growth. If the capacity gap becomes negative when 
there is excessive capacity, Foreign Students Budget increasing rate will be a negative flow. 
This implies a reduction of Foreign Student Tertiary Budget as well as Extra Tertiary 
Education Capacity for Foreign Students.  
 
After the implementation of Policy 3, it will boost up skilled labor supply by having 
6,403 foreign students employed in the country (Figure 5-21). As skilled job density is 
reduced in the absence of other policy to boost Motivation to University, the locals will end 
up staying away from tertiary education. This leads to a reduction of 41 domestic skilled 
laborers in the country by 2050.  Although the reduction in domestic skilled labor force is 
insignificant, this provides a strong indication of the drawback of this policy being carried out 
alone. Thus, the change in total skilled labor force is insignificant (Figure 5-22).  In 
conclusion, Foreign Tertiary Education Policy will only fill 13,875 job vacancies (Figure 5-
23). 
 
 
Figure 5-21 Employed Foreign Students: Foreign Student Policy 
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Figure 5-22 Total Skilled Labor Force: Foreign Student Policy  
 
 
Figure 5-23 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: Foreign 
Students Policy 
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The following table presents the changes of domestic skilled labor force, skilled labor 
shortage, CEA and performance analysis of Foreign Student Policy. 
 
 
Domestic Skilled 
LF  
Reduction in 
Skilled Labor 
Shortage  
Foreign Student Tertiary 
Education Budget 
 (NOK/year) 
Changes from 
Policy 3 
 
-41 
(people) 
13,875 
(people) 
1.7 billion 
CEA 
(NOK/people) 
43 million 126,698 - 
Performance 
Analysis 
(MAPE) 
0% 2.05% - 
 
Figure 5-24 The Impact of Foreign Student Policy on Domestic SLF, 
Skilled Labor Shortage, and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
 
After the implementation of Foreign Student Policy, the policy will cost 1.7 billion 
kroner per year in 2050.  For every 43 million kroner per year spent on this policy reduce one 
domestic skilled laborer; on the contrary, for every 126,698 kroner per year spent reduces one 
skilled labor shortage. The performance analysis shows that Policy 3 will not bring changes 
to domestic skilled labor force but will reduce skilled labor shortage by 2.05% as compared 
to the base run.  
 
We envisage three hurdles associated with the foreign student policy. First, 
comparatively high quality programs offered in English is the pre-requisite for the success of 
this policy; second, potential foreign students need to be convinced that the education quality 
of Norwegian tertiary programs meet international standard so they will choose Norway as 
the destination for their studies; third, the high living expenses in Norway might turn away 
foreign students.  Many tertiary students from OECD countries receive limited financial 
support in terms of public loan, scholarships, and grants (Appendix E).  Unless students are 
sponsored by organizations or governments, otherwise students will be required to cover their 
living expenses entirely from private sources. 
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Policy 4 - All three policies carried out concurrently 
 
Finally, we combine all three policies and compare the cost effectiveness and 
performance of Policy 1, Policy 2, Policy 3, and Policy 1+2+3.  The following table 
summarizes the changes in numbers, CEA, and Performance Analysis of each individual 
policy. 
 
 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
 
Performance Analysis 
(MAPE) 
Total University 
Students_19 to 29 
1.40% 0.10% 0% 1.33% 
Domestic Skilled LF 0.64% 1.90% 0% 2.48% 
Skilled Labor Shortage 6.28% 25.90% 2.56% 34.51% 
     
 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
 
Changes in Absolute Numbers 
(people) 
Domestic Skilled LF 34402 129065 -41 157569 
Skilled Labor Shortage 24769 153460 13875 225342 
     
 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
(NOK/people) 
Domestic Skilled LF 1022414 62650 43 mil 298808 
Skilled Labor Shortage 1420033 52691 126698 208939 
 
Figure 5-25 Summary of Simulated Changes from Policy 1-4 
 
From the summary above, Policy 4 results in the highest increase of domestic skilled 
labor and it costs 298,808 kroner per domestic skilled labor production per year in 2050. In 
terms of skilled labor shortage reduction, Policy 4 also achieves the most reduction among 
the four policies.  It will successfully fill up 225,342 skilled jobs by 2050.  Nevertheless, 
Policy 4 will cost 208,939 kroner per year per skilled labor shortage reduction. 
 
Policy 2, the Online Tertiary Education Policy, alone will be able to boost up 
domestic skilled labor force by 129,065 laborers. It will successfully reduce skilled labor 
shortage by almost 153,000.  This policy will cost the least to produce domestic skilled labor 
and to reduce shortage.  However, the drawback is the minimal impact on encouraging 
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tertiary education participation for the age group of 19 to 29.  As shown in the performance 
analysis above, the Total University Students_19 to 29 only increases 0.1% in 2050. 
 
The internship policy (Policy 1) will increase 34,402 domestic skilled laborers in 2050, 
but the governmental spending is as high as 1.0 million kroner per person per year. This 
policy has the largest impact on promoting growth in tertiary education enrollments among 
age group 19 to 29, as compared to the other three policies. With this policy, the number of 
tertiary students between age 19 to 29 enrolled in tertiary education system will be 5,756 
more than in the base run in 2050. 
 
Policy 3 will reduce the least skilled labor shortage, with only about 14,000 skilled 
jobs filled. This policy has the most detrimental impact on domestic skilled labor production; 
the domestic skilled labor force will be reduced by 41 laborers in 2050.  We consider that 
Policy 3 carried out alone will generate insignificant improvement with high costs.  So, it is 
not cost effective to implement this policy alone. Nevertheless, the time delay involves in 
implementing this policy and to attract students to come to the country is long. Should 
Norway treat this policy as a backup plan and only launch this policy when the country fails 
to attract foreign skilled labor amidst strong international competition for talents, the 
economy transformation will be slowed down.   
 
The choice of policy depends on the goal of the policy makers. Among all four 
policies, Policy 2 and 4 show biggest improvement in reducing skilled labor shortage.  Even 
though Policy 4 incur 4 to 5 times higher spending per person, the policy will also raise the 
motivation to tertiary education among the 19 to 29 age cohorts, encourage tertiary education 
participation in age group 30 to 35, and attract foreign students to the country as skilled labor 
force reserve. Domestic skilled labor production is crucial to the country’s human capital 
accumulation.  Being overly independent on foreign labor or students to reduce skilled labor 
shortage is detrimental to domestic skilled labor production because it provides less incentive 
for individuals to participate tertiary education. However, as the population is growing at a 
decreasing rate, increasing immigration is essential to maintain positive population growth.  
From the behavior sensitivity test in section 4.8, it shows that in the absence of foreign 
skilled labor, Motivation to University will be lifted significantly (Figure 4-13-1).  However, 
the lack of foreign skilled labor will lead to a more intensified skilled labor shortage (Figure 
4-13-5). Thus, the country might lose its’ competitiveness in the international market amidst 
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worsening skilled labor shortage.  So, we perceive the need to grow domestic skilled labor 
force and reduce skilled labor shortage is equally important. 
 
Figure 5-25 shows that with Policy 4 in place, the gap between skilled labor supply 
and demand will be drawn closer by 2050. 
 
 
Figure 5-25 Indicated Total Skilled Labor Needed and Total Skilled Labor Force: All-in-
One Policy 
 
 Domestic skilled labor force increases by 2050 with Policy 4 (Figure 5-26). Total 
university students in age group 19 to 29 also shows visible increment (Figure 5-27), so does 
Total Skilled Labor Force (Figure 5-28). 
 
 
Figure 5-26 Domestic Skilled Labor Force: All-in-One Policy  
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Figure 5-27 Total University Students_19 to 29: All-in-One Policy 
 
 
Figure 5-28 Total Skilled Labor Force: All-in-One Policy  
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
Norway’s economy has gone through unprecedented growth in the past decade.  The 
strong growth in GDP, employment, labor productivity, real wage, labor immigration 
combine with increasing outflows from the labor force, such as early retirement scheme, 
sickness and disability, and old age retirement implies that Norway’s labor market is tight.  
Since the working age population is growing at a decreasing rate, the skilled and unskilled 
labor forces are competing for laborers.   
 
We hypothesize that perceived wage premium and skilled job opportunities are 
affected by capital investment, job composition, and skilled labor shortage. Perceived wage 
premium and skilled job density influence individuals’ desire to pursue tertiary education in 
close feedback loops.  Through the analysis, it shows that without the expected foregone 
earnings feedback loop, the motivation for individual to take up tertiary education increases 
considerably; on the contrary, perceived wage premium has strong positive effect on the 
motivation from 1994 to 2020.   After 2020, the effect of skilled job density dominates 
Motivation to University.  The introduction of foreign skilled laborers will mitigate the 
bottleneck situation, but in long run it will deteriorate the incentives for the local to pursue 
tertiary education.  Since wages for skilled and unskilled are increasing due to the tight labor 
market, firms will increase capital investment.  By investing more in capital for production, 
two different outcomes are revealed:  a complimentary relationship for the skilled laborers 
and substitution effect on unskilled laborers.  Capital investment will boost the requirements 
of skilled labor further but replace the need for unskilled labor due to higher labor 
productivity.  As more unskilled laborers are being substituted, the shortage of unskilled 
labor will reduce, as will the unskilled wages. Thus, perceived wage premium increase and 
individuals are motivated to participate in tertiary education.   
 
As a result, we propose the government to incorporate optional internship program as 
into tertiary curriculum. Secondly, we propose the government to utilize the existing digital 
education facilities to promote online tertiary education in age group 30-35 because this will 
eliminate the expected foregone earnings of individuals who participate.  Besides, we 
propose the government to set goals for the number of students to be recruited to the country 
because these students can be potential skilled labor supply upon graduation. 
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All in all, the system is very resistant to any parametric changes.  Depending on the 
goals of policy makers, Online Tertiary Education Policy will boost domestic skilled labor 
supply at a lower cost compared to the combination of Internship Policy, Online Tertiary 
Education Policy, and Foreign Student Policy. But the combination of policies will also 
encourage domestic skilled labor production as well as the recruitment of foreign students. 
Foreign students can be seen as skilled labor reserve for the country.  Internship Policy and 
Foreign Student Policy implemented alone will lead to very costly outcome.   
 
For future research, it will be interesting to study the psychological and social factors 
influence individuals decision to participate in tertiary education.  Also, from our study, it 
will be useful to study how the economic returns to tertiary education and job opportunity 
affect skilled labor migration to the country.  
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Appendix A – Validation Test Results 
Equilibrium Test 
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4.1 Parameter Verification Test (A1) & Structure Verification Test (A2)  
 
The following table presents all the exogenous parameters in our model.  It is divided 
into parameters with statistical data and estimated value.  In the parameter and structure 
verification test, we compare the behaviors generated in our model through statistical data to 
determine if these behaviors are conceptually and numerically reasonable as compared to the 
real system.  We will test the parameters with estimated value in the parameter sensitivity 
testing section later on. 
 
Statistical Data Estimated Value 
Labor Force Submodel 
frct_death  
frct_AFP_skilled  
frct_AFP_unskilled  
frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 49  
frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 61  
frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 39  
frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 49  
frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 61  
Idle_SWAP_enter_SLF  
frct_unskilled_Idles_re-enter  
frct_To_Idled_USLF_AG_19  
Tertiary Education Submodel  
Age Group 18 Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 to 24 
frct_NOT_to_Univ1_AG_19 Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24 
frct_To_Univ1_AG_19 Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 to 29 
 Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29 
Job Demand Submodel 
Aggregate Demand hiring_SL _AT 
Reference Skilled Labor Fraction hiring_USL _AT 
 F_Labors_SL_AT 
 F_Labors_US_AT 
 natural_UR_SL 
 natural_UR_US 
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 frct of _F_SL leaving 
 frct of _F_USL leaving 
Wages Submodel 
 labor share_skilled 
 labor share_unskilled 
Motivation to University Submodel 
 distr_starting wage 
 distr_foregone earnings 
 distr_foregone earnings 
 distr_ease of finding job 
Labor and Capital Submodel 
 
Ave Capital Investment Growth 
Rate 
 
Labor Force Submodel Statistical Parameter Verification 
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We compared the simulated behavior of the statistical parameters with the statistical input 
from OECD (2004, 2006): 
 Outflow from disability recipient to work is almost nil. 
 Disability benefit recipiency rates among the working age population is 11.4%. 
 The beneficiary rate increased most among young workers aged 20-34 and very little 
for those over 50. 
 Employment rate among the disability recipients is only 45%.  Since 2000, the 
employment rate for disability recipients has been falling despite existing and new 
employment integration programs and campaigns.   
 Employment rate of disabled people aged 20-34 and disabled persons with tertiary 
education are between 70% and 88%. 
 The inflow to disability benefits was over 1% of the working age population from the 
beginning of 1990s to 2005. 
 Age group of 50-66 will increase 40% until 2015; age group over 67 will increase 200% 
by 2050. 
 The simulated behavior does not reach 1% in the beginning of the simulation because 
in our model, the labor force stock is constructed as an array with 49 age groups from 
19 to 67.  We estimated the initial values of the skilled and unskilled labor force. We 
also broke down the sickness and disability fractions for three different age groups, 
namely 30-39, 40-49, and 50-61.  People who become 62 usually opt for early 
retirement rather.  Those who reach 67 will leave the labor force as old age retiree.  
Around 2000, the outflow from labor force due to sickness and disability is close to 1% 
of the working age population.  The outflow will continue to rise over 1% after 2005 
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due to the lack of incentive for the recipients to re-enter the labor market if everything 
remains status quo, this trend will remain. About 20% - 30% of the working age 
population leaving the labor force from 1994 to 2005 due to old age retirement.  After 
the introduction of Early Retirement Scheme (AFP) in 1989, the outflow through this 
schmed was under 5% until 1998 where the AFP qualified age was reduced to 62 
from 66.  The fraction of age group 62-66 opt to leave the labor force through this 
scheme was increasing significantly after 1998.  Therefore, the outflow of old age 
retirement decreased.  As the working age population is growing at a decreasing rate, 
the outflows will gradually decrease.  
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Tertiary Education Submodel Statistical Parameter Verification 
In this statistical parameter verification test, we compared the simulated behavior with the 
historical input from Statistics Norway database. 
 
 
  
The reference trend represents the tertiary student enrollment in age group 19 to 24 
from 1994 to 2008 (total_In_Edu_19-24).  From 1994 to 2008, the trend was based on 
historical data (ref_In_Edu_19 to 24_all tert).   
 
 
 
 
  
From 1994 to 2008, the simulated behavior of tertiary student enrollment in age group 
25-29 (tota_In_Edu_25-29) replicated the historical trend (ref_In_Educ_25 to 29_all tert).     
 
 Age Group 18 is the population at age 18 in 1993.  When the simulation starts in 1994, 
this age group will become the entrants to age group 19.  As we mentioned earlier on, the age 
group 19 becomes the entry point to the unskilled labor force or tertiary education.  The data 
on fraction of age group 19 transiting to tertiary education is adapted from OECD Education 
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at a Glance (2009). The remaining of age group 19 proceeds to unskilled labor force.  The 
following figure presents the historical development and future projection of age group 18 
based on statistical data from Statistics Norway.  The future projection takes the future 
population growth of the country into consideration.  Though, it will be the exogenous input 
to our model. 
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Job Demand Submodel Statistical Parameter Verification 
 The growth fraction of aggregate demand in the country is averaged to be 3.7%.  This 
is the average growth fraction from 2001 to 2009 according to Statistics Norway, and it is 
also predicted that the growth fraction from 2011 to 2013 is between 3.3% and 3.9%. But the 
simulated behavior fits the historical trend better when we use 3.3%.  Therefore, we will use 
3.3% in our model.  Statistics Norway predicts that the demand for goods and services in the 
country will remain strong in the near future. The following figure presents the simulated 
behavior of aggregate demand in the job demand submodel. 
 
 
Aggregate demand growth fraction = 3.3% per year 
 
 Initially, Reference Skilled Labor Fraction is determined by the fraction of skilled 
labor in the total labor force.  Since it has been publicly voiced out that the labor market is 
tight, we infer that the fraction of aggregate demand that required skilled input and the skilled 
labor supply is in equilibrium in the beginning of the simulation.  We cross reference with 
foreign skilled labor inflows in 1990s.  The specialist permits are granted to foreign labor 
with skilled or higher education, such as professional training in relevant occupation or 
tertiary education. It shows that the specialist permits granted during 1996 to 2000 was 
around 500.  So, the skilled labor market seemed to be tight or the shortage was not severe. 
  
Hence, we simulate the aggregate demand that requires skilled input with the 
previously stated assumption and obtain the following behavior mode.  The fraction of skilled 
aggregate demand will grow in parallel to the skilled labor force.  As the working age 
population tertiary education attainment rate was increasing every year from 26% to 32% 
from 1997 to 2007, the Reference Skilled Labor Fraction increased accordingly too.  The 
Reference Skilled Labor Fraction presents a goal-seeking behavior because the fractional 
increment will slow down gradually as the fraction is approaching 1, which is the maximum 
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of skilled aggregate demand can be in an economy.  This development in line with the theory 
explained in Section 1.1 that one of the causes of labor shortage is the ―supply generates 
demand‖ scenario.   As this fraction of aggregate demand is increasing, so will aggregate 
demand that requires skilled input (AD_Skilled). 
 
 
Reference Skilled Labor Fraction 
 
AD_Skilled presents an exponential growth behavior because ave_AD_growth rate is 
set to be 3.3%.  However, GDP in the country will have impact on the average aggregate 
demand growth rate. When the ratio of GDP and AD equals to 1, the average growth rate will 
be 3.3%; when the ratio is less than 1, the ave_AD_growth rate will be less than 3.3% and 
vice versa. The following non-linear graphical function is used for this purpose. 
 
 
Non-linear Graphical Function on Average Aggregate Demand Growth Fraction 
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Simulated Aggregate Demand 
 
4.2 Local Extreme Condition Test (A3)  
(1) R1 – Aggregate demand and skilled input loop 
Increase ave_AD_growth rate by 500%.  Ref Skilled Labor Fraction increases faster 
and reaches equilibrium at 1.0, which is also the maximum fraction of skilled aggregate 
demand the country will have. 
 
 
Ref Skilled Labor Fraction 
 
 
Decrease ave_AD_growth rate by 99%, Ref Skilled Labor Fraction grows at a slower 
pace and only reaches slightly above 0.5 by 2050. 
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Ref Skilled Labor Fraction 
 
Divide the initial value of Ref Skilled Labor Fraction by 27.  Thus the initial value 
becomes 1%.  Subsequently AD_Skilled only reaches almost NOK 317 billion instead of 
NOK 600 billion in 2050. But this development causes Motivation to University to drop 
drastically and remains below 1 from 2000 onwards. 
 
 
AD_Skilled 
 
 
 
Motivation to University 
 
 
Now, we shall shock the loop with the initial value two times greater than the value in 
base run.  AD_Skilled in this test presents a higher trend than in the base run.  This is because 
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the initial value of AD_Skilled is already higher due to larger fraction of skilled aggregate 
demand in the country in the beginning.  Therefore, AD_Unskilled is lower than in the base 
run.  Surprisingly, Motivation to University increases considerably from 1994 to 2000. After 
2000, it starts taking downward turn until 2030 where it eventually stabilizes as in the base 
run.  Since unskilled labor shortage diminishes because the fraction of aggregate demand that 
requires unskilled input decreases drastically, wages for unskilled labor drops. So, individuals 
find that expected foregone earnings are much lower and wage premium is high. This 
constitutes to the strong increment of motivation to university in the beginning. As time goes 
by, many foreign skilled laborers are brought into the country to fill the available vacancies.  
In the later stage, perceived skilled job density returns to the same level as in the base run. So, 
skilled job density loses its appeal when it comes to attracting individuals to pursue tertiary 
education. 
 
 
AD_Skilled 
 
 
 
Motivation to University 
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(2) The effect of Motivation to University on Domestic Skilled Labor Force and Total 
Skilled Labor Force 
 
We zero out the Motivation to University variable (C1, C2, C3, C13-C15), so that no 
inflow to tertiary education. Thus, the Domestic Skilled LF stock will be drained due to lack 
of inflow combines with persistent outflows.  The simulated behavior presented a decaying 
behavior.  Total Skilled LF is still increasing because more foreign skilled laborers are 
brought into the country. However, due to the increasing outflow from Domestic Skilled LF 
and only by relying on foreign skilled labor, Total Skilled Labor Force starts to grow at a 
decreasing rate from 2030 onwards.  
 
 
Domestic Skilled Labor Force 
 
 
Total Skilled Labor Force 
 
We exaggerate the Motivation to University by five times larger than the value in base 
run.  Therefore, more entrants to tertiary education and more locally produced skilled 
laborers in the labor force.  Domestic Skilled Labor Force and Total Skilled Labor Force 
present goal-seeking behavior as the fraction of available unskilled working age population is 
becoming smaller and smaller.  
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Domestic Skilled Labor Force 
 
 
 
Total Skilled Labor Force 
 
 (3) C7 – Foreign Skilled Labor Loop 
 
 In this test, we lengthen F_Labors_SL_AT to 100 years from 2.5 years.  Therefore 
Foreign Labor_Skilled stock is only about 25,000 in 2050 due to very low inflow. Since 
foreign skilled labor accumulation is slow, fraction of aggregate demand that requires skilled 
input grows slowly. Thus, Motivation to University grows slightly higher after 2020 when 
skilled job density springs up. 
  
 
Foreign Skilled Labor Force 
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Motivation to University 
 
 The following figure presents the simulated behavior of Foreign Skilled Labor Force 
stock with Foreign Labors_Skilled Hiring AT equals to 0.5 year.  Thus, the stock 
accumulates exponentially as long as Need for F_labors_SL is a positive. From 2005 to 2010, 
most of the jobs are filled, so the inflow of foreign skilled labor slows down until 2030.  
Shortage starts to appear again after 2032, so influx of foreign skilled labor takes place again. 
 
 
 
Foreign Skilled Labor Force 
 
Prior to 2010, the Motivation to University is higher than the base run. This is because 
that more foreign skilled labor hired to the country will reduce skilled labor shortage and thus 
encourage the growth of Ref Skilled Labor Fraction. Therefore, aggregate demand that 
requires skilled input springs up considerably. This will prompt firms to increase investment 
in capital in order to reduce human input. As a result perceived wage premium increases 
significantly from 2000 to 2010. Since the effect of capital investment will bring forth labor 
need reduction, skilled labor shortage will be reduced. This explains why Motivation to 
University returns to almost the same level as in the base run after 2020. 
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Motivation to University 
 
  
(4) C8 –Foreign Unskilled Labor Force Loop 
 
 This test is similar to the previous test on Foreign Skilled Labor Force.  We lengthen 
Foreign Labors_Unskilled Hiring AT to 100 years.  Hence, the stock accumulates at a very 
slow rate as compared to the behavior generated from base run. 
 
 
Foreign Unskilled Labor Force 
 
Motivation to University presents a higher trend than in the base run after 2005.  This 
is because that more domestic unskilled labor enters the labor force as a result of fewer 
foreign unskilled laborers being hired to the country.  As the aggregate demand of the 
country grows slower due to lack of labor, shortages for unskilled labor reduces. More 
unskilled labor is unemployed. Thus, this drives down the wages for unskilled. So, wage 
premium increases. 
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Motivation to University 
 
 Finally, we shorten Foreign Labors_Unskilled Hiring AT to 0.5 year.  The simulated 
behavior presents an oscillation.  This is due to the fact that the inflow to the stock is much 
larger, so jobs are filled up faster.  Once the shortage is reduced, the foreign unskilled labor 
hiring slows down.  As Foreign Unskilled LF grows, the outflow from the stock grows too. 
So the stock will drain faster.  Therefore when the shortage occurs again, the hiring process 
takes place and jobs get filled up quickly.  This process will continue to the future.  As long 
as the demand for unskilled labor continues to be strong, the behavior of this stock will be 
oscillating in the future. 
 
 
Foreign Unskilled Labor Force 
 
Motivation to University presents a higher trend than in the base run. This is because 
that more unskilled labor is brought into the country to fill up job vacancies, shortage is 
reduced. This will lead to lower wages and less capital investment from firms. Lower 
unskilled wages will lead to higher wage premium and expected lifetime earnings and lower 
foregone earnings. As unskilled labor shortage re-occur, Motivation to University returns to 
the level as in the base run. 
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Motivation to University 
 
Extreme Condition Tests 
(1) Reduce the inflow to tertiary education and unskilled labor force by reducing age group 
18 to zero from year 2020 
 
 
 
 As the inflow to tertiary education and unskilled labor force becomes zero from 2020 
while the outflows continue, then the shortage starts to worsen after a few years of delay.  
When the shortage starts to increase, it triggers the inflow of foreign skilled labor, which is 
the F_Labors hiring rate_SL.  Even so, the hiring adjustment time for foreign skilled labor is 
longer than the hiring adjustment time for local skilled labor.  Thus, the stock of total skilled 
labor increases at a slower pace.  This development accounts for the widening gap between 
skilled labor demand and supply.   
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(2)  Average aggregate demand growth fraction becomes -3.3% from 2020 to 2030 
 
 
 When the growth fraction of aggregate demand becomes -6.3% from 2020 to 2030, 
the aggregate demand stock decreases consistently for 10 years.  So, the need of skilled labor 
reduces gradually.  In this case, the locally produced skilled laborers are sufficient to cover 
the need.  Therefore, foreign skilled labor immigration dropped significantly in this period.  
Motivation to University decreases from 2030 onwards due to reduced skilled job 
opportunity.  The more lax job market imposes downward pressure in skilled wages, 
therefore perceived wage premium decreases consistently from 2020 onwards.  When the 
aggregate demand growth resumes, skilled labor supply fails to catch up immediately.  Hence 
the skilled labor supply and demand demonstrates a bigger gap than in the base case. 
 
(3) Domestic Skilled Labor hiring adjustment time becomes 100 years 
 When the domestic skilled labor hiring adjustment time is elongated to enormously 
long, which is 100 years in our test, the number of unemployed skilled labor keeps pilling up.  
This is because that the inflow of tertiary graduates to seek jobs is constant while the outflow 
from the Unemployed Skilled LF is incredibly small.  Therefore, skilled labor shortage 
aggravates.  However, the need for foreign labor (Need for F_Labors_SL) will only be 
triggered if the total domestic skilled labor force fails to satisfy the indicated skilled labor 
needed.  Total domestic skilled labor force is made up of employed domestic skilled labor 
and unemployed domestic skilled labor. So, the inflow of foreign skilled labor is very small 
even though the shortage of skilled labor is very high. As shown in the figure below, the 
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supply of skilled labor starts to exceed the demand from 2015 onwards.  This is because it 
takes there are constant inflow to skilled labor force, even though the inflow is small. But it 
takes years for the skilled labor to retire or leave the labor force. 
 
 
  
(4) Foreign Skilled Labor hiring adjustment time becomes 100 years 
 
When the hiring adjustment time for foreign skilled labor is extended to 100 years, it 
represents very small inflow. Motivation to University increases slightly after 2020 because 
of higher skilled job density.  Total Skilled Labor Force is trying to catch up with the demand.  
Only after around 2030, the outflow of domestic skilled labor force starts to exceed the 
inflow. Therefore, skilled labor shortage starts worsening. 
 
 
 
1,995 2,000 2,005 2,010 2,015 2,020 2,025 2,030 2,035 2,040 2,045 2,050
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
people
indicated Total Skilled Labors needed (people)
Total Skilled LF (people)
Non-commercial use only!
1,995 2,000 2,005 2,010 2,015 2,020 2,025 2,030 2,035 2,040 2,045 2,050
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
people
indicated Total Skilled Labors needed (people)
Total Skilled LF (people)
Non-commercial use only!
135 
 
(5) Domestic Unskilled Labor hiring adjustment time becomes 10 years 
 When the hiring adjustment for domestic unskilled labor is set to 10 years, that means 
the outflow from the unemployed domestic unskilled labor force is very slow. This will drive 
down wages as job seekers increase significantly. Also, this development will reduce the 
inflow of foreign unskilled labor. Currently, the hiring adjustment time for foreign unskilled 
labor is 1 year.  This means that whenever firms fail to fill up vacancies with local unskilled 
labor, they will seek out foreign unskilled labor.  Due to heighten unemployment rate, wages 
for unskilled presents a downward trend. Hence, wage premium hikes. This is the main 
reason for the significant increment for Motivation to University. As a consequence, 
domestic skilled labor production swells. This will eventually leads to the oversupply of 
skilled labor because of lower GDP due to labor shortage in general. 
  
 
 
(6) Foreign unskilled labor hiring adjustment time becomes 100 years 
 The adjustment time for foreign unskilled labor hiring is elongated to 100 years.  Thus 
the inflow to foreign unskilled labor stock becomes very small.  Unskilled labor shortage 
increase drastically.  As the unskilled labor market becomes tight, the wages for unskilled 
labor increases.  As wages for the unskilled becomes higher and the unskilled labor market is 
tight, firms increase investment in capital for production.  Therefore, the need for unskilled 
labor will be reduced.  Subsequently, the unemployment rate of unskilled labor increase due 
to the decrease in unskilled job demand.   From 2020 onwards, the wages for the unskilled is 
slightly lower than in the base case.  Thus, perceived wage premium remains higher from 
2010 until 2050.  The higher perceived wage premium compensates for lower skilled job 
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density, so Motivation to University remains higher from 2010 onwards. As a result, total 
skilled labor force is able to closely following the demand. Only until 2030, the increasing 
outflow from total skilled labor force causes skilled labor shortage to enlarge. 
 
 
 
4.5 Parameter Sensitivity Test (A6) 
 
Parameter Domestic Skilled LF Total Skilled LF 
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Mean Absolute 
Percent Error 
Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24 = 0.14 
0.9997 8.16% 0.9999 1.97% 
Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24 = 0.72 
0.9999 20.52% 0.9984 4.77% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 
to 24 = 0.08 
0.9995 6.47% 0.9999 1.41% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 
to 24 = 0.56 
0.9998 16.77% 0.9990 3.59% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 
to 29 = 0.14 
0.9998 3.32% 1.000 8.26% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 
to 29 = 0.7 
0.9997 0.51% 0.9999 1.58% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 
to 29 = 0.08 
0.9999 2.63% 1.0000 0.36% 
Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 
to 29 = 0.56 
0.9999 6.16% 1.0000 1.13% 
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hiring_SL _AT = 0.25 0.9999 0.24% 0.9998 0.43% 
hiring_SL _AT = 1 0.9999 0.29% 0.9964 5.47% 
hiring_USL _AT = 0.25 0.9999 0.22% 0.9999 0.32% 
hiring_USL _AT = 0.1 0.9999 0.62% 0.9999 0.76% 
F_Labors_SL_AT 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 1.3% 
F_Labors_SL_AT 0.9999 0.1% 0.9998 1.8% 
F_Labors_US_AT 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 0.3% 
F_Labors_US_AT 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 0.6% 
frct of _F_SL leaving 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 0.1% 
frct of _F_SL leaving 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 0.3% 
frct of _F_USL leaving 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 0.1% 
frct of _F_USL leaving 0.9999 0.1% 0.9999 0.2% 
distr_starting wage 0.9999 2.4% 0.9998 1.3% 
distr_starting wage 0.9999 2.7% 0.9996 2.1% 
distr_foregone earnings 0.9999 2.0% 0.9998 1.2% 
distr_foregone earnings 0.9999 2.6% 0.9998 1.1% 
distr_LT earnings 0.9999 0.2% 0.9999 0.2% 
distr_LT earnings 0.9999 0.6% 0.9999 0.3% 
distr_ease of finding job 0.9999 0.2% 0.9999 0.2% 
distr_ease of finding job 0.9999 0.3% 0.9999 0.3% 
 
  
138 
 
4.6 Integration Error Test (B1) 
 
Timestep = 0.03125 Timestep = 0.00390625 
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4.7 Policy Parameter and Behavior Sensitivity Tests 
  
We conduct parameter sensitivity tests on several uncertain added policy parameters 
for each individual policy as well as for combined policies. These parameters are:  
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Appendix B – Overview of Causal Loop Diagram & Loop Names 
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List of Loop Names 
 
Loop Number Loop Name 
Reinforcing Loop 
R1 Aggregate Demand and Skilled Input Loop 
R2 Capital Investment and Skilled Wages Loop 
Counteracting Loop 
C1 & C3 Perceived Wage Premium Loop 
C2 Skilled Job Density Loop 
C7 Foreign Skilled Labor Force Loop 
C8 Foreign Unskilled Labor Force Loop 
C9 
Capital Investment and Skilled Labor Gap 
Loop 
C13 & C14 Expected Lifetime Earnings Loop 
C15 Expected Foregone Earnings Loop 
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Appendix C – Model Documentation  
  
Detailed View of Skilled Labor Force 
 
  
Domestic LF_Skilled
TT_D_SLF
deaths_SLF
frct_death
tert grad entering
SLF
total graduates
retirement_rate_SL
F
Domestic Idled SWAP
leaving_SLF
frct_leaving_SLF_30
to 49
frct_leaving_SLF_50
to 61
AFP_SL TT_D_Idled_SWAP
deaths_Idled_SWA
P
retirement_rate_Idl
ed_SWAP
frct_death
frct_AFP_SL
Idled_SWAP_enter_
SLF
frct_skilled_Idles_re
-enter
tert grad not
seeking for job
frct not seeking for
job
PULS
PULS
PULS
PULS
USL upgrading to SL
143 
 
Name Dimens
ions 
Unit Definition Note 
actual GDP   NOK/year GDP_skilled+GDP_unskilled   
actual 
individual 
wages_SL 
  NOK/(year*people) 'Expected Skilled Labor Productivity'*'labor 
share_skilled'*'effect of skilled unemployment rate 
on wages' 
  
actual 
individual 
wages_US 
  NOK/(year*people) 'Expected Unskilled Labor Productivity'*'labor 
share_unskilled'*'effect of unskilled unemployment 
rate on wages' 
  
AD 
increasing 
rate 
  NOK/year² 'Aggregate Demand'*'ave_AD_growth fraction'   
AD_skilled   NOK/year 'Aggregate Demand'*'Reference Skilled Labor 
Fraction' 
  
AD_unskille
d 
  NOK/year ('Aggregate Demand'-AD_skilled)   
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AFP_SL 20..68 people/year IF(TIME<=1997<<@year>>, 
{ 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>>  ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[67]*frct_AFP_SL ,0<<people>>} 
/TIMESTEP*PULS, 
{ 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>>  ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[63]*frct_AFP_SL ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[64]*frct_AFP_SL ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[65]*frct_AFP_SL ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[66]*frct_AFP_SL ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[67]*frct_AFP_SL ,0<<people>>} 
/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
Divided by 2 because the 
fraction of of SLF who opted 
to retire early is less than 
nonTE LF. Need to find more 
documentation on this. 
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AFP_unskille
d 
20..68 people/year IF(TIME<=1997<<@year>>, 
{ 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>>  ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[67]*frct_AFP_unskilled ,0<<people>>} 
/TIMESTEP*PULS, 
{ 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>>  ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[63]*frct_AFP_unskilled ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[64]*frct_AFP_unskilled ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[65]*frct_AFP_unskilled ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[66]*frct_AFP_unskilled ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[67]*frct_AFP_unskilled ,0<<people>>} 
/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
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AG_18 and 
Incompletes 
entering_US
LF 
20..68 people/year {'Age 
Group_18'*frct_To_USLF_AG_19/TIMESTEP*PULS,'In
completes to USLF'[21],'Incompletes to 
USLF'[22],'Incompletes to USLF'[23],'Incompletes to 
USLF'[24],'Incompletes to USLF'[25],'Incompletes to 
USLF'[26],'Incompletes to USLF'[27],'Incompletes to 
USLF'[28],'Incompletes to USLF'[29],'Incompletes to 
USLF'[30],'Incompletes to USLF'[31],'Incompletes to 
USLF'[32],0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<p
eople/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0
<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>
>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/ye
ar>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people
/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>} 
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Age 
Group_18 
  people GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{ 578
21, 55038, 52724, 53510, 53473, 53372, 53293, 
53873, 52835, 53349, 54293, 55704, 57236, 60587, 
62574, 64754, 65164, 64855, 64422, 65046, 65700, 
66645, 65730, 64431, 65366, 65472, 63495, 62613, 
64142, 64650, 64718, 66381, 66255, 68267, 68365, 
68282, 68280, 68333, 68885, 69492, 70138, 70800, 
71461, 72102, 72696, 73234, 73697, 74080, 74378, 
74595, 74739, 74827, 74872, 74895, 74909, 74929, 
74968//Min:-1;Max:11// }<<people>>) 
  
Aggregate 
Demand 
  NOK/year 1588532000000<<NOK/year>> real AD=rea GDP-change in 
real Inventories real 
AD=1588741000000<<NOK/ye
ar>>-
209000000<<NOK/year>>= 
1588532000000 
All Tert 
Graduates 
1994 to 
2008 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{275
40 ,26763 ,31702 ,31812 ,30083 ,30644 ,31324 ,3194
8 ,30323 ,30601 ,32160 ,32161 ,33626 ,35487 ,35330 
,35203//Min:20000;Max:40000// }) 
The state university colleges is 
a term for type of university 
college which is a result from 
a reform in 1994.  This 
includes all tertiary graduates, 
including those with 
lower/higher, and doctoral 
studies. 
arrsum DSLF   people ARRSUM('Domestic LF_Skilled')   
arrsum 
DUSLF 
  people ARRSUM('Domestic LF_Unskilled')   
arrsum PT 1   people ARRSUM('Students as PT USL yr 1')   
arrsum PT 2   people ARRSUM('Students as PT USL yr 2')   
arrsum PT 3   people ARRSUM('Students as PT USL yr 3')   
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arrsum total 
grad_22 to 
32 
  people ARRSUM('total graduates')*TIMESTEP   
ave capital 
investment 
growth 
fraction 
  1/year 0.08<<1/year>>*'Effect of Wage Growth on Capital 
Investment' 
  
ave study 
period 
  year 3   
ave time 
stay in 
Norway 
    40   
ave working 
years in 
life_SL 
  year 43   
ave working 
years in 
life_unskille
d 
  year 48   
ave_AD_gro
wth fraction 
  1/year 0.033<<1/year>>*'effect of GDP_AD differential on 
AD growth' 
  
ave_L_pdty_
growth 
rate_SL 
  1/year GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.01
87,0.02,0.02055,0.01945,0.0193,0.0193,0.0193//Min:
0.015;Max:0.025//}<<1/year>>)*'effect of UR_SL on 
probability of hiring high-quality labors'*'capital 
deepening effect on SL pdty'  
L/pdty has slowed down since 
2005 as the level in the 
beginning of 1990s.  The ave 
L/pdty growth rate was 
around 2.5% from 1990 - 2003 
ave_L_pdty_
growth 
rate_US 
  1/year GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.01
944,0.0199,0.0206,0.02176,0.02197,0.02187,0.02187
//Min:0.015;Max:0.023//}<<1/year>>)*'effect of 
UR_unskilled on probability of hiring high-quality 
labors'*'capital deepening effect on USL pdty' 
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become US 
Idles at 19 
20..68 people/year { 'Age 
Group_18'*frct_To_Idle_USLF_AG_19 ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> }/TIMESTEP*PULS 
  
capital 
deepening 
effect on SL 
pdty 
    DELAYINF(GRAPHCURVE('capital intensity 
index',0.1,0.05,{1,1,1.006,1.013,1.02,1.028,1.038,1.0
49,1.059,1.074,1.0845,1.09,1.092//Min:0.95;Max:1.1
//}),1<<year>>,1) 
  
capital 
deepening 
effect on 
USL pdty 
    DELAYINF(GRAPHCURVE('capital intensity 
index',0.1,0.05,{1,1,1.006,1.018,1.034,1.052,1.073,1.
092,1.105,1.111,1.116,1.119,1.118//Min:0.95;Max:1.
15//}),1<<year>>,1) 
  
capital 
intensity 
  NOK/(year*people) 'Net Capital Investment'/'total LF'   
capital 
intensity 
index 
    ('capital intensity'-'delayed cap intensity')/'delayed 
cap intensity' 
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change in 
labor 
pdty_SL 
  NOK/(year²*people) MAX('Expected Skilled Labor 
Productivity',1<<NOK/year/people>>)*'ave_L_pdty_g
rowth rate_SL' 
  
change in 
labor 
pdty_unskill
ed 
  NOK/(year²*people) MAX('Expected Unskilled Labor 
Productivity',1<<NOK/year/people>>)*'ave_L_pdty_g
rowth rate_US' 
  
Constant_A
D 
1..16   0   
Constant_D
SLF 
1..57   0   
Constant_FS
LF 
1..57   0   
Constant_F
USLF 
1..57   0   
Constant_TS
LF 
1..57   0   
Cont_USLF_
AG_30 
  people/year 'To_Pot Students_AG_30'   
Cont_USLF_
AG_31 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_31-
To_Online_Univ1_AG_31 
  
Cont_USLF_
AG_32 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_32-
To_Online_Univ1_AG_32 
  
Cont_USLF_
AG_33 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_33-
To_Online_Univ1_AG_33 
  
Cont_USLF_
AG_34 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_34-
To_Online_Univ1_AG_34 
  
Cont_USLF_
AG_35 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_35-
To_Online_Univ1_AG_35 
  
deaths_AG_
19 
  people/year deaths_USLF[20]   
deaths_AG_
20 
  people/year deaths_USLF[21]   
deaths_AG_
21 
  people/year deaths_USLF[22]   
deaths_AG_
22 
  people/year deaths_USLF[23]   
deaths_AG_
23 
  people/year deaths_USLF[24]   
deaths_AG_
24 
  people/year deaths_USLF[25]   
deaths_AG_
25 
  people/year deaths_USLF[26]   
deaths_AG_
26 
  people/year deaths_USLF[27]   
deaths_AG_
27 
  people/year deaths_USLF[28]   
deaths_AG_
28 
  people/year deaths_USLF[29]   
deaths_AG_
29 
  people/year deaths_USLF[30]   
deaths_AG_
30 
  people/year deaths_USLF[31]   
deaths_AG_   people/year deaths_USLF[32]   
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31 
deaths_AG_
32 
  people/year deaths_USLF[33]   
deaths_AG_
33 
  people/year deaths_USLF[34]   
deaths_AG_
34 
  people/year deaths_USLF[35]   
deaths_Idle
_SWAP 
20..67 people/year 'Domestic Idle 
SWAP'[20..67]/TIMESTEP*PULS*frct_death[20..67] 
  
deaths_Inac
tive USWAP 
20..67 people/year MAX(0<<people>>,'Domestic Idle 
USWAP'[20..67])/TIMESTEP*PULS*frct_death[20..67] 
  
deaths_SLF 20..67 people/year 'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[20..67]*frct_death[20..67]/TIMESTEP*PUL
S 
  
deaths_USL
F 
20..67 people/year IF('Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[20..67]>0<<people>>,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[20..67])*frct_death[20..67]/TIMESTEP*
PULS 
  
delayed cap 
intensity 
  NOK/(year*people) DELAYINF('capital intensity',5<<year>>,1)   
delayed 
indicated SL 
needed 
  people DELAYINF('indicated Total Skilled Labor 
needed',5<<year>>,1) 
  
delayed SLF 
fraction 
    DELAYINF('SLF fraction',1<<year>>,1)   
delayed 
total SLF 
  people DELAYINF('total SLF',1<<year>>,1)   
delayed 
total SLF frct 
    DELAYINF('total SLF frct',1<<year>>,1)   
delayed 
total USLF 
  people DELAYINF('Total Unskilled LF',1<<year>>,1)   
delayed 
Total Wages 
  NOK/year DELAYINF('Total Wages',5<<year>>,1)   
density of 
skilled job 
    'indicated Total Skilled Labor needed'/'total SLF' 
//more than 1 means tight. 
  
density of 
unskilled job 
    'indicated Total USL needed'/'Total Unskilled LF'   
desired total 
interns_19-
29 
  people IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,'total tert students_19-
29'+0*'total F_Students') 
  
distr_ease 
of finding 
job 
    2   
distr_forego
ne earnings 
    4   
distr_LT 
earnings 
    1   
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distr_wage 
premium 
    3   
Domestic 
Idle SWAP 
20..68 people { 2445                    //19// ,2619,2297,2352,2908,4022 
//20..24 // ,3125,3077,3249,2905,2942 //25..29 
// ,2507,2157,2147,2128,2152 //30..34 
// ,1991,1821,1771,1820,1789 //35..39 
// ,1637,1471,1276,1162,1022 //40..44 
// ,1495,1688,1916,1861,1927 //45..49 
// ,1837,1685,1578,1731,1780 //50..54 
// ,1909,2002,2194,2269,2521 //55..59 
// ,2685,2940,3025,3182,3201 //60..64 
// ,3589,4436,5557           //65..67// } 
  
Domestic 
Idle USWAP 
20..68 people { 16361                               
//19// ,11932,10466,9409,9209,12736       
//20..24// ,9896, 9744, 10288, 9201, 9316  //25..29 
// ,7939, 6832, 6797, 6738, 6816  //30..34 // ,6304, 
5766, 5609, 5764, 5664  //35..39// ,5185, 4657, 4039, 
3678, 3237  //40..44 // ,4733, 5346, 6069, 5894, 6102  
//45..49 // ,5816, 5337, 4997, 5481, 5637  //50..54 
// ,6044, 6339, 6947, 7184, 7982  //55..59 // ,8503, 
9311, 9578, 10077, 10138 //60..64 // ,11366, 14047, 
17597        //65..67//  } 
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Domestic 
LF_Skilled 
20..68 people { 4045                                    
//19// ,8993 ,9403 ,9570 ,9469 ,9936 
//20..24// ,11728 ,12055 ,12529 ,12734 ,12988 
//25..29// ,12901 ,13189 ,13288 ,13336 ,13657 
//30..34// ,13770 ,13809 ,14182 ,14132 ,14048 
//35..39// ,12772 ,12762 ,13819 ,12882 ,13097 
//40..44// ,12971 ,13169 ,13547 ,12005 ,11407 
//45..49// ,9019 ,8277 ,7179 ,7324 ,7029 
//50..54// ,6617 ,6151 ,5704 ,5316 ,5097 
//55..59// ,4327 ,4527 ,4452 ,4481 ,4316 
//60..64// ,4083 ,3364 ,2809                   //65..67//  }  
  
Domestic 
LF_Unskilled 
20..68 people { 29666                              
//19// ,25595 ,26761 ,27239 ,26950 ,28280 
//20..24// ,33381 ,34312 ,35660 ,36244 ,36965 
//25..29// ,37939 ,38760 ,39043 ,39178 ,40091 
//30..34// ,40414 ,40524 ,41586 ,41443 ,41205 
//35..39// ,43032 ,42999 ,40552 ,43392 ,44095 
//40..44// ,43681 ,44329 ,45568 ,40519 ,38561 
//45..49// ,35565 ,32738 ,28559 ,29110 ,27985 
//50..54// ,26417 ,24644 ,22941 ,21463 ,20630 
//55..59// ,20671 ,21570 ,21233 ,21364 ,20621 
//60..64// ,18350 ,15119 ,12627                  //65..67 
//  } 
  
Domestic 
Skilled LF 
  people DELAYINF(ARRSUM('Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[20..67]),1<<year>>,1) 
  
Domestic 
Skilled LF 
with all-in-
one policy 
    GRAPH(TIME,STARTTIME,1<<year>>,Constant_DSLF)   
Domestic 
USLF 
  people DELAYINF(ARRSUM('Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[20..67]),0.5<<year>>,1) 
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dropOuts LF 
parti rate 
    1   
ease of 
finding jobs 
    GRAPHCURVE('pcvd density of skilled 
job',0.9,0.05,{1.01,1.01,1.01,1.05,1.1,1.17,1.25,1.32,1
.405,1.49,1.56,1.61,1.63//Min:0.7;Max:2//}) 
  
effect of  
wage 
premium 
    GRAPHCURVE('perceived wage 
premium',0.8,0.1,{0.63,0.74,0.835,0.93,1.07,1.18,1.3
05,1.44,1.515,1.565,1.61,1.66,1.71,1.76,1.84,1.92,1.9
5,2.02//Min:0.5;Max:2.5//}) 
  
effect of 
domestic 
SLF 
coverage on 
foreign SL 
hiring AT 
    GRAPH('density of skilled 
job',0.8,0.1,{1.1,1.05,1,1,1,1,1,1//Min:0.95;Max:1.15/
/}) 
  
effect of 
domestic 
USLF 
coverage on 
foreign USL 
hiring 
    GRAPH('density of unskilled 
job',0.8,0.1,{1.1,1.05,1,1,1,1,1,1//Min:0.95;Max:1.15/
/}) 
  
effect of 
expected 
foregone 
earnings 
growth 
    GRAPHCURVE('perceived foregone earnings 
ratio',0.95,0.02,{1.158,1.14,1.106,1,0.935,0.906,0.85
2,0.824,0.798,0.776,0.766,0.762//Min:0.7;Max:1.2//}
)*'effect of internship_foregone earnings ratio on 
internship attractiveness' 
  
effect of 
F_Student 
cap on 
expected 
budget 
growth fract 
    GRAPH('F_Students cap 
ratio',0.95,0.02,{0,2.14,4.07,5,5//Min:-1;Max:5//}) 
  
effect of 
GDP_AD 
differential 
on AD 
growth 
    GRAPHCURVE('GDP and AD 
ratio',0.1,0.2,{0.74,0.745,0.77,0.82,0.974,1.014,1.02,
1.02//Min:0.7;Max:1.05//}) 
  
effect of 
internship 
cap on 
expected 
budget 
growth fract 
    GRAPH('internship capacity 
ratio',0.7,0.05,{3.55,3.35,3.06,2.32,1.2,0.5,0,0//Min:-
1;Max:4//}) 
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effect of 
internship_f
oregone 
earnings 
ratio on 
internship 
attractivene
ss 
    IF(TIME>2015<<@year>>,GRAPHCURVE('internship_ 
foregone earnings 
ratio',0,0.03,{1,1.024,1.066,1.11,1.15,1.186,1.206,1.2
1//Min:0.9;Max:1.5//}),1) 
  
effect of 
Online_Stud
ent cap on 
expected 
budget 
growth fract 
    GRAPH('Online_Students 
ratio',0.98,0.05,{0,2.03,3.32,3.77,3.84//Min:-
1;Max:4//}) 
  
effect of 
relative 
expected LT 
earnings 
    GRAPHCURVE('relative expected LT earnings'/'pcvd 
relative expected LT 
earnings',0.75,0.01,{0.784,0.813,0.846,0.842,0.864,0.
87,0.875,0.88,0.885,0.89,0.896,0.903,0.91,0.91,0.914
,0.914,0.94,0.94,0.935,0.953,0.974,0.98,0.99,1.005,1.
011,1.013,1.028,1.035,1.042,1.055,1.062,1.07,1.077,
1.088,1.1,1.11,1.13,1.16,1.173,1.19,1.215,1.223,1.22
6,1.25,1.265,1.28,1.294,1.304,1.31,1.32,1.325//Min:0
.75;Max:1.4//}) 
  
effect of 
skilled 
unemploym
ent rate on 
wages 
    GRAPHCURVE('unemployment 
rate_SL',0.01,0.02,{1.1,1.08,1.03,0.987,0.953,0.922,0.
908//Min:0.85;Max:1.15//}) 
  
effect of 
surplus on 
firing rate 
    GRAPHCURVE('surplus of F_labors_SL'/'total 
Employed 
SLF',0.1,0.1,{0.05,0.08,0.086,0.125,0.18,0.24,0.365,0.
49,0.7,0.984//Min:-0.1;Max:1.1//}) 
  
effect of 
unskilled 
unemploym
ent rate on 
wages 
    GRAPHCURVE('unemployment 
rate_USL',0.01,0.02,{1.071,1.055,1.011,0.97,0.939,0.
922,0.908//Min:0.85;Max:1.15//}) 
  
effect of 
UR_SL on 
probability 
of hiring 
high-quality 
labors 
    GRAPH('unemployment 
rate_SL'/natural_UR_SL,0.8,0.1,{1,1,1,1.015,1.037,1.0
74,1.106,1.129//Min:0.95;Max:1.2//}) 
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effect of 
UR_unskille
d on 
probability 
of hiring 
high-quality 
labors 
    GRAPH('unemployment 
rate_USL'/natural_UR_unskilled,0.8,0.1,{1,1,1,1.015,1
.037,1.074,1.106,1.129//Min:0.95;Max:1.2//}) 
  
Effect of 
Wage 
Growth on 
Capital 
Investment 
    GRAPHCURVE('frct_total wages 
growth',0.9,0.05,{0.94,0.95,1.01,1.04,1.08,1.126,1.15
,1.184,1.19,1.2,1.2//Min:0.5;Max:1.5//}) 
  
effectivenes
s of 
F_Students 
Policy 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0,0,
0,0,0.09,0.31,0.39,0.44,0.47,0.496,0.496,0.5//Min:-
0.1;Max:1//}) 
  
effectivenes
s of 
Internship 
Policy 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,4<<year>>,{0,0,
0,0,0.03,0.305,0.56,0.62,0.65,0.66,0.67,0.68,0.695,0.
695,0.7//Min:-0.1;Max:0.8//}) 
  
effectivenes
s of Online 
Univ Policy 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0,0,
0,0,0.09,0.39,0.52,0.61,0.67,0.716,0.76,0.77//Min:-
0.1;Max:1//}) 
  
ELT earnings     'relative expected LT earnings'/'pcvd relative 
expected LT earnings' 
  
Employed 
Domestic 
SLF 
  people 463917   
Employed 
Domestic 
USLF 
  people 1494200   
Employed 
F_ Students 
  people DELAYINF('Employed Foreign Students',1<<year>>,1)   
employed 
F_students 
leaving rate 
  people/year ('Employed Foreign Students'/'ave time stay in 
Norway')/TIMESTEP*PULS 
  
Employed 
Foreign 
Students 
  people 0<<people>>   
Employed 
USLF 
  people 'Employed Domestic USLF'+'Foreign Labor_Unskilled'   
employment 
rate_SL 
    'Employed Domestic SLF'/'total SLF'   
employment 
rate_USL 
    'Employed Domestic USLF'/'Total Unskilled LF'   
entering_On
line_Univ1_
AG_19 
  people/year To_Online_Univ_AG_30   
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entering_Un
iv1_AG_19 
  people/year To_Univ_AG_19/TIMESTEP*PULS   
estimated 
F_students 
recruitment 
AT 
  year 10<<year>>   
Estimated 
Skilled Labor 
Demand 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{479114 ,49
9802 ,538477 ,574924 ,616100 ,642523 ,652978 ,708
598 ,747457 ,750757 ,765194 ,798058 ,760718 ,8391
64 ,862120 ,891947 ,935149 ,965970 ,996835 ,10271
39 ,1056780 ,1086150 ,1115276 ,1144827 ,1174042 ,
1203720 ,1233956 ,1265359 ,1297369 ,1329610 ,136
1744 ,1394738 ,1428319 ,1462251 ,1496946 ,153224
1 ,1568473 ,1604921 ,1641977 ,1679440 ,1717412 ,1
755652 ,1794122 ,1833649 ,1873751 ,1914939 ,1957
133 ,2000354 ,2045724 ,2092300 ,2140464 ,2190129 
,2240880 ,2293468 ,2347816 ,2403604 ,2460222  })  
  
exp per 
F_Student 
  NOK/(year*people) 70000<<NOK/year/people>>*(1+RAMP(0.05<<1/year
>>,2016<<@year>>)) 
  
expected 
foregone 
earnings 
  NOK/people ('perceived unskilled  wages'*'ave study period')-
1*(IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,'total internship 
spending per person'*'effectiveness of Internship 
Policy')) 
  
expected 
foreign 
student 
capacity 
growth frct 
    1.05*'effect of F_Student cap on expected budget 
growth fract' 
  
Expected 
Indicated SL 
needed 
  people/year ('indicated Total Skilled Labor needed'-'delayed 
indicated SL needed')/TIMESTEP*PULS 
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expected 
intern cap 
growth frct 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,2014<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.25
,0.15,0.1,0.05,0.05,0.05,0.03,0.03,0.03//Min:-
0.1;Max:0.5//})*'effect of internship cap on expected 
budget growth fract' 
  
expected LT 
Earnings_no
nTE 
  NOK/people 'perceived unskilled  wages'*'ave working years in 
life_unskilled' 
  
expected LT 
Earnings_SL 
  NOK/people ('perceived skilled  wages'*'ave working years in 
life_SL')-'expected foregone earnings' 
  
expected 
online cap 
growth frct 
    1.02*'effect of Online_Student cap on expected 
budget growth fract' 
  
Expected 
Skilled Labor 
Productivity 
  NOK/people/year 860000<<NOK/people/year>> real gdp @ 1994 * frct of 
skilled gdp 
=1588741000000*0.3 = 
476622300000 skilled 
employed labors = SLF * 
employed frct = 478265*0.97 
= 463917 skilled labor pdty 
=476622300000/463917 = 
1027387 
Expected 
Unskilled 
Labor 
Productivity 
  NOK/people/year 720000 real GDP @ 1994 *(1- frct of 
skilled gdp) 
=1588741000000*0.7 
=1112118700000 employed 
USL = USLF * employed frct 
=1589571*0.94 = 1494200 US 
labor pdty 
=1112118700000/1494200 
=744290 
expenditure 
per online 
student 
  NOK/(year*people) 70000<<NOK/year/people>>*(1+RAMP(0.05<<1/year
>>,2016<<@year>>)) 
  
extra 
F_Student 
cap 
  people IF('F_Student cap gap'>0<<people>>,('F_Student cap 
gap'+'total F_Students'*'expected foreign student 
capacity growth frct'),'F_Student cap gap') 
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extra 
internship 
cap needed 
  people IF('desired total interns_19-29'>'internship cap 
gap',IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,('desired total 
interns_19-29'-'Internship Capacity')*(1+'expected 
intern cap growth frct'),0<<people>>),('desired total 
interns_19-29'-'Internship Capacity')) 
  
extra online 
cap 
  people IF(TIME>2013<<@year>>,IF('online edu cap 
gap'>0<<people>>,('online edu cap gap'+('total online 
students'*'expected online cap growth frct')),'online 
edu cap gap')) 
  
Extra 
Tert_Edu 
Capacity for 
Foreign 
Students 
  people 0   
F_Labors 
firing 
rate_SL 
  people/year (MIN('surplus of F_labors_SL',MAX('Foreign 
Labor_Skilled',0<<people>>)))/(TIMESTEP)*PULS*'eff
ect of surplus on firing rate' 
  
F_Labors 
firing 
rate_unskill
ed 
  people/year MIN('surplus of_F_USL',MAX('Foreign 
Labor_Unskilled',0<<people>>))/TIMESTEP*PULS 
  
F_Labors 
hiring 
rate_SL 
  people/year 1*('need for 
F_labors_SL'/F_Labors_SL_AT/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
F_Labors 
hiring 
rate_unskill
ed 
  people/year 1*('need for 
F_labors_US'/F_Labors_US_AT)/TIMESTEP*PULS 
  
F_Labors 
leaving 
rate_SL 
  people/year 'Foreign Labor_Skilled'*'frct of _F_SL leaving'   
F_Labors 
leaving 
rate_unskill
ed 
  people/year 'Foreign Labor_Unskilled'*'frct of _F_USL leaving'   
F_Labors_SL
_AT 
    (2.5-STEP(0.5,2006<<@year>>))*'effect of domestic 
SLF coverage on foreign SL hiring AT' 
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F_Labors_U
S_AT 
    (1.25-STEP(0.25,2005<<@year>>))*'effect of 
domestic USLF coverage on foreign USL hiring' 
  
F_Student 
cap gap 
  people IF('total F_Students'>'Extra Tert_Edu Capacity for 
Foreign Students','total F_Students'-'Extra Tert_Edu 
Capacity for Foreign Students') 
  
F_Student 
graduation 
rate 
  people/year 'Foreign Students_Univ3'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
F_Student 
to Univ2 
  people/year 'Foreign Students_Univ1'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
F_Student 
to Univ3 
  people/year 'Foreign Students_Univ2'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
F_student_r
ecruitement 
rate 
  people/year 0<<people/year>>+STEP(('targeted no of F_students 
recruitment per 
year'),2014<<@year>>)*'effectiveness of F_Students 
Policy'*'effect of internship_foregone earnings ratio 
on internship attractiveness' 
  
F_Students 
cap ratio 
    IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,'total F_Students'/'Extra 
Tert_Edu Capacity for Foreign Students') 
  
F_Students 
Edu budget 
increasing 
rate 
  NOK/year² IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,(('extra F_Student cap'*'exp 
per F_Student')/'foreign students T_Edu budget 
AT')/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
F_Students 
hiring AT 
    0.75*'effect of domestic SLF coverage on foreign SL 
hiring AT' 
  
F_Students_
cap 
increasing 
rate 
  people/year IF(TIME>2016<<@year>>,('extra F_Student 
cap'/'foreign students T_Educap building 
AT')/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
F_students_l
eaving rate 
after grad 
  people/year TT_F_TertGrads*'frct_F_students_leave after grad'   
finish 
studies 
20..68 people/year 'Students as PT USL yr 3'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
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firing 
rate_SL 
  people/year (MIN(MAX('surplus of 
F_labors_SL',0<<people>>),MAX('Employed Domestic 
SLF',0<<people>>)))/(TIMESTEP)*PULS*'effect of 
surplus on firing rate'  
  
firing 
rate_unskill
ed 
  people/year (MIN(MAX('surplus 
of_F_USL',0<<people>>),MAX('Employed Domestic 
USLF',0<<people>>)))/(TIMESTEP)*PULS 
  
foregone 
earnings_no 
internship 
  NOK/people 'ave study period'*'perceived unskilled  wages'   
Foreign Job-
seeking Tert 
Grads 
  people 0<<people>>   
Foreign 
Labor_Skille
d 
  people 2191 OECD International Migration 
Outlook 2006 (table A.2.2, 
A.2.3) Stock of Migrants in LF 
(males) (number of foreigners 
or foregin born individuals 
living and working)  in 1994 - 
2.8% of LF in 2004 - 4.1% of LF  
Assuming 0.2 is skilled  total LF 
x 0.028 = 57887 57887 * 0.2 = 
11577  
Foreign 
Labor_Unski
lled 
  people 10000 OECD International Migration 
Outlook 2006 (table A.2.2, 
A.2.3) Stock of Migrants in LF 
(males) (number of foreigners 
or foregin born individuals 
living and working)  in 1994 - 
2.8% of LF in 2004 - 4.1% of LF  
Assuming 0.8 is unskilled  total 
LF x 0.028 = 57887 57887 * 0.8 
= 46310 
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foreign 
skilled 
labors 
inflow 
  people/year GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{1182 ,1245
 ,1310 ,1379 ,1452 ,1528 ,1586 ,1899 ,2416 ,2565 ,33
01 ,2842 ,4053 ,5491 ,5257 ,5605,5600//Min:-
1;Max:6000//}<<people/year>>) 
  
Foreign 
Skilled LF- 
no wage 
premium 
effect 
    GRAPH(TIME,STARTTIME,1<<year>>,Constant_FSLF)   
Foreign 
Student 
Tert_Edu 
Budget 
  NOK/year 0   
foreign 
students 
T_Edu 
budget AT 
    2   
foreign 
students 
T_Educap 
building AT 
    3+'foreign students T_Edu budget AT'   
Foreign 
Students_U
niv1 
  people 0<<people>>   
Foreign 
Students_U
niv2 
  people 0<<people>>   
Foreign 
Students_U
niv3 
  people 0<<people>>   
foreign 
unskilled 
labors 
inflow 
  people/year GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{4507 ,5634
 ,7042 ,8802 ,11003 ,13754 ,14270 ,17095 ,21742 ,23
085 ,29712 ,25580 ,36475 ,49422 ,47314 ,50446 
//Min:-1;Max:6000//}<<people/year>>) 
  
Foreign 
unskilled LF-
FUSL hiring 
AT 6 months 
    GRAPH(TIME,STARTTIME,1<<year>>,Constant_FUSLF)   
fraction with 
PT job 
    0.55   
fractional 
growth of 
SLF 
  year^-1 'Reference Skilled Labor Fraction'*'SLF growth rate'   
fractional 
hiring 
increment 
rate_SL 
    GRAPHCURVE('employment 
rate_SL',0,0.1,{0.99,0.976,0.972,0.97,0.957,0.95,0.94
5,0.937,0.934,0.903,0.78//Min:0.5;Max:1.1//}) 
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fractional 
hiring 
increment 
rate_US 
    GRAPHCURVE('employment 
rate_USL',0,0.1,{1,1,1,0.984,0.98,0.965,0.94,0.895,0.
798,0.697,0.535//Min:0.5;Max:1.1//}) 
  
fractional 
skilled frct 
increment 
rate 
  year^-1 GRAPH('gap of skilled job 
frct',0,0.1,{1,0.965,0.89,0.816,0.66,0.426,0.3,0.21,0.1
4,0.06,0//Min:0;Max:1.1//}<<1/year>>) 
  
frct not 
seeking for 
job 
    0.15   
frct of _F_SL 
leaving 
  1/year 0.01   
frct of 
_F_USL 
leaving 
  1/year 0.05   
frct work 
part_time 
    0.5   
frct_AFP_SL     GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.01,0.02,
0.04,0.04,0.04//Min:0;Max:0.1//}) 
  
frct_AFP_un
skilled 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.04,0.15,0
.19,0.19,0.19//Min:0;Max:0.4//}) 
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frct_death 1..82   { 0.002,0.002,0.002,0.002,0.002  //0-
4// ,0.0005,0.0005,0.0005,0.0005,0.0005  //5-
9// ,0.0004,0.0004,0.0004,0.0004,0.0004  //10-
14// ,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001  //15-
19// ,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001  //20-
24// ,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001  //25-
29// ,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001,0.0001  //30-
34// ,0.0002,0.0002,0.0002,0.0002,0.0002  //35-
39// ,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003  //40-
44// ,0.006,0.006,0.006,0.006,0.006       //45-49   
// ,0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01            //50-
54// ,0.02,0.02,0.02,0.02,0.02            //55-
59// ,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03            //60-
64// ,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03            //65-
69// ,0.07,0.07,0.07,0.07,0.07            //70-
74// ,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1                 //75-79// ,0.25,0.25 
//over 80// } 
  
frct_F_stude
nts_leave 
after grad 
    0.6   
frct_interns
hip_coverag
e 
    MIN((0.3+RAMP(0.01<<1/year>>,2015<<@year>>)),0
.65) 
  
frct_labor_p
dty_growth 
  year^-1 GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{0.037,0.03
2,0.033,0.027,0.02,0.012,0.039,0.034,0.022,0.031,0.0
2,0.013,-0.009,-0.012,-0.013}<<1/year>>) 
  
frct_labor_p
dty_growth
_SL 
  year^-1 GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{0.037,0.03
7,0.032,0.033,0.027,0.02,0.012,0.039,0.034,0.022,0.0
31,0.02,0.013,-0.009,-0.012,0.01//Min:-
0.1;Max:0.1//}<<1/year>>)*'effect of UR_SL on 
probability of hiring high-quality labors' 
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frct_leaving
_SLF_30 to 
49 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.003,0.0
08,0.01,0.01//Min:0;Max:0.06//}) 
  
frct_leaving
_SLF_50 to 
61 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.03,0.07,
0.06,0.06//Min:0;Max:0.02//})  
  
frct_leaving
_USLF_30 to 
39 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.0
0716,0.0084,0.0088,0.00884//Min:0;Max:0.01//}) 
  
frct_leaving
_USLF_40 to 
49 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.0
095,0.0154,0.017,0.017//Min:0;Max:0.04//})   
  
frct_leaving
_USLF_50 to 
61 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.0
185,0.0304,0.033,0.0323//Min:0;Max:0.06//}) 
  
frct_NOT_to
_Univ1_AG_
19 
    1-frct_To_Univ1_AG_19 Jobs for Youth (OECD) - 
Norway  The average young 
Norwegian has a relatively low 
probability of being out of 
employment after leaving 
education.  That probability is 
of 10.3 percentage points for 
young men aged 20-29.    
Note: in Norway, being non-
employed = inactive, rather 
than unemployed. (pg. 51) 
frct_skilled_I
dles_re-
enter 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.1
,0.12,0.15,0.15//Min:0;Max:2//}) 
  
frct_To_Idle
_USLF_AG_1
9 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.08
5,0.03,0.054,0.077,0.096,0.092,0.092//Min:-
0.1;Max:0.5//})*frct_NOT_to_Univ1_AG_19 
  
frct_To_Onli
ne_Univ1_3
0 to 35 
    (0+RAMP(0.004<<1/year>>,2012<<@year>>))   
frct_To_Onli
ne_Univ1_A
G_30 
    (0+RAMP(0.004<<1/year>>,2014<<@year>>))    
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frct_To_Uni
v1_AG_19 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.12
6,0.12,0.15,0.17,0.1776,0.1776//Min:0.1;Max:0.2//})
*'motivation to univ' 
  
frct_to_Univ
_20 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.23
4,0.275,0.296,0.308,0.31,0.31,0.31//Min:0.2;Max:0.3
3//})*'motivation to univ' 
  
frct_to_Univ
_21 to 25 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.19
7,0.155,0.194,0.246,0.25,0.25,0.254//Min:0;Max:0.3/
/})*'motivation to univ' 
  
frct_to_Univ
_26  to 29 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.00
1,0.143,0.114,0.108,0.114,0.117,0.117//Min:0;Max:0
.2//})*'motivation to univ' 
  
frct_To_USL
F_AG_19 
    frct_NOT_to_Univ1_AG_19*(1-
frct_To_Idle_USLF_AG_19) 
  
frct_total 
wages 
growth 
    'Total Wages'/'delayed Total Wages'   
frct_unskille
d_Idles_re-
enter 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.1
1,0.087,0.069,0.06//Min:-0.05;Max:0.2//}) 
  
gap of 
skilled job 
frct 
    'Reference Skilled Labor Fraction'/'max fract of skilled 
job' 
  
GDP and AD 
ratio 
    'actual GDP'/'Aggregate Demand'   
GDP_skilled   NOK/year 'Expected Skilled Labor Productivity'*'total Employed 
SLF' 
  
GDP_unskill
ed 
  NOK/year 'Employed USLF'*'Expected Unskilled Labor 
Productivity' 
  
Grad_19-24   people In_Univ3_AG_22+In_Univ3_AG_23+In_Univ3_AG_24   
Grad_25-29   people In_Univ3_AG_25+In_Univ3_AG_26+In_Univ3_AG_27
+In_Univ3_AG_28+In_Univ3_AG_29 
  
Graduate_T
urning_22 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_21/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_23 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_22/TIMESTEP*PULS   
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Graduate_T
urning_24 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_23/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_25 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_24/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_26 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_25/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_27 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_26/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_28 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_27/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_29 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_28/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_30 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_29/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_31 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_30/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduate_T
urning_32 
  people/year In_Univ3_AG_31/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Graduates_L
ower_25-29 
  people/year Graduates_lower_Turning_25+Graduates_lower_Tur
ning_26+Graduates_lower_Turning_27+Graduates_lo
wer_Turning_28+Graduates_lower_Turning_29 
  
Graduates_l
ower_Turni
ng_25 
  people/year Graduate_Turning_25   
Graduates_l
ower_Turni
ng_26 
  people/year Graduate_Turning_26   
Graduates_l
ower_Turni
ng_27 
  people/year Graduate_Turning_27   
Graduates_l
ower_Turni
ng_28 
  people/year Graduate_Turning_28   
Graduates_l
ower_Turni
ng_29 
  people/year Graduate_Turning_29   
growth frct 
of SGDP 
  year^-1 DELAYINF(L_Pdty_growth_rate_SL+'SLF growth 
rate',1<<year>>,1) 
  
growth frct 
of USGDP 
  year^-1 DELAYINF(L_Pdty_growth_rate_unskilled+'USLF 
growth rate',1<<year>>,1) 
  
hiring 
rate_f_stud
ent 
  people/year ((TT_F_TertGrads*(1-'frct_F_students_leave after 
grad'))/'F_Students hiring AT') 
  
hiring 
rate_SL 
  people/year (MIN(MAX('SL gap'/'hiring_SL 
_AT',0<<people>>),MAX('Unemployed Skilled 
LF'/'hiring_SL _AT',0<<people>>))*'fractional hiring 
increment rate_SL')/TIMESTEP*PULS 
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hiring 
rate_unskill
ed 
  people/year (MIN(MAX('USL gap'/'hiring_USL 
_AT',0<<people>>),MAX('Unemployed 
USLF'/'hiring_USL _AT',0<<people>>))*'fractional 
hiring increment rate_US')/TIMESTEP*PULS 
  
hiring_SL 
_AT 
    0.6   
hiring_USL 
_AT 
    0.5   
historical 
pdty growth 
  year^-1 GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{0.037 ,0.03
2 ,0.033 ,0.027 ,0.02 ,0.012 ,0.039 ,0.034 ,0.022 ,0.03
1 ,0.02 ,0.013 ,-0.09 ,-0.012 ,-0.013 }<<1/year>>) 
  
Idle_SWAP_
enter_SLF 
20..67 people/year IF('Domestic Idle 
SWAP'[20..67]>0<<people>>,'Domestic Idle 
SWAP'[20..67]*'frct_skilled_Idles_re-
enter'/TIMESTEP*PULS,0<<people/year>>) 
  
In_Online_U
niv1_2_Turn
ing_31 
  people/year In_Online_Univ1_AG_30/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv1_2_Turn
ing_32 
  people/year In_Online_Univ1_AG_31/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv1_2_Turn
ing_33 
  people/year In_Online_Univ1_AG_32/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv1_2_Turn
ing_34 
  people/year In_Online_Univ1_AG_33/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv1_2_Turn
ing_35 
  people/year In_Online_Univ1_AG_34/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv1_2_Turn
ing_36 
  people/year In_Online_Univ1_AG_35/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv1_AG_30 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv1_AG_31 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv1_AG_32 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv1_AG_33 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv1_AG_34 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv1_AG_35 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv2_3_Turn
ing_32 
  people/year In_Online_Univ2_AG_31/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv2_3_Turn
ing_33 
  people/year In_Online_Univ2_AG_32/TIMESTEP*PULS   
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In_Online_U
niv2_3_Turn
ing_34 
  people/year In_Online_Univ2_AG_33/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv2_3_Turn
ing_35 
  people/year In_Online_Univ2_AG_34/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv2_3_Turn
ing_36 
  people/year In_Online_Univ2_AG_35/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv2_3_Turn
ing_37 
  people/year In_Online_Univ2_AG_36/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv2_AG_31 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv2_AG_32 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv2_AG_33 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv2_AG_34 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv2_AG_35 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv2_AG_36 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv3_4_Turn
ing_33 
  people/year In_Online_Univ3_AG_32/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv3_4_Turn
ing_34 
  people/year In_Online_Univ3_AG_33/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv3_4_Turn
ing_35 
  people/year In_Online_Univ3_AG_34/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv3_4_Turn
ing_36 
  people/year In_Online_Univ3_AG_35/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv3_4_Turn
ing_37 
  people/year In_Online_Univ3_AG_36/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv3_4_Turn
ing_38 
  people/year In_Online_Univ3_AG_37/TIMESTEP*PULS   
In_Online_U
niv3_AG_32 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv3_AG_33 
  people 0<<people>>   
In_Online_U
niv3_AG_34 
  people 0<<people>>   
In_Online_U
niv3_AG_35 
  people 0<<people>>   
In_Online_U
niv3_AG_36 
  people 0<<people>>   
In_Online_U
niv3_AG_37 
  people 0<<people>>   
In_Online_U
niv4_AG_33 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv4_AG_34 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv4_AG_35 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv4_AG_36 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv4_AG_37 
  people 0   
In_Online_U
niv4_AG_38 
  people 0   
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_20 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_20*(1-'Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24') 
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In_Univ1_2_
Turning_21 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_21*(1-'Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_22 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_22*(1-'Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_23 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_23*(1-'Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_25 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_25*(1-'Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_26 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_26*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_27 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_27*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_28 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_28*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_29 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_29*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ1_2_
Turning_30 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_30*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ1_2T
urning_24 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_24*(1-'Incompletion 
fract_Univ1_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ1_A
G_19 
  people 8766   
In_Univ1_A
G_20 
  people 13748<<people>>*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_21 
  people (16826<<people>>-2380<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_22 
  people (18355<<people>>-2487<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_23 
  people (17680<<people>>-2350<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_24 
  people (14511<<people>>-2167<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_25 
  people (11268<<people>>-1742<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_26 
  people (8999<<people>>-1479<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_27 
  people (7115<<people>>-1224<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_28 
  people (6941<<people>>-1011<<people>>)*0.6   
In_Univ1_A
G_29 
  people (5293<<people>>-883<<people>>)*0.6   
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In_Univ2_3_
Turning_21 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_21*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_22 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_22*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_23 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_23*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_24 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_24*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_25 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_25*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_26 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_26*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_19 to 24') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_27 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_27*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_28 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_28*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_29 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_29*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_30 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_30*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ2_3_
Turning_31 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_31*(1-
'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_25 to 29') 
  
In_Univ2_A
G_20 
  people 13748<<people>>*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_21 
  people (16826<<people>>-2380<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_22 
  people (18355<<people>>-2487<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_23 
  people (17680<<people>>-2350<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_24 
  people (14511<<people>>-2167<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_25 
  people (11268<<people>>-1742<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_26 
  people (8999<<people>>-1479<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_27 
  people (7115<<people>>-1224<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_28 
  people (6941<<people>>-1011<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A
G_29 
  people (5293<<people>>-883<<people>>)*0.4   
In_Univ2_A   people 1400   
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G_30 
In_Univ3_A
G_21 
  people 2380<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_22 
  people 2487<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_23 
  people 2350<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_24 
  people 2167<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_25 
  people 1742<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_26 
  people 1479<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_27 
  people 1224<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_28 
  people 1011<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_29 
  people 883<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_30 
  people 806<<people>>   
In_Univ3_A
G_31 
  people 766<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_22 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_23 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_24 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_25 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_26 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_27 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_28 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_29 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_30 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_31 
  people 554<<people>>   
In_Univ4_A
G_32 
  people 554<<people>>   
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_20 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_20*'Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_21 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_21*'Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_22 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_22*'Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_23 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_23*'Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_24 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_24*'Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_25 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_25*'Incompletion fract_Univ1_19 
to 24' 
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Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_26 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_26*'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_27 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_27*'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_28 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_28*'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_29 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_29*'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ1
_AG_30 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ1_2_AG_30*'Incompletion_fract_Univ1_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_21 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_21*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_1
9 to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_22 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_22*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_1
9 to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_23 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_23*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_1
9 to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_24 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_24*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_1
9 to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_25 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_25*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_1
9 to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_26 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_26*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_1
9 to 24' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_27 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_27*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_28 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_28*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_29 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_29*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_30 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_30*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incompetion
_rate_Univ2
_AG_31 
  people/year TT_fr_Univ2_3_AG_31*'Incompletion_fract_Univ2_2
5 to 29' 
  
Incomplete_
AG_20 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_20   
Incomplete_
AG_21 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_21+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_21 
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Incomplete_
AG_22 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_22+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_22 
  
Incomplete_
AG_23 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_23+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_23 
  
Incomplete_
AG_24 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_24+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_24 
  
Incomplete_
AG_25 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_25+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_25 
  
Incomplete_
AG_26 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_26+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_26 
  
Incomplete_
AG_27 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_27+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_27 
  
Incomplete_
AG_28 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_28+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_28 
  
Incomplete_
AG_29 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_29+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_29 
  
Incomplete_
AG_30 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_30+Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_30 
  
Incomplete_
AG_31 
  people/year Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG_31   
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Incompletes 
to USLF 
20..68 people/year {0<<people/year>>,Incomplete_AG_20,Incomplete_A
G_21,Incomplete_AG_22,Incomplete_AG_23,Incompl
ete_AG_24,Incomplete_AG_25,Incomplete_AG_26,In
complete_AG_27,Incomplete_AG_28,Incomplete_AG
_29,Incomplete_AG_30,Incomplete_AG_31,0<<peopl
e/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<pe
ople/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<
<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>
,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>} 
  
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_20 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[21]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_21 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[22]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_22 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[23]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_23 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[24]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_24 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[25]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_25 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[26]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_26 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[27]   
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Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_27 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[28]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_28 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[29]   
Incompletes
_to_Pot 
Students_A
G_29 
  people/year 'Incompletes to USLF'[30]   
Incompletio
n 
fract_Univ1
_19 to 24 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.36,0.37,
0.32,0.28//Min:0;Max:0.05//}) 
  
Incompletio
n_fract_Uni
v1_25 to 29 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.35,0.35,
0.3,0.28//Min:0;Max:0.05//}) 
  
Incompletio
n_fract_Uni
v2_19 to 24 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.28,0.26,
0.22,0.16//Min:0;Max:0.05//}) 
  
Incompletio
n_fract_Uni
v2_25 to 29 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,10<<year>>,{0.28,0.26,
0.21,0.16//Min:0;Max:0.05//}) 
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Incompletio
n_Univ1 
20..68 people/year {Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_20,Incompetion_rate_
Univ1_AG_21,Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_22,Inco
mpetion_rate_Univ1_AG_23,Incompetion_rate_Univ
1_AG_24,Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_25,Incompeti
on_rate_Univ1_AG_26,Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG
_27,Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_28,Incompetion_ra
te_Univ1_AG_29,Incompetion_rate_Univ1_AG_30,0<
<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>
,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>} 
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Incompletio
n_Univ2 
20..68 people/year {0<<people/year>>,Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG_21,
Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG_22,Incompetion_rate_
Univ2_AG_23,Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG_24,Inco
mpetion_rate_Univ2_AG_25,Incompetion_rate_Univ
2_AG_26,Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG_27,Incompeti
on_rate_Univ2_AG_28,Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG
_29,Incompetion_rate_Univ2_AG_30,Incompetion_ra
te_Univ2_AG_31,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>
>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/ye
ar>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people
/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>} 
  
indicated 
Total Skilled 
Labor 
needed 
  people AD_skilled/'Expected Skilled Labor Productivity'   
indicated 
Total USL 
needed 
  people AD_unskilled/'Expected Unskilled Labor Productivity'   
initial cap 
for 
F_Students 
  people/year PULSE(3000<<people>>,2015<<@year>>,100000000
0<<year>>) 
  
Initial 
Foreign 
StudentTert
_Edu Budget 
  NOK/year² PULSE(210000000<<NOK/year>>,2013<<@year>>,10
00000000<<year>>) 
  
initial 
internship 
budget 
allocation 
  NOK/year² PULSE(6400000000<<NOK/year>>,2014<<@year>>,1
000000<<year>>) 
  
initial 
internship 
capacity 
built 
  people/year PULSE(40000<<people>>,2014<<@year>>,10000<<ye
ar>>) 
  
Initial 
number of  
Online Edu 
cap 
  people/year PULSE(1000<<people>>,2013<<@year>>,100000000
0<<year>>) 
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Initial Online 
Tert_Edu 
Budget 
  NOK/year² PULSE(70000000<<NOK/year>>,2013<<@year>>,100
0000000<<year>>) 
  
internship 
budget 
allocation 
AT 
    1   
internship 
cap building 
AT 
    2+'internship budget allocation AT'   
internship 
cap gap 
  people IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,'desired total interns_19-
29'-'Internship Capacity') 
  
internship 
cap 
increasing 
rate 
  people/year IF(TIME>2015<<@year>>,('extra internship cap 
needed'/'internship cap building 
AT')/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
Internship 
Capacity 
  people 0<<people>>   
internship 
capacity 
ratio 
    IF (TIME>2014<<@year>>,'Internship 
Capacity'/'desired total interns_19-29') 
  
internship 
period as 
ave study 
period 
    0.25   
internship 
spending 
per person 
per year 
  NOK/(year*people) 'total internship spending per person'/3<<year>>   
internship_ 
foregone 
earnings 
ratio 
    'total internship spending per person'/'foregone 
earnings_no internship' 
  
Intership 
Budget 
  NOK/year 0<<NOK/year>>   
intership 
expenditure 
increasing 
rate 
  NOK/year² IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,(('extra internship cap 
needed'*'internship spending per person per 
year')/'internship budget allocation 
AT')/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
L_Pdty_gro
wth_rate_SL 
  year^-1 DELAYINF('ave_L_pdty_growth rate_SL',2<<year>>,1)   
L_Pdty_gro
wth_rate_u
nskilled 
  year^-1 DELAYINF('ave_L_pdty_growth 
rate_US',1.5<<year>>,1) 
  
Labor 
Immigrants_
SL 
  people DELAYINF('Foreign Labor_Skilled',1<<year>>,1)   
Labor 
Immigrants_
unskilled 
  people DELAYINF('Foreign Labor_Unskilled',1<<year>>,1)   
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labor 
share_skille
d 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.41
6 ,0.421 ,0.424 ,0.4284 ,0.431 ,0.433 ,0.435 ,0.4365 ,0
.439 ,0.44 ,0.4406 ,0.441//Min:0.4;Max:0.45//}) 
  
labor 
share_unskil
led 
    GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.22
3,0.26,0.326,0.35,0.34,0.31,0.297//Min:0;Max:0.5//}) 
  
leaving_SLF 20..68 people/year {0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'D
omestic LF_Skilled'[31]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[32]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[33]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[34]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[35]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[36]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[37]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[38]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[39]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[40]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[41]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[42]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[43]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[44]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[45]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[46]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[47]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[48]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[49]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[50]*'frct_leaving_SLF_30 to 
49' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[51]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[52]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[53]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[54]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[55]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[56]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[57]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[58]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[59]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[60]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[61]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic LF_Skilled'[62]*'frct_leaving_SLF_50 to 
61' ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>>}/TIMESTEP*PULS  
Divided by 2 because the SL 
who leaves the LF 
permanently due to disability 
is much lesser than the nonTE.  
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leaving_uns
killed_rate 
20..68 people/year IF('Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[20..68]>1<<people>>,{0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[31]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[32]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[33]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[34]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[35]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[36]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[37]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[38]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[39]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[40]*'frct_leaving_USLF_30 to 
39' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[41]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[42]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[43]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[44]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[45]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[46]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[47]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[48]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[49]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[50]*'frct_leaving_USLF_40 to 
49' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[51]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[52]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[53]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[54]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[55]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[56]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[57]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[58]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[59]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[60]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[61]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[62]*'frct_leaving_USLF_50 to 
61' ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>>},0<<people>>)/TI
MESTEP*PULS 
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Level_1   people 10000   
Level_2   people 0   
man per 
work 
    0.5   
max fract of 
skilled job 
    1   
modular     NUMBER(TIME) MOD 1   
motivation 
to univ 
    (('effect of  wage premium'*'weight distr'[1])+('effect 
of expected foregone earnings growth'*'weight 
distr'[2])+('effect of relative expected LT 
earnings'*'weight distr'[3])+('ease of finding 
jobs'*'weight distr'[4])) 
  
natural_UR_
SL 
    0.035   
natural_UR_
unskilled 
    0.035   
need for 
F_labors_SL 
  people DELAYINF(IF('SL gap'-'Unemployed Skilled 
LF'>0<<people>>,('SL gap'-'Unemployed Skilled 
LF'),0<<people>>),1<<year>>,1) 
  
need for 
F_labors_US 
  people DELAYINF(IF('USL gap'-'Unemployed 
USLF'>0<<people>>,'USL gap'-'Unemployed 
USLF',0<<people>>),1<<year>>,1) 
  
Net Capital 
Investment 
  NOK/year 24780000000   
net capital 
investment 
rate 
  NOK/year² 'ave capital investment growth fraction'*'Net Capital 
Investment' 
  
nonTE 
wages from 
pdty 
  NOK/(year*people) (GRAPHCURVE(TIME,1994<<@year>>,5<<year>>,{0.2
,0.25,0.3,0.33,0.33,0.34,0.35//Min:-
1;Max:11//}))*'Expected Unskilled Labor Productivity' 
  
online 
budget 
increasing 
rate 
  NOK/year² IF(TIME>2013<<@year>>,(('extra online 
cap'*'expenditure per online student')/'Online T_Edu 
cap building AT')/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
online edu 
cap gap 
  people 'total online students'-'Online Tert_Edu Capacity'   
Online 
Graduates_3
  people DELAYINF(Level_2,1<<year>>,1)   
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3-38 
Online 
T_Edu 
budget AT 
    3+'Online T_Edu cap building AT'   
Online 
T_Edu cap 
building AT 
    3   
Online 
Tert_Edu 
Budget 
  NOK/year 0   
Online 
Tert_Edu 
Capacity 
  people 0   
Online Univ 
Grad_33-38 
  people/year Online_Graduate_Turning_34+Online_Graduate_Tur
ning_35+Online_Graduate_Turning_36+Online_Grad
uate_Turning_37+Online_Graduate_Turning_38+Onli
ne_Graduate_Turning_39 
  
Online_Grad
uate_Turnin
g_34 
  people/year In_Online_Univ4_AG_33/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Online_Grad
uate_Turnin
g_35 
  people/year In_Online_Univ4_AG_34/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Online_Grad
uate_Turnin
g_36 
  people/year In_Online_Univ4_AG_35/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Online_Grad
uate_Turnin
g_37 
  people/year In_Online_Univ4_AG_36/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Online_Grad
uate_Turnin
g_38 
  people/year In_Online_Univ4_AG_37/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Online_Grad
uate_Turnin
g_39 
  people/year In_Online_Univ4_AG_38/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Online_Stud
ents ratio 
    IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,'total online 
students'/'Online Tert_Edu Capacity') 
  
Online_T_Ed
u cap 
increasing 
rate 
  people/year IF(TIME>2013<<@year>>,('extra online cap'/'Online 
T_Edu budget AT')/TIMESTEP*PULS) 
  
pcvd density 
of skilled job 
    DELAYINF('density of skilled job',2<<year>>,1)   
pcvd 
foregone 
earnings 
  NOK/people DELAYINF('expected foregone earnings',3<<year>>,1)   
pcvd job 
density_uns
killed 
    DELAYINF('density of unskilled job',2.5<<year>>,1)   
pcvd 
relative 
expected LT 
earnings 
    DELAYINF('relative expected LT 
earnings',5<<year>>,1) 
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perceived 
foregone 
earnings 
ratio 
    'expected foregone earnings'/'pcvd foregone 
earnings' 
  
perceived 
skilled  
wages 
  NOK/(year*people) DELAYINF('actual individual wages_SL',3<<year>>,1)   
perceived 
total job 
vacancies_S
L 
  people DELAYINF(('F_Labors leaving 
rate_SL'*TIMESTEP+'total SLF 
exit'*TIMESTEP+'employed F_students leaving 
rate'*TIMESTEP)+'need for 
F_labors_SL'/NUMBER(TIMESTEP)*PULS,5<<year>>,1
) 
  
perceived 
unskilled  
wages 
  NOK/(year*people) DELAYINF('actual individual wages_US',3<<year>>,1)   
perceived 
wage 
premium 
    'perceived skilled  wages'/'perceived unskilled  wages'   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
19 
  people 46027 28213//age cohort of nonTE 
LF 15-19 =141062, assume the 
initial stock value is 141062/5 
= 28213  INIT('nonTE Labor 
Force'[4]/5)  2502//assuming 
10% of the total Turning_19 
was already in the nonTE LF 
since they were 18 years old. 
Potential_St
udents_AG_
20 
  people 37527 29625//age cohort of nonTE 
LF 20-24 =148126, assume the 
initial stock value is 148126/5 
= 29625  28213//age cohort of 
nonTE LF 15-19 =141062, 
assume the initial stock value 
is 141062/5 = 28213 
Potential_St
udents_AG_
21 
  people 37227   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
22 
  people 36648   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
23 
  people 36159   
Potential_St   people 41016   
185 
 
udents_AG_
24 
Potential_St
udents_AG_
25 
  people 43277   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
26 
  people 44056   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
27 
  people 45948   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
28 
  people 45445   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
29 
  people 46281   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
30 
  people 37939 28213//age cohort of nonTE 
LF 15-19 =141062, assume the 
initial stock value is 141062/5 
= 28213  INIT('nonTE Labor 
Force'[4]/5)  2502//assuming 
10% of the total Turning_19 
was already in the nonTE LF 
since they were 18 years old. 
Potential_St
udents_AG_
31 
  people 38760 29625//age cohort of nonTE 
LF 20-24 =148126, assume the 
initial stock value is 148126/5 
= 29625  28213//age cohort of 
nonTE LF 15-19 =141062, 
assume the initial stock value 
is 141062/5 = 28213 
Potential_St
udents_AG_
32 
  people 39043   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
33 
  people 39178   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
34 
  people 40091   
Potential_St
udents_AG_
35 
  people 40414   
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ppl over 16 
w_tert_edu
_SSB 
  people GRAPH(TIME, 
1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{ 617417  ,643056  ,6716
67  ,699424  ,725749  ,743809  ,758079  ,775867  ,79
5809  ,818981  ,849100  ,879759  ,907408  ,933304  ,
976372 }<<people>>) 
  
PULS     IF(modular=0,1,0)   
Rate_11   people/year Level_2/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Rate_4   people/year 'arrsum total grad_22 to 32'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Rate_7   people/year IF(TIME>1994<<@year>>,Level_1,0<<people>>)/TIM
ESTEP*PULS 
  
re-enter 
USLF 
20..67 people/year MAX(0<<people>>,'Domestic Idle 
USWAP'[20..67])/TIMESTEP*PULS*'frct_unskilled_Idl
es_re-enter' 
  
red symbol     1   
ref mode-
SLF 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{479114 ,52
1210 ,566593 ,606169 ,632526 ,655243 ,673078 ,727
283 ,756531 ,761099 ,792058 ,822546 ,828963 ,8621
46 ,880768 ,903331 ,938866 ,961392 ,983501 ,10046
04 ,1024624 ,1043961 ,1062652 ,1081342 ,1099312 ,
1117319 ,1135444 ,1154235 ,1173163 ,1191883 ,121
0094 ,1228656 ,1247319 ,1265868 ,1284657 ,130353
4 ,1322778 ,1341769 ,1360835 ,1379804 ,1398755 ,1
417490 ,1435979 ,1454877 ,1473793 ,1493117 ,1512
773 ,1532761 ,1553921 ,1575507 ,1597787 ,1620671 
,1643834 ,1667810 ,1692514 ,1717693 ,1742895  })  
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ref mode-
SLF_1994 to 
2009 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{479114 ,52
1210 ,566593 ,606169 ,632526 ,655243 ,673078 ,727
283 ,756531 ,761099 ,792058 ,822546 ,828963 ,8621
46 ,880768 ,903331 ,938866 ,961392 ,983501 ,10046
04 ,1024624 ,1043961 ,1062652 ,1081342 ,1099312 ,
1117319 ,1135444 ,1154235 ,1173163 ,1191883 ,121
0094 ,1228656 ,1247319 ,1265868 ,1284657 ,130353
4 ,1322778 ,1341769 ,1360835 ,1379804 ,1398755 ,1
417490 ,1435979 ,1454877 ,1473793 ,1493117 ,1512
773 ,1532761 ,1553921 ,1575507 ,1597787 ,1620671 
,1643834 ,1667810 ,1692514 ,1717693 ,1742895  })  
  
ref NFCF     GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{247800000
00 ,31547000000 ,37308000000 ,52641000000 ,8063
5000000 ,108534000000 ,85713000000 ,7271500000
0 ,65162000000 ,56157000000 ,53312000000 ,79143
000000 ,117675000000 ,159106000000 ,2120590000
00 ,206245000000 ,159026000000  }) 
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ref real AD     GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{158853075
9496, 1588308563905, 1656188043139, 
1742400284393, 1836780621556, 1885547889422, 
1922428629625, 1981428677062, 2033466480095, 
2057971493930, 2085880598984, 2158535828280, 
2224185414212, 2423354252260, 2489342104275, 
2581447762133}) 
  
ref real GDP     GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{158874054
6757 ,1656338607087 ,1742664166709 ,1837094865
031 ,1885752296663 ,1922875901275 ,19816042098
00 ,2033676981800 ,2058152916265 ,208632135303
3 ,2159111342407 ,2224768260513 ,2423722113591
 ,2489722959692 ,2543188000000 }) 
  
ref real total 
labor 
compensati
on 
    GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{558352934
712 ,577919216561 ,612279766002 ,647049095092 ,
696068950000 ,726980707722 ,745284738389 ,7680
34149954 ,794035250681 ,794793840426 ,82994172
1094 ,867063566464 ,926867696686 ,102116847301
9 ,1078045000000 ,1094639215686  }) 
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ref_In_Edu_
19  to 24_all 
tert 
  people GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{  89896 ,92
619 ,94802 ,92550 ,91680 ,92406 ,86235 ,83848 ,924
10 ,93454 ,95781 ,98186 ,98931 ,99129 ,102850 ,105
800 ,108762 ,111808 ,114938 ,118157 ,121465 ,1248
66 ,128362 ,131956 ,135651 ,139449 ,143354 ,14736
8 ,151494 ,155736 ,160097 ,164579 ,169188 ,173925 
,178795 ,183801 ,188947 ,194238 ,199677 ,205268 ,2
11015 ,216924 ,222997 ,229241 ,235660 ,242259 ,24
9042 ,256015 ,263183 ,270553 ,278128 ,285916 ,293
921 ,302151 ,310611 ,319308 ,328249  }<<people>>) 
  
ref_In_Edu_
25 to 29_all 
tert 
  people GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{ 39616 ,40
196 ,41442 ,42290 ,43646 ,45711 ,44361 ,45881 ,471
23 ,46054 ,45782 ,44576 ,43454 ,42401 ,42138 ,4360
0,45082 ,46615 ,48200 ,49839 ,51533 ,53286 ,55097 ,
56971 ,58908 ,60910 ,62981 ,65123 ,67337 ,69626 ,7
1994 ,74441 ,76973 ,79590 ,82296 ,85094 ,87987 ,90
978 ,94072 ,97270 ,100577 ,103997 ,107533 ,111189 
,114969 ,118878 ,122920 ,127099 ,131421 ,135889 ,1
40509 ,145287 ,150226 ,155334 ,160616 ,166076 ,17
1723 //Min:-1;Max:50000//  }<<people>>) 
  
Reference 
Skilled Labor 
Fraction 
    0.27 =(569907*0.9)/2067841 
(skilledLF/LF) 
relative 
expected LT 
earnings 
    'expected LT Earnings_SL'/'expected LT 
Earnings_nonTE' 
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retirement_
rate_Idle_S
WAP 
20..68 people/year { 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
Idle SWAP'[68]}/TIMESTEP*PULS  
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retirement_
rate_Idle_U
SWAP 
20..68 people/year { 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
Idle USWAP'[68]}/TIMESTEP*PULS  
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retirement_
rate_SLF 
20..68 people/year { 0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peopl
e>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<pe
ople>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
LF_Skilled'[68]}/TIMESTEP*PULS  
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retirement_
rate_unskill
ed 
20..68 people/year IF('Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[20..68]>1<<people>>,{ 0<<people>> ,0<
<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> 
,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,
0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people
>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<peo
ple>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<people>> ,0<<
people>> ,0<<people>> ,'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[68]},0<<people>>)/TIMESTEP*PULS  
  
Sim AD     GRAPH(TIME,STARTTIME,1<<year>>,Constant_AD)   
SL gap   people ('indicated Total Skilled Labor needed'-'total 
Employed SLF'+('F_Labors leaving rate_SL'+'total SLF 
exit')*TIMESTEP) //positive means shortage of 
domestic labors, negative means surplus of domestic 
labors 
  
SL wages 
from pdty 
  NOK/(year*people) 'Expected Skilled Labor Productivity'*0.41   
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SL_real_ann
ual wages 
  NOK/year GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{ 332765 ,3
41726 ,355560 ,365365 ,383614 ,389545 ,396352 ,40
6196 ,430387 ,433829 ,441328 ,448229 ,457104 ,479
841 ,491850,506606 ,521804 ,537458 ,553582 ,57018
9 ,587295 ,604913 ,623061 ,641753 ,661005 ,680835 
,701260 ,722298 ,743967 ,766286 ,789275 ,812953 ,8
37342 ,862462 ,888336 ,914986 ,942435 ,970709 ,99
9830 ,1029825 ,1060719 ,1092541 ,1125317 ,115907
7 ,1193849 ,1229665 ,1266554 ,1304551 ,1343688 ,1
383998 ,1425518 ,1468284 ,1512332 ,1557702 ,1604
433 ,1652566 ,1702143 //Min:-
1;Max:11//}<<NOK/year>>) 
  
SL_shortage   people DELAYINF('SL gap',3<<year>>,1)   
SLF fraction     DELAYINF('total SLF'/'total LF',5<<year>>,1)   
SLF growth 
frct 
  year^-1 ('SLF fraction'-'delayed SLF fraction')/'delayed SLF 
fraction'*1<<1/year>> 
  
SLF growth 
rate 
  year^-1 ('total SLF'-'delayed total SLF')/'delayed total 
SLF'*'fractional skilled frct increment rate' 
  
SLF over LF 
growth frct 
  year^-1 ('total SLF frct'-'delayed total SLF frct')/'delayed total 
SLF frct'*1<<1/year>> 
  
smoothed 
growth frct 
of SGDP 
  year^-1 DELAYINF('growth frct of SGDP',1<<year>>,1)   
smoothed 
growth frct 
of USGDP 
  year^-1 DELAYINF('growth frct of USGDP',1.5<<year>>,1)   
smoothed 
net lack of 
SL 
  people DELAYINF('SL gap',3<<year>>,1)   
smoothed 
UR unskilled 
    DELAYINF('unemployment rate_USL',1<<year>>,1)   
smoothed 
UR_SL 
    DELAYINF('unemployment rate_SL',1<<year>>,1)   
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Students as 
PT USL yr 1 
20..68 people {0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>
>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people
>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<peopl
e>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<peo
ple>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<pe
ople>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<p
eople>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<
people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<
<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0
<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,
0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>
>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people
>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>} 
  
Students as 
PT USL yr 2 
20..68 people {0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>
>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people
>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<peopl
e>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<peo
ple>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<pe
ople>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<p
eople>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<
people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<
<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0
<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,
0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>
>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people
>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>} 
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Students as 
PT USL yr 3 
20..68 people {0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>
>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people
>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<peopl
e>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<peo
ple>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<pe
ople>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<p
eople>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<
people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<
<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0
<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,
0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>
>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>,0<<people
>>,0<<people>>,0<<people>>} 
  
Students 
working 
PT_yr1 
20..68 people/year USL_to_Univ1*'fraction with PT job'*'man per work'   
Students 
working 
PT_yr2 
20..68 people/year 'Students as PT USL yr 1'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
Students 
working 
PT_yr3 
20..68 people/year 'Students as PT USL yr 2'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
surplus of 
F_labors_SL 
  people IF('SL gap'<0<<people>>,-('SL gap'),0<<people>>)   
surplus 
of_F_USL 
  people  IF('USL gap'<0<<people>>,-('USL gap'),0<<people>>)   
SWAP 
reactive rate 
  people/year ARRSUM(Idle_SWAP_enter_SLF)   
switch_Forei
gn 
Students_Po
licy 
    1   
targeted no 
of 
F_students 
recruitment 
per year 
  people/year 'perceived total job vacancies_SL'/'estimated 
F_students recruitment AT' 
  
tert grad 
entering SLF 
20..68 people/year 'total graduates'*(1-'frct not seeking for job')   
tert grad not 
seeking for 
job 
20..68 people/year 'tert grad entering SLF'*'frct not seeking for job'   
tert grad 
seeking job 
  people/year ARRSUM('tert grad entering SLF')+'total USL 
upgrading to SL' 
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tert 
students 
work 
part_time 
  people 'total tert students_19-29'*'frct work part_time'   
tert_grad_2
2 to 32 
  people DELAYINF(Level_1,2<<year>>,1)   
To_Online_
Univ1_AG_3
1 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_31*'frct_To_Online_Uni
v1_30 to 35'*'motivation to univ'*'effectiveness of 
Online Univ Policy' 
  
To_Online_
Univ1_AG_3
2 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_32*'frct_To_Online_Uni
v1_30 to 35' 
  
To_Online_
Univ1_AG_3
3 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_33*'frct_To_Online_Uni
v1_30 to 35' 
  
To_Online_
Univ1_AG_3
4 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_34*'frct_To_Online_Uni
v1_30 to 35' 
  
To_Online_
Univ1_AG_3
5 
  people/year TT_non_study_USLF_to_AG_35*'frct_To_Online_Uni
v1_30 to 35' 
  
To_Online_
Univ_AG_30 
  people/year 'TT_Pot 
Students_to_AG_30'*frct_To_Online_Univ1_AG_30*'
effectiveness of Online Univ Policy'*'motivation to 
univ' 
  
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_19 
  people/year ('Age 
Group_18'/TIMESTEP*PULS)*frct_NOT_to_Univ1_AG
_19 
  
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_20 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_20'-To_Univ1_AG_20   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_21 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_21'-To_Univ1_AG_21   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_22 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_22'-To_Univ1_AG_22   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_23 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_23'-To_Univ1_AG_23   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_24 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_24'-To_Univ1_AG_24   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_25 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_25'-To_Univ1_AG_25   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_26 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_26'-To_Univ1_AG_26   
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To_Pot 
Students_A
G_27 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_27'-To_Univ1_AG_27   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_28 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_28'-To_Univ1_AG_28   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_29 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_29'-To_Univ1_AG_29   
To_Pot 
Students_A
G_30 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_30'-To_Online_Univ_AG_30   
To_Univ1_A
G_20 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_20'*frct_to_Univ_20   
To_Univ1_A
G_21 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_21'*'frct_to_Univ_21 to 25'   
To_Univ1_A
G_22 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_22'*'frct_to_Univ_21 to 25'   
To_Univ1_A
G_23 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_23'*'frct_to_Univ_21 to 25'   
To_Univ1_A
G_24 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_24'*'frct_to_Univ_21 to 25'   
To_Univ1_A
G_25 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_25'*'frct_to_Univ_21 to 25'   
To_Univ1_A
G_26 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_26'*'frct_to_Univ_26  to 29'   
To_Univ1_A
G_27 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_27'*'frct_to_Univ_26  to 29'   
To_Univ1_A
G_28 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_28'*'frct_to_Univ_26  to 29'   
To_Univ1_A
G_29 
  people/year 'TT_Pot Students_to_AG_29'*'frct_to_Univ_26  to 29'   
To_Univ_AG
_19 
  people 'Age Group_18'*frct_To_Univ1_AG_19   
total AFP 
rate 
  year^-1 ARRSUM(AFP_unskilled+AFP_SL)/WAP   
total 
dropOuts 
seeking for 
jobs 
  people/year ARRSUM('Incompletes to 
USLF')+0.000001<<people/year>> 
  
total 
Employed 
SLF 
  people 'Employed Domestic SLF'+'Foreign 
Labor_Skilled'+'Employed Foreign Students'*1 
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total 
Employed 
USLF 
  people 'Employed Domestic USLF'+'Foreign Labor_Unskilled'   
total 
employed 
USLF exit 
  people/year 'total USLF exit'   
total 
entrants to 
USLF 
  people/year ARRSUM('AG_18 and Incompletes entering_USLF')   
Total 
F_Labor 
Stock in 
Total 
Employment 
    'Total F_Labors'/('total Employed SLF'+'Employed 
USLF') 
  
Total 
F_Labors 
  people 'Foreign Labor_Skilled'+'Foreign Labor_Unskilled'   
total 
F_Students 
  people 'Foreign Students_Univ1'+'Foreign 
Students_Univ2'+'Foreign Students_Univ3' 
  
total 
graduates 
20..68 people/year {0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,Graduate_Turning_22,Graduate_Turning_23,Gra
duate_Turning_24,Graduate_Turning_25,Graduate_T
urning_26,Graduate_Turning_27,Graduate_Turning_
28,Graduate_Turning_29,Graduate_Turning_30,Grad
uate_Turning_31,Graduate_Turning_32,0<<people/y
ear>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peopl
e/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<pe
ople/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<
<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>
,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>} 
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total In Edu 
19-24 
  people DELAYINF(In_Univ1_AG_19+In_Univ1_AG_20+In_Uni
v1_AG_21+In_Univ1_AG_22+In_Univ1_AG_23+In_Un
iv1_AG_24+In_Univ2_AG_20+In_Univ2_AG_21+In_U
niv2_AG_22+In_Univ2_AG_23+In_Univ2_AG_24+In_
Univ3_AG_21+In_Univ3_AG_22+In_Univ3_AG_23+In
_Univ3_AG_24,1<<year>>,1) 
  
total 
internship 
spending 
per person 
  NOK/people IF(TIME>2014<<@year>>,'perceived unskilled  
wages'*'ave study 
period'*frct_internship_coverage*'internship period 
as ave study period') 
  
total LF   people DELAYINF('total SLF'+'Total Unskilled LF',1<<year>>,1)   
total LF 1   people 'total SLF'+'Total Unskilled LF'   
total LF 
sickness and 
disability 
exit flow 
  people ARRSUM(leaving_SLF+leaving_unskilled_rate)*TIMES
TEP 
  
total LF 
sickness and 
disability 
exit rate 
    'total LF sickness and disability exit flow'/WAP   
total 
nonTE_LF_1
9-24 
  people Potential_Students_AG_19+Potential_Students_AG_
20+Potential_Students_AG_21+Potential_Students_A
G_22+Potential_Students_AG_23+Potential_Students
_AG_24 
  
total old age 
retirement 
fr LF 
  year^-1 ARRSUM(retirement_rate_SLF+retirement_rate_unsk
illed)/WAP 
  
total online 
students 
  people 'total online_students_Univ1'+'total 
online_students_Univ2'+'total 
online_students_Univ3'+'total 
online_students_Univ4' 
  
Total Online 
Univ 
Grad_33-38 
  people 'Online Univ Grad_33-38'*TIMESTEP   
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total 
online_stud
ents_Univ1 
  people In_Online_Univ1_AG_30+In_Online_Univ1_AG_31+In
_Online_Univ1_AG_32+In_Online_Univ1_AG_33+In_
Online_Univ1_AG_34+In_Online_Univ1_AG_35 
  
total 
online_stud
ents_Univ2 
  people In_Online_Univ2_AG_31+In_Online_Univ2_AG_32+In
_Online_Univ2_AG_33+In_Online_Univ2_AG_34+In_
Online_Univ2_AG_35+In_Online_Univ2_AG_36 
  
total 
online_stud
ents_Univ3 
  people In_Online_Univ3_AG_32+In_Online_Univ3_AG_33+In
_Online_Univ3_AG_34+In_Online_Univ3_AG_35+In_
Online_Univ3_AG_36+In_Online_Univ3_AG_37 
  
total 
online_stud
ents_Univ4 
  people In_Online_Univ4_AG_33+In_Online_Univ4_AG_34+In
_Online_Univ4_AG_35+In_Online_Univ4_AG_36+In_
Online_Univ4_AG_37+In_Online_Univ4_AG_38 
  
Total Skilled 
LF 
  people DELAYINF('total SLF',1<<year>>,1)   
Total Skilled 
LF with all-
in-one 
policy 
    GRAPH(TIME,STARTTIME,1<<year>>,Constant_TSLF)   
total SLF   people ARRSUM('Domestic LF_Skilled'[20..67])+'Foreign 
Labor_Skilled'+'Employed Foreign 
Students'*'switch_Foreign Students_Policy' 
  
total SLF exit   people/year IF('Employed Domestic 
SLF'>0<<people>>,(ARRSUM(deaths_SLF)+ARRSUM(A
FP_SL+leaving_SLF+retirement_rate_SLF))) 
  
total SLF frct     'total SLF'/'total LF 1'   
total 
student as 
PT USL 
  people ARRSUM('Students as PT USL yr 1'+'Students as PT 
USL yr 2'+'Students as PT USL yr 3') 
  
total tert 
students_19
-29 
  people 'total In Edu 19-24'+'total_In_Edu_25-29'   
total 
unemployed 
USLF exit 
  people/year ('total USLF exit'*'unemployment rate_USL')   
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total 
University 
Students_19 
to 29 
  people DELAYINF(Univ_1+Univ_2+Univ_3+Univ_4,0.8<<year
>>,1) 
  
Total 
Unskilled LF 
  people ARRSUM('Domestic LF_Unskilled'[20..67])+'Foreign 
Labor_Unskilled'+'total student as PT USL' 
  
Total 
Unskilled LF 
1 
  people DELAYINF('Total Unskilled LF',1<<year>>,1)   
total 
unskilled to 
Univ1_AG_1
9 to 29 
20..68 people/year {0<<people/year>>,To_Univ1_AG_20,To_Univ1_AG_
21,To_Univ1_AG_22,To_Univ1_AG_23,To_Univ1_AG
_24,To_Univ1_AG_25,To_Univ1_AG_26,To_Univ1_A
G_27,To_Univ1_AG_28,To_Univ1_AG_29,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>} 
  
total USL 
upgrading to 
SL 
  people/year ARRSUM('USL upgrading to SL')   
total USLF 
exit 
  people/year (ARRSUM(deaths_USLF)+ARRSUM(AFP_unskilled+lea
ving_unskilled_rate+retirement_rate_unskilled+USL_
to_Univ1)) 
  
Total Wages   NOK/year 'Total Wages_SL'+'Total Wages_USL'   
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Total 
Wages_SL 
  NOK/year ('Employed Domestic SLF'+'Foreign 
Labor_Skilled')*'actual individual wages_SL' 
  
Total 
Wages_USL 
  NOK/year ('Employed Domestic USLF'+'Foreign 
Labor_Unskilled')*'actual individual wages_US' 
  
total_In_Edu
_25-29 
  people DELAYINF(In_Univ1_AG_28+In_Univ1_AG_25+In_Uni
v1_AG_26+In_Univ1_AG_27+In_Univ1_AG_29+In_Un
iv2_AG_25+In_Univ2_AG_26+In_Univ2_AG_27+In_U
niv2_AG_28+In_Univ2_AG_29+In_Univ3_AG_25+In_
Univ3_AG_26+In_Univ3_AG_27+In_Univ3_AG_28+In
_Univ3_AG_29,1<<year>>,1) 
  
Total_USLF   people 'Employed Domestic USLF'+'Foreign 
Labor_Unskilled'+'Unemployed USLF' 
  
TT_D_Idle_S
WAP 
23..67 people/year FOR(i=23..67|'Domestic Idle SWAP'[i]*1<<1/year>>)   
TT_D_Idle_u
nskilled 
20..67 people/year FOR(i=20..67|'Domestic Idle USWAP'[i]*1<<1/year>>)   
TT_D_SLF 20..67 people/year FOR(i=20..67|'Domestic LF_Skilled'[i]*1<<1/year>>)   
TT_D_USKL 20..67 people/year FOR(i=20..67|'Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[i]*1<<1/year>>) 
  
TT_F_TertGr
ads 
  people/year 'Foreign Job-seeking Tert Grads'/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_20 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_19/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_21 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_20/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_22 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_21/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_23 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_22/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_24 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_23/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_25 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_24/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_26 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_25/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_27 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_26/TIMESTEP*PULS   
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TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_28 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_27/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_29 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_28/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ1
_2_AG_30 
  people/year In_Univ1_AG_29/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_21 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_20/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_22 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_21/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_23 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_22/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_24 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_23/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_25 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_24/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_26 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_25/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_27 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_26/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_28 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_27/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_29 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_28/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_30 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_29/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_fr_Univ2
_3_AG_31 
  people/year In_Univ2_AG_30/TIMESTEP*PULS   
TT_non_stu
dy_USLF_to
_AG_31 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_30/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_30 
  
TT_non_stu
dy_USLF_to
_AG_32 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_31/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_31 
  
TT_non_stu
dy_USLF_to
_AG_33 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_32/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_32 
  
TT_non_stu
dy_USLF_to
_AG_34 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_33/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_33 
  
TT_non_stu
dy_USLF_to
_AG_35 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_34/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_34 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_20 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_19/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_19 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_21 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_20/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_20 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_22 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_21/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_21 
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TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_23 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_22/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_22 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_24 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_23/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_23 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_25 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_24/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_24 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_26 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_25/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_25 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_27 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_26/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_26 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_28 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_27/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_27 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_29 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_28/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_28 
  
TT_Pot 
Students_to
_AG_30 
  people/year (Potential_Students_AG_29/TIMESTEP*PULS)-
deaths_AG_29 
  
Unemploye
d Skilled LF 
  people 14348<<people>>   
Unemploye
d USLF 
  people 95374   
unemploym
ent rate_SL 
    'Unemployed Skilled LF'/'total SLF'   
unemploym
ent 
rate_USL 
    'Unemployed USLF'/'Total Unskilled LF'   
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Univ 
Droputs to 
Idles 
1..13 people/year {0<<people/year>>,Incomplete_AG_20*(1-'dropOuts 
LF parti rate'),Incomplete_AG_21*(1-'dropOuts LF 
parti rate'),Incomplete_AG_22*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_23*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_24*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_25*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_26*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_27*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_28*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_29*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_30*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate'),Incomplete_AG_31*(1-'dropOuts LF parti 
rate')} 
  
Univ_1   people In_Univ1_AG_19+In_Univ1_AG_20+In_Univ1_AG_21
+In_Univ1_AG_22+In_Univ1_AG_23+In_Univ1_AG_2
4+In_Univ1_AG_25+In_Univ1_AG_26+In_Univ1_AG_
27+In_Univ1_AG_28+In_Univ1_AG_29 
  
Univ_2   people In_Univ2_AG_20+In_Univ2_AG_21+In_Univ2_AG_22
+In_Univ2_AG_23+In_Univ2_AG_24+In_Univ2_AG_2
5+In_Univ2_AG_26+In_Univ2_AG_27+In_Univ2_AG_
28+In_Univ2_AG_29+In_Univ2_AG_30 
  
Univ_3   people In_Univ3_AG_21+In_Univ3_AG_22+In_Univ3_AG_23
+In_Univ3_AG_24+In_Univ3_AG_25+In_Univ3_AG_2
6+In_Univ3_AG_27+In_Univ3_AG_28+In_Univ3_AG_
29+In_Univ3_AG_30+In_Univ3_AG_31 
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Univ_4   people In_Univ4_AG_22+In_Univ4_AG_23+In_Univ4_AG_24
+In_Univ4_AG_25+In_Univ4_AG_26+In_Univ4_AG_2
7+In_Univ4_AG_28+In_Univ4_AG_29+In_Univ4_AG_
30+In_Univ4_AG_31+In_Univ4_AG_32 
  
US_real_ann
ual wages 
  NOK/year GRAPH(TIME,1994<<@year>>,1<<year>>,{ 134392 ,1
45006 ,154420 ,166811 ,182179 ,193155 ,207291 ,22
2103 ,238465 ,251972 ,260428 ,272846 ,291355 ,308
763 ,339336,356303 ,374118 ,392824 ,412465 ,43308
8 ,454743 ,477480 ,501354 ,526422 ,552743 ,580380 
,609399 ,639869 ,671862 ,705455 ,740728 ,777764 ,8
16653 ,857485 ,900359 ,945377 ,992646 ,1042279 ,1
094393 ,1149112 ,1206568 ,1266896 ,1330241 ,1396
753 ,1466591 ,1539920 ,1616916 ,1697762 ,1782650 
,1871783 ,1965372 ,2063640 ,2166822 ,2275163 ,238
8922 ,2508368 ,2633786   //Min:-
1;Max:11//}<<NOK/year>>) 
  
USL gap   people ('indicated Total USL needed'-'total Employed 
USLF')+('F_Labors leaving rate_unskilled'+'total 
employed USLF exit')*TIMESTEP//positive means 
shortage of domestic labors, negative means surplus 
of domestic labors 
  
USL leaving 
for SLF 
20..68 people/year 1*'USL upgrading to SL'   
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USL 
upgrading to 
SL 
20..68 people/year 1*{0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/y
ear>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peopl
e/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<pe
ople/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<
<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>
,Online_Graduate_Turning_34,Online_Graduate_Tur
ning_35,Online_Graduate_Turning_36,Online_Gradu
ate_Turning_37,Online_Graduate_Turning_38,Online
_Graduate_Turning_39,0<<people/year>>,0<<people
/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/
year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<peo
ple/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<
people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,
0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/yea
r>>,0<<people/year>>,0<<people/year>>} 
  
USL_shortag
e 
  people DELAYINF('USL gap',3<<year>>,1)   
USL_to_Uni
v1 
20..68 people/year IF('Domestic 
LF_Unskilled'[20..68]>1<<people>>,'total unskilled to 
Univ1_AG_19 to 29',0<<people/year>>) 
  
USLF entry 
rate 
  people/year 'total entrants to USLF'   
USLF growth 
rate 
  year^-1 ('Total Unskilled LF'-'delayed total USLF')/'delayed 
total USLF'*1<<1/year>> 
  
W premium     'SL wages from pdty'/'nonTE wages from pdty'   
WAP   people ARRSUM('Domestic Idle SWAP'+'Domestic Idle 
USWAP')+'total SLF'+'Total Unskilled LF' 
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WAP 
inactive 
fraction 
    ARRSUM('Domestic Idle SWAP'+'Domestic Idle 
USWAP')/WAP 
  
WAP 
reactive rate 
  people/year ARRSUM('re-enter USLF')   
weight distr 1..4   {'distr_wage premium'/('distr_wage 
premium'+'distr_foregone earnings'+'distr_LT 
earnings'+'distr_ease of finding job'),'distr_foregone 
earnings'/('distr_wage premium'+'distr_foregone 
earnings'+'distr_LT earnings'+'distr_ease of finding 
job'),'distr_LT earnings'/('distr_wage 
premium'+'distr_foregone earnings'+'distr_LT 
earnings'+'distr_ease of finding job'),'distr_ease of 
finding job'/('distr_wage premium'+'distr_foregone 
earnings'+'distr_LT earnings'+'distr_ease of finding 
job')} 
{effect of wage premium, 
effect of expected foregone 
earnings growth, effect of 
relative expected LT earnings, 
ease of finding jobs} 
 
 
  
210 
 
Appendix D – Tertiary Entry Fraction of Different Age Groups 19 – 24 
 
 
  19 20 21 22 23 24 
1994 15 24 27 28 26 22 
1995 16 24 28 28 27 22 
1996 17 26 29 29 28 24 
1997 19 28 32 31 29 25 
1998 14 29 33 32 30 26 
1999 14 28 34 34 31 27 
2000 13 28 34 34 32 27 
2001 13 27 31 31 29 26 
2002 12 25 30 30 29 26 
2003 14 28 34 34 31 28 
2004 13 29 34 35 32 28 
2005 14 29 35 35 32 28 
2006 15 30 36 35 32 28 
2007 15 29 35 36 32 28 
 
Tertiary Entry Fraction of Different Individual Age Group 19 – 24 
Source:  OECD StatExtract 
 
 
  20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 
1994 26 12 5 3 
1995 26 12 5 3 
1996 27 12 5 3 
1997 29 12 5 3 
1998 30 13 5 3 
1999 31 13 5 3 
2000 31 14 5 4 
2001 29 14 6 4 
2002 28 15 6 5 
2003 31 16 7 5 
2004 31 16 7 5 
2005 32 16 7 5 
2006 32 16 7 5 
2007 32 15 7 5 
 
Tertiary Entry Fraction of Different 5-year-Age Group 20-39 
Source:  OECD StatExtract 
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Appendix E – Proportion of Tertiary Students who Benefits from Public 
Financial Aids in OECD Countries (2006/2007) 
 
 
Source: OECD Education at a Glance (2009) 
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Appendix F – Sick benefits to disability pension process in Norway 
 
The process from sick benefits to disability pension, 2005 
 
Time Scale Progress 
1 week Up to three days of self-declared absence (up 
to 8 days in inclusive workplace enterprises) 
2 weeks First medical certificate for 1-2 weeks; as of 
day 16, NIA pays sickness benefit. 
8 weeks Follow-up plan by the employer and the 
employee with support from Workplace 
Centres; no sanctions but control by the Labor 
Inspection Authority. 
9 months Dismissal possible after 6-12 months. 
12 months End of sickness benefit payment and 
application for medical rehabilitation benefit 
(disability benefit possible but unlikely at this 
stage). 
1.5 years Local NIA assessment as to whether medical 
rehabilitation needs continue (8-9 months 
medical rehab on average). 
2 years End of medical rehabilitation, start of 
vocational rehabilitation (if needed) with a 
rehabilitation allowance. 
3 years Typical time for transfer into disability 
benefit (but much earlier transfer possible if 
no prospect for improvement). 
3 years plus Vocational rehabilitation can often stretch 
over several years (three year maximum since 
recently, two years on average). 
 
Re-created from ―Sickness, Disability, and Work: Breaking the Barrier‖ (OECD, 2006a), 
page 62.
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Appendix G – ISCED Classification 
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